# 1AC

## 1AC---DPS


### 1AC---Crisis

#### Advantage 1 is Crisis:


#### Marx’s law of profitability explains cyclical recessions and renders capitalism unsustainable


Roberts 15 - London economist citing PhD economists (Michael, https://thenextrecession.wordpress.com/2015/12/29/the-marxist-theory-of-economic-crises-in-capitalism-part-two/, emuse)

Does Marx’s law fit the facts? Some Marxist critics of Marx’s law of profitability reckon that the law cannot be empirically proven or refuted because official statistics cannot be used to show Marx’s law in operation. But there are plenty of studies by Marxist economists that show otherwise. The key tests of the validity of the law in modern capitalist economies would be to show whether 1) the rate of profit falls over time as the organic composition of capital rises; 2) the rate of profit rises when the organic composition falls or when the rate of surplus value rises faster than the organic composition of capital; 3) the rate of profit rises, if there is sharp fall in the organic composition of capital as in a slump. These would be the empirical tests and there is plenty of empirical evidence for the US and world economy to show that the answer is yes to all these questions. For example, [Basu and Manolakos](http://gesd.free.fr/basumano.pdf) applied econometric analysis to the US economy between 1948 and 2007 and found that there was a secular tendency for the rate of profit to fall with a measurable decline of about 0.3 percent a year “after controlling for counter-tendencies.” In [my work on the US rate of profit,](http://gesd.free.fr/mr1213.pdf) I also found an average decline of 0.4 percent a year through 2009. And here is a figure by G Carchedi for the rise in the organic composition of capital (OCC) in the industrial sector of the US since 1947 versus the average rate of profit (ARP). It tells the same story. US ARP and OCC (i.e. C/V) versus the average rate of profit (ARP). It tells the same story. US ARP and OCC (i.e. C/V)


[](https://thenextrecession.files.wordpress.com/2015/12/arp.png)

There is a clear inverse correlation between a rising organic composition of capital and a falling rate of profit. Can Marx’s law explain crises? How does Marx’s law of profitability work as an explanation and forecast of slumps in capitalist economies? The law leads to a clear causal connection to regular and recurrent crises (slumps). It runs from falling profitability to falling profits to falling investment to falling employment and incomes. A bottom is reached when there is sufficient destruction of capital values (the writing off technology, the bankruptcy of companies, a reduction in wage costs) to raise profits and then profitability. Then rising profitability leads to rising investment again. The cycle of boom recommences and the whole ‘crap’ starts again, to use Marx’s colourful phrase. [There is a cycle of profit alongside the long-term tendency for the rate of profit to fall.](https://thenextrecession.files.wordpress.com/2013/07/cycles-in-capitalism.pdf)

[](https://thenextrecession.files.wordpress.com/2015/12/profit-cycle.png) The evidence of this causality between profit and investment is available. Jose Tapia Granados, using regression analysis, finds that, over 251 quarters of US economic activity from 1947, profits started declining long before investment did and that pre-tax profits can explain 44% of all movement in investment, while there is no evidence that investment can explain any movement in profits. I find a higher ‘Granger causality’ of 60% from annual changes in profit and investment (unpublished) and a correlation of 0.67 for the period since 2000. And see this by G Carchedi ([Carchedi Presentation](https://thenextrecession.files.wordpress.com/2015/06/carchedi-presentation.pptx)). In the period leading up to the Great Recession 2008-9, we can see the causality visually for US profits, investment and real GDP in the graphic below. The mass of US corporate profit peaks in mid-2006, investment and GDP follows two years later. Profits turn back up in late 2008 and investment follows one year later.

[](https://thenextrecession.files.wordpress.com/2015/12/profits-lead.png)

There are two basic regularities shown by the data: that a change in profits tends to be followed next year by a change in investment in the same direction; and that a change in investment is usually followed in a few years by changes in profits in the opposite direction. Thus we have a cycle. From these results, the “regularity” of the business cycle, and the fact that profitability stagnated in 2013 and declined in 2014 (and now the mass of profits in 2015) after growing between 2008 and 2012, it can be concluded with some confidence that a recession of the US economy, which will be also part of a world economic crisis like the Great Recession, will occur again in the next few years. And Marx’s law of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall makes an even more fundamental prediction: that the capitalist mode of production will not be eternal, that it is transitory in the history of human social organisation. The law of the tendency predicts that, over time, there will be a fall in the rate of profit globally, delivering more crises of a devastating character. Work has been done by modern Marxist analysis that confirms that the world rate of profit has fallen over the last 150 years. See the graph below ([data from Esteban Maito](https://thenextrecession.files.wordpress.com/2015/05/maito-esteban-the-historical-transience-of-capital-the-downward-tren-in-the-rate-of-profit-since-xix-century.pdfhttp:/gesd.free.fr/mrwrate.pdf) and ‘doctored’ by me).

[](https://thenextrecession.files.wordpress.com/2015/12/world-rate-of-profit-maito.png) Maito’s data for the 19th century have recently been questioned ([DUMENIL-LEVY on MAITO](https://thenextrecession.files.wordpress.com/2015/12/dumenil-levy-on-maito.pdf)), but in a recent work using different sources and countries, I find a similar trend for the post-1945 period globally ([Revisiting a world rate of profit June 2015](https://thenextrecession.files.wordpress.com/2015/12/revisiting-a-world-rate-of-profit-june-2015.pdf)). And earlier groundbreaking work by Minqi Li and colleagues, as well as by Dave Zachariah, show a similar trend. As Maito concludes: “The tendency of the rate of profit to fall and its empirical confirmation highlights the historically limited nature of capitalist production. If the rate of profit measures the vitality of the capitalist system, the logical conclusion is that it is getting closer to its endpoint. There are many ways that capital can attempt to overcome crises and regenerate constantly. Periodic crises are specific to the capitalist mode of production and allow, ultimately, a partial recovery of profitability. This is a characteristic aspect of capital and the cyclical nature of the capitalist economy. But the periodic nature of these crises has not stopped the downward trend of the rate of profit over the long term. So the arguments claiming that there is an inexhaustible capacity of capital to restore the rate of profit and its own vitality and which therefore considers the capitalist mode of production as a natural and a-historical phenomenon, are refuted by the empirical evidence.” So the law predicts that, as the organic composition of capital rises globally, the rate of profit will fall despite counteracting factors and despite successive crises (which temporarily help to restore profitability). This shows that capital as a mode of production and social relations is transient. Capitalism has not always been here and it has ultimate limits, namely capital itself. It has a ‘use-by-date’. That is the essence of the law of profitability for Marx. Alternative theories This is not to deny other factors in capitalist crises. The role of credit is an important part of Marxist crisis theory and indeed, as the tendency of the rate of profit to fall engenders countertendencies, one of increasing importance is the expansion of credit and the switching of surplus value into investment in fictitious capital rather than productive capital to raise profitability temporarily, but with eventually disastrous consequences, as The Great Recession shows ([The Great Recession](https://thenextrecession.files.wordpress.com/2013/08/the-great-recession.pdf); [Debt matters](https://thenextrecession.files.wordpress.com/2012/11/debt-matters.pdf)). Alternative theories of crisis like underconsumption, or the lack of effective demand, are taken from theories from the reactionary Thomas Malthus and the radical Sismondi in the early 19th century and then taken up by Keynes in the 1930s and by modern inequality theorists like Stiglitz and [post-Keynesian economists](http://bilbo.economicoutlook.net/blog/?p=15854). But lack of demand and rising inequality cannot explain the regularity of crises or predict the next one. These theories do not have strong empirical backing either ([Does inequality causes crises](https://thenextrecession.files.wordpress.com/2015/11/does-inequality-causes-crises.pdf)). Professor Heinrich, after concluding that Marx did not have a theory of crisis and dropped the law of profitability, [does offer a vague one of his own](https://thenextrecession.wordpress.com/2015/05/19/the-two-michaels-heinrich-and-roberts-in-berlin-dogmatism-versus-doubt/): namely capital accumulates and produces more means of production blindly. This gets out of line with consumption demand from workers. So a ‘gap’ develops that has to be filled by credit, but somehow this cannot hold up things indefinitely and production then collapses. Well, it is a sort of a theory, but pretty much the same as the underconsumption (overproduction) theory that Heinrich himself dismisses and [Marx dismissed 150 years ago.](http://www.mcg-j.org/swp_arc/english/etheory/economics/eprm29-2.htm) It seems way less convincing or empirically supported that Marx’s own theory of crisis based on the law of profitability. No other theory, whether from mainstream economics or from heterodox economics, can explain recurrent and regular crises and offer a clear objective foundation for the transience of the capitalist system.

#### Profitability will hit zero by 2054---but converging tipping points ensure collapse much sooner

Reese 20 - author of Socialism or Extinction and The End of Capitalism: The Thought of Henryk Grossman (Ted, <https://www.patreon.com/posts/socialism-is-now-37023695>, emuse)

That capitalism is unsustainable has long been empirically observable. Most obviously, manufacturing costs and consumer commodity prices are trending towards zero. For example, whereas the world’s fastest supercomputer in 1975 was worth $5m ($32m in 2013’s money), the price of an iPhone 4 released in 2010 with the equivalent performance was $400. Aerospace companies producing propulsion systems in 2010 for $24m in 24 months are now 3-D printing their engines for $2,000 in two weeks. And rather than having globalised supply chains, such companies foresee the entire rocket being built in ‘at home’ [7]. While ‘offshoring’ manufacturing jobs to the ‘low-income economies’ is said to save up to 65% on labour costs, replacing human workers with robots saves up to 90% [8]. Unlike workers, robots do not need wages, breaks, sick days, holidays or pensions. And they work quicker in the first place, too. While industrialisation, particularly in Asia, saw 83 ‘developing countries’ achieving growth rates by the early 2000s that were more than twice the rate of the ‘developed’ OECD members, the rest of the world has seen the same opportunity end ‘prematurely’. Latin America and Africa are already deindustrialising (shifting to services-based workforces) – from a much lower starting point than Asia [9]. Whereas industrialisation peaked in western European countries at income levels of around $14,000, India and many sub-Saharan African countries appear to have reached their peak manufacturing employment at income levels of $700 (both at 1990 levels) [10]. Not only do robots and 3D-printing increasingly remove the incentive for capitalists based in the US and Europe to exploit workers overseas, the incentive to exploit transit workers – who add production time/value to the commodities they transport around the world – is also removed [11]. The emergence of cellular agriculture (lab-grown food), with falling prices and rising quality estimated to see the beef industry go bust by 2035, is going to have the same effect [12]. For the past 145 years, the imperialist powers – the US, Britain, France, Germany and Japan – have been increasingly compelled to export capital (invest) overseas in order to expand and cheapen their exploitable labour bases, thereby sustaining their own economies by living off profits generated by commodity-producing workers in the ‘developing world’. Britain, for example, exported capital equal to 560% of its GDP in 2014 [13]. Between 1980 and 2012 the net outflows of capital from ‘developing’ countries being funnelled into ‘developed’, ie imperialist nations, totalled $16.3 trillion [14]. But the economic relation that underpins imperialism is now unravelling. If prices are trending historically towards zero, so too must the ‘global’ aggregate rate of profit. According to Estaban Maito’s estimates, it fell in a secular trend from 43% in the 1870s to 17% in the 2000s, and is (as of 2014) on course to reach zero around 2054 [15]. Automation and absolute overaccumulation But as the criminally under-appreciated Polish Marxist Henryk Grossman warned in 1929, capitalism is bound to collapse “much earlier than a zero rate of profit” [16], because capital, inherently, does not accumulate harmoniously – the process tends to break down. Overaccumulated capital – surplus capital that has become unprofitable to reinvest – is inevitable. It causes every recession, a partial and temporary breakdown, and is at the same time an underproduction of surplus value; ie, too little profit has been generated to preserve and expand the value of total capital. (Surplus value, or surplus labour time, is the amount of value the capitalist appropriates from the worker, who, on average, keeps only what they need to subsist, their necessary labour time. Profit then is essentially unpaid labour, which tends to increase with innovation. Hence falling prices.) Debt therefore rises to ‘fill the gap’ caused by this underproduction, but can only cover the lag in profit for so long before recession becomes inevitable, since investors are bound to withdraw funds when growth becomes too stagnant, channelling this new surplus instead into tax havens, land and the competitive gambling of speculation that generates financial ‘bubbles’. Each breakdown is overcome through the sufficient destruction, cheapening and centralisation of capital. But the resulting innovation means fewer workers tend to remain employed relative to total capital. Despite the increased rate of exploitation that temporarily lifts profit rates, the next overaccumulation tends to be greater than the one which preceded it. There is no such thing as ‘technological unemployment’ though – alongside surplus capital grows unexploitable surplus labour (unemployment). Clearly, the closer we get to the completion of the historical trend towards fully-automated production, the closer capitalism gets to its final breakdown. Production is already highly automated. As James Manyika, McKinsey Global Institute director, said in June 2017: “Find a factory anywhere in the world built in the past five years  –  not many people work there.” But the services jobs – relatively unproductive since they tend to handle near-finished commodities, if they handle commodities at all – that replaced manufacturing work are now becoming increasingly automated, too. In Britain, where services count for 80% of economic activity, the number of supermarket checkout assistants fell by 25.3% between 2011 and 2017. At the end of March, after most countries had entered lockdown, almost half of company bosses in 45 countries said they were speeding up plans to automate their businesses. [17] Innovation always takes place most rapidly during a recession, when prices are low. With lockdown turning the home into the place of work, Microsoft could boast of having discovered a fresh way of reducing labour costs and extending absolute labour time as it announced “two years’ worth of digital transformation in two months”. As The Guardian reported at the end of April: “Bank branches were already closing in droves before the epidemic, but here is the perfect excuse to shut more. And that’s not all. The authors of an Oxford University study thought that by 2035 it would be possible to automate 86% of restaurant jobs, three-quarters of retail jobs, and 59% of recreation jobs. By unlucky coincidence, those are among the very industries hardest hit by an epidemic now demanding quantum leaps in efficiency if some companies are to avoid going under.” [18] But automation is abolishing the source of profit, ie, commodity-producing human labour. To be more precise, automation is the final expression of capitalism’s self-abolishing tendency. As Marx wrote in 1858: “As soon as labour in the direct form has ceased to be the great wellspring of wealth, labour time ceases and must cease to be its measure... Capital thus works towards its own dissolution as the form dominating production.” [19] But this dissolution does not happen in a seamless falling rate of profit towards zero, since – as explained, and as indicated by both zig-zagging profit rates and the recessions that tend to strike roughly every 10 years – capital does not accumulate harmoniously. As the Soviet Russian philosopher Genrikh Volkov wrote in 1967, increasing automation eventually leads to “the breakdown, instead of the consolidation, of the existing relations ... of the private ownership of the means of production…. Its consummation is incompatible with capitalism.” [20] In Capital, Marx anticipates an eventual “absolute overaccumulation” of capital. “The limit of capitalist production is the excess time of the labourers,” says Marx. [21] But stretching the rate of exploitation of the working class to anywhere near 100% is obviously impossible – for starters, capital cannot even afford to exploit an ever-increasing part of it, a surplus population that grows alongside surplus capital, while workers in the growing services sector are also relatively unproductive. “As the capitalist mode of production develops, an ever larger quantity of capital is required to employ the same, let alone an increased, amount of labour-power.” But there are other limits too: “As soon as capital would, therefore, have grown in such a ratio to the labouring population that neither the absolute working time supplied by this population, nor the relative surplus working time, could be expanded any further (this last would not be feasible at any rate in the case where the demand for labour were so strong that there were a tendency for wages to rise); at a point, therefore when the increased capital produced just as much, or even less, surplus value than it did before its increase, there would be absolute overproduction of capital.” [22] From zero interest rates to worldwide hyperinflation If the rate of profit is on course to hit zero around 2054, but the final breakdown is bound to happen much earlier than that, it at least becomes impossible to dismiss the theory that we are entering this uncharted territory right now. But empirically, there also seem to be several approaching economic limits or ‘tipping points’ which cannot be converging at the same time merely by coincidence. For starters, average GDP growth rates in what the World Bank defines as ‘high income countries’ are already closing in on zero, having fallen every decade for the past half century: from 5.59% in the 1960s, to 4.15% in the 1970s, 2.93% in the 1980s, 2.35% in the 1990s, and 1.78% in the 2000s. The figure rose slightly to 1.97% in the years 2010-2017, but this minor reprieve has already proven to be unsustainable. GDP in the imperialist nations, though, is inflated by the profits leached from the rest of the world, since much of the profit from each commodity goes towards the GDP of the nation in which it is sold, rather than where it was made. [23] Productivity growth in the high income countries has itself, since 2011, spluttered below 1%. Aggregate global debt (the total debt of governments, corporations and households), already mountainous before the Great Recession, has hit new heights, indicating record-high overaccumulation [24]. According to the IMF, global debt fell by 1.5% of GDP in 2017 compared to a year earlier, but remained more than 11 percentage points of GDP above the previous high in 2009. In June 2019, the IMF said global debt stood officially at $184 trillion, 225% of global GDP. This averages out at $86,000 for every person in the world, 2.5 times average annual per capita income. But according to financial analyst Ron Surz, once ‘off-the-books’ net obligations such as social security and health care are taken into account, official figures are understated by a factor of 2.5, making actual global debt $460 trillion, 560% of GDP and $215,000 per person (as of July 2019) [25]. He put the US figure not at the official 105%, but 390%. Even that is without taking into account the serious accounting problem in the US Department of Defense. In 2016, before Trump was elected, the department’s Inspector General said he could not properly track $6.5 trillion in defence spending. An academic study looking at the years 1998-2015 later put the figure at $21 trillion [26]. The US defence budget has ballooned to $748bn as the long-time imperialist superpower scrambles to hold on to its dying empire. Another financial analyst, Simon Thorpe, calculated in 2015 that global debt was 2.5 times higher than the global money supply (up from two times higher in 2013) [27]. This is despite the fact that the US’s monetary base exploded from $842bn in August 2008 to $2.9 trillion in January 2013 and then $4 trillion in August 2014. The sheer amount of debt is unsustainable since the tax base needed to pay it is obviously shrinking in relative terms. Though it has been socialised, it is now simply too large to work off. Something the capitalist state can do to ease the government’s ability to pay its debt is reduce interest rates, which also makes borrowing cheaper and stimulates lending, maintaining the circulation of money. But lifting the economy out of recession usually takes a 4-5% base interest rate cut. In the US and across Europe base rates are already at zero, having been cut by around only 2%. Central banks have said going negative would make the banks unviable. Therefore, it is highly probable – lockdown or no lockdown – that capitalism, as Pento says, is soon going to spiral for the first time in its history into a crisis of worldwide hyperinflation, since rates will have to start going back up to re-incentivise bond holding and sustain the tax base. But debt-to-GDP – already at record highs and rising – will surge, and so the tax base will continue to shrink; bondholders will realise that what they are owed cannot be repaid and increasingly transfer their funds into hard assets, especially precious metals. The only way to avoid hyperinflation is for states to default on their debt through hyperdeflation – which the record bailouts imply they are understandably trying to avoid – but that would happen after hyperinflation anyway. The US’s national annual deficit is now expected to soar from $984bn in 2019 to $3.8 trillion in 2020. The US has never meaningfully defaulted on its debt but, historically, countries that have failed to get their debt-to-GDP back below 90% have gone on to default, meaning they have had to go to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for a bail out (usually in the form of high-interest loans and on the condition of privatising state assets). But given that the US dollar is the world’s reserve currency – all oil must be traded in US dollars, for example, making the solvency of all countries dependent on their ability to purchase US dollars – the IMF effectively is the US. The US dollar has lost more than 96% of its value, its purchasing power, since 1913. The figure is more than 99.5% for British pound sterling, compared to 1694, the year it was founded [28]. This is why negative rates would make the banks unviable – they would finish off the depreciation of fiat currency. Many countries, including Russia and China, have started diversifying their foreign currency reserves in the past few years, meaning the main source of financing US debt is disappearing. Even the biggest US bank, JP Morgan, told its clients in August 2019 to sell the dollar. The world economy will likely soon be without a reserve currency. While smaller economies have survived defaults through bailouts in the past, the US and western European countries are the richest and most developed in the world. They represent monopoly capitalism, or imperialism, the highest stage of capitalism. As mentioned, with their workforces now largely services-based, the imperialist nations have been largely living off of profit produced by the labour of commodity-producing workers in Africa, Asia and South America. If the imperialist economies collapse, it’s because the whole system has collapsed. Indeed, as of 7 March, investors had already pulled $83bn from developing markets, the largest capital outflow ever recorded, according to the Institute of International Finance. If all these converging factors – near-zero prices, flat productivity growth, unsustainably high debt, zero interest rates, exhausted currencies – do not constitute a final breakdown of the system, then what will?

#### Mounting dysfunction drives imperialism and inter-capitalist competition---risks nuclear war

Reese 20 - author of Socialism or Extinction and The End of Capitalism: The Thought of Henryk Grossman (Ted, <https://www.amazon.com/Socialism-Extinction-Automation-Capitalist-Breakdown-ebook/dp/B081FHF2ZQ>, emuse)

We have seen that the crisis is intensifying competition between the major imperialist and capitalist powers. The counter-tendencies have failed to prevent the onset of the next crisis. An even greater devaluation of capital and labour power is required. The death and destruction wrought by war is the ultimate source of devaluation and therefore the most important counter-tendency. If war wasn’t an inevitability under capitalism, militarism would be done away with since it is funded through taxation that could otherwise be put towards productive capital. Many Marxists have failed to grasp this. Luxemburg, for example, claimed that “from the purely economic point of view, militarism is a pre-eminent means for the realisation of surplus-value; it is in itself a sphere of accumulation”.[496] Again, her analysis was based on circulation, not production. Grossman counters that “this is how things may appear from the standpoint of individual capital as military supplies have always been the occasion for rapid enrichment. But from the standpoint of the total capital, militarism is a sphere of unproductive consumption. Instead of being saved, values are pulverised. Far from being a sphere of accumulation, militarism slows down accumulation. By means of indirect taxation a major share of the income of the working class which might have gone into the hands of the capitalists as surplus value is seized by the state and spent mainly for unproductive purposes.” On the other hand, though, apart from natural resources, the main resource the capitalists are fighting over in a war is human labour, enough of which is not available at home. What better way to decimate the wages of this new source of surplus value than through warfare? And as well as the destruction of capital value, innovation is accelerated by the arms race, leading to new use-values for the post- war civilian economy and furthering devaluation. Idealists claimed the fall of the Soviet Union would bring about a new era of world peace. The destruction of Yugoslavia, Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia, Libya, Syria and Yemen since then shows both that they did not appreciate the nature of imperialism or the protection the Soviet Union afforded to countries threatened by imperialism. Who is next for daring to seek independence? Venezuela? Iran? Russia and China have been encircled by NATO in the biggest build- up of military forces since the Second World War. As the crisis of accumulation deepens, the size and frequency of wars tend to grow. In the wake of 9/11, the author Zoltan Grossman circulated a list, based on Congressional Records and The Library of Congress Congressional Research Service, of 133 US military interventions from 1890 to 2001. The average per year is 1.15 before, and 1.29 after, the Second World War. After the Cold War, from late 1989, the figure rises to 2.0. The Democrat Barack Obama replaced the gung-ho Republican warmonger George W Bush in 2008 promising ‘hope’ and ‘change’. But by the end of his second term in 2016, US special operators could be found in 70% – 138 – of the world’s nations, a huge jump of 130% since Bush left office. In 2016 alone, the Obama administration sanctioned the use of at least 26,171 bombs. “This means that every day last year, the US military blasted combatants or civilians overseas with 72 bombs; that’s three bombs every hour, 24 hours a day,” Medea Benjamin of the anti-war CodePink wrote in The Guardian.[500] In 2017, Trump – who in his April 2016 foreign policy speech said that “war and aggression will not be my first instinct” because he wanted to spend the money instead domestically to ‘make America great again’ – outstripped Obama’s 2016 figure by 9,000. Given that many of these wars are fought in an alliance of the imperialist powers, mainly through NATO, much analysis on the Left makes the mistake of thinking that inter-imperialist rivalry no longer exists. This follows on from Kautsky who, because he did not see war as arising from economic necessity, came up with a theory of “ultra- imperialism” whereby the imperialists would realise that it was not in their interests to continue the First World War and would therefore unite to “peaceably redivide the world". Something like this – to a limited extent – did temporarily emerge, but only after the Second World War, only in collective opposition to the Soviet Union, and during a period in which capitalism was recovering in the wake of the war’s devaluation of capital, meaning competition had temporarily diminished. But the barbaric aggression of the wars on the Middle East is symptomatic of deepening capitalist crisis and intensifying rivalry. Through their opposition to the 2003 war on Iraq, France and Germany showed that they are not subordinate to US interests. In the 1990s, TotalFinaElf, France’s huge oil firm, secured the contract to develop Iraq’s southern Majnoon and Nahr Umar oil fields, containing as much as 25% of the country's reserves. German firms were the market leaders in supplying sensitive dual-use technology to Iraq in the years before the 1991 Persian Gulf war, and they had been bidding for more civilian commercial contracts. Khidir Hamza, an Iraqi defector, called Germany “the hub of Iraq's military purchases in the 1980s”. France and Germany did not want new competition. Between the start of 2002 to March 2003 the dollar fell by 20% against the euro. The US had to respond to this: its international economic domination is bound up with the dollar’s strength as the world’s currency anchor. The dollar’s dominance as the main currency for foreign exchange enables it to blackmail countries that do not yield to its demands. Ultimately, the strength of a currency reflects the productivity and size of the economy behind it. Trump’s administration has claimed that Germany is using its currency to “exploit” both its neighbours and the US, sparking fears of a currency war. The US made the desperate accusation that Germany is “under-consuming” goods and services from other countries. At the 2010 G20 summit in Seoul, the US made an unsuccessful attempt to limit the size of current account surpluses to 4% of GDP. Germany’s surplus overtook China’s in absolute size in 2017 and as a share of GDP became much larger. The IMF put Germany’s 2017 surplus as 8.1% of GDP and China’s at 1.6%. The EU’s surplus as a whole in 2017 was $387.1bn. In contrast, the US current account deficit was $462bn in 2017, bigger only than Britain’s $91.4bn. The deficit was 2.5% of GDP in the first quarter, up from 2.4% in the fourth quarter. Bush warned that the US would “neither forgive nor forget” if France continued to oppose the war on Iraq. US Secretary of State Donald Rumsfeld accused Austria of blocking US troop movements from Germany to Italy and said the US was considering bringing home 100,000 troops stationed in Europe (70,000 in Germany) or relocating them to Eastern Europe. He threatened sanctions for “one reason only: to harm the German economy”. At the time, the US controlled 31.5% of world output to the EU’s 26%. However in 2004 ten additional countries were scheduled to join the 15 EU member states, a combination that would match the size of the US’s economy and exceed its population. FRFI – one of the few left-wing publications in Britain to anticipate the potential for conflict between the US and EU – reported in 2003 that total EU FDI already amounted to 52.5% of the world total, nearly 2.5 times that of the US. Over the period 1980-2001, the US share of the global total has halved. The massive rise in the US’s military spending has been necessitated by the need to reverse the decline of its economic dominance – to reiterate, if it doesn’t reverse this it won’t be able to valorise its capital. The Department of Defense’s base budget grew by 31% between 2000 and 2014. An $82bn hike to $716bn in 2018 represented an increase that by itself was larger than the entire defence budget of every country on earth, save China. Trump called the Defense Department’s annual budget “crazy” and proposed a 5% cut, but then committed to a $750bn budget for 2019. Who is really in charge? US military spending is at least 10 times the size of Russia’s, and four times the size of China’s. This is the same Department of Defense with a serious existing accounting problem. In 2016, before Trump was elected, the department’s Inspector General said he could not properly track $6.5 trillion in defence spending. An academic study looking at the years 1998-2015 later put the figure at $21 trillion. Clearly this is unsustainable. As Engels says, “the triumph of force is based on the production of arms, and this in turn on production in general”. US manufacturing output in the 1960s, at the time of the Vietnam War, constituted 27% of the economy and provided 24% of employment. In 2003 manufacturing amounted to 13.8% of its GDP, falling to 12.5% in 2015, and 10.5% of employment, falling to 8.8% in 2013. The US industrial base is shrinking and with it the manufacturing and engineering capacity to achieve military domination of the world. In November 2004 Le Monde Diplomatique reported that, “Some new (EU) states are large arms producers and exporters. The EU is now home to more than 400 companies in 23 countries manufacturing small arms and light weapons – hardly less than the US.” China’s manufacturing sector is now almost as large as those of the US, Japan and Germany combined. When the US invaded Iraq in 2003 its military expenditure was almost $400bn; Iraq’s was $1.4bn, 0.35% of the US’s. In violation of the Iraqi constitution and international law the US-UK Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) “laid off hundreds of thousands of Iraqi workers, virtually eliminated trade tariffs and enacted laws that radically alter Iraq’s economy. Order 39, decreed by CPA head Paul Bremer on September 20 2003, abolished Iraq's ban on foreign investment, allowing foreigners to own up to 100% of all sectors except natural resources. Over 200 state-owned enterprises, including electricity, telecommunications and pharmaceuticals have been privatised. Iraq's highest tax rate has been lowered from 45% to a flat rate of 15%. Although foreign ownership of land remains illegal, companies or individuals will be allowed to lease properties for up to 40 years.” The extraction of Iraq’s oil was also illegal. In 2011 government documents leaked to The Independent revealed that in November 2002, five months before the invasion, the UK Foreign Office invited BP to talks about opportunities in Iraq “post regime change”. Labour’s Baroness Symons, the then Trade Minister, promised BP that she would lobby the Bush administration because the oil giant feared it was being “locked out” of deals that Washington was quietly negotiating with the French and Russian governments and their energy firms. Control over territory, oil and oil transhipment routes is of paramount importance. With around 60% of the world’s oil reserves, the Middle East has been the key battleground. But this rivalry is playing out all over the world, in South America, Asia, Africa and, since the fall of the USSR, central and eastern Europe, which was identified by the UNCTAD World Investment Report 2002 as “a stable and promising region for FDI”. China, whose contribution to global GDP was expected to eclipse that of the US in 2018, is a particular concern to the traditional powers because its strategy of offering low- or even interest-free loans in exchange for fixed-price sales of primary commodities makes it a more attractive business partner to underdeveloped countries who have been bled dry by high interest loans from the IMF. The US only has intimidation and force left to offer in response. In 2008, for example, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) reached a deal with China for roads, railways, clinics, hospitals, schools and two new universities worth $6bn. In exchange, China was given the right to extract 12 million tonnes of copper and cobalt over 25 years. In 2004, when Angola was reluctant to accept the terms of an IMF loan, China stepped in with a no-strings-attached $2bn. An Angolan minister said relations with China “not only allowed us to obtain large loans, but most importantly it forced the West to treat us with more respect”. China has overtaken Britain, France and the US as a trading partner with Africa. In 2017, China’s trade with Africa was worth $170bn, four-times larger than US-Africa trade. China invested $125bn in Africa in the decade to 2016 and committed to $60bn more over the next three years. In 2017 China’s trade with Latin America reached $244bn, again exceeding that of the US. China’s dominance in manufacturing has forced Latin American countries to deindustrialise somewhat and focus on producing primary commodities; but China’s investments have also had the effect of strengthening their currencies relative to the dollar. In July 2016, the RAND Corporation think tank warned that, whereas the US would have been capable of achieving a quick and decisive victory with minimal losses in a war with China in 2015, China’s improving anti-access and area-denial (A2AD) capabilities meant that a war in 2025 would instead be “prolonged and destructive, yet inconclusive”. The earlier part of that prediction seemed optimistic, given that the US became bogged down in the face of resistance in Iraq and Afghanistan for years when it expected quick, decisive victories in both, against forces inferior to China’s. Indeed, in March 2019 a RAND analyst said that its war game simulations showed that “when we fight Russia and China, blue gets its ass handed to it”. He said it would cost an extra $24bn a year to turn things around. Chinese and Russian opposition to US deployments of anti-missile systems in Asia has resulted in their greater military cooperation. However, Russia is using its position in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) to try and contain Chinese economic expansion in Central Asia, where it has regional ambitions of its own. As Trevor Rayne wrote in FRFI: “The US turns to alliances with Japan, India, the Philippines and Australia to confront China, but China offers them investments and better trade deals. If it has to the US ruling class will resort to military force to prevent China ejecting it from its dominant position in the world. Competition between the imperialist powers may be limited to geopolitical manoeuvring, ideological and cyber warfare and negotiation table diplomacy for now, but that cannot last forever. At some point the capitalist crisis will become so deep that the imperialist powers will be forced into direct confrontation with each other. The overaccumulation of capital will have become so great that the only way to sufficiently devalue capital and labour power will be through global conflagration. This tendency expresses itself in increasing competition between the imperialist powers as they vie to attain dominance – that is, to apportion losses to one another, to seize each other’s capital and resources by any means. This is what happened in the 20th century. Two world wars, the Great Depression and fascism were the counter-tendencies and crisis measures required over a span of 41 years to keep the accumulation process going and eventually revive it to a healthy enough level to restore political stability. Kautsky – because he believed accumulation was harmonious – claimed that absolute capitalist breakdown would be brought about inevitably by world war, which in his view would happen only because of uncivilised ruling classes.[513] On the other side of the same coin, Bukharin and Varga believed the Second World War would bring about the completion of the world revolution. This perhaps partly explains some of the controversial decisions taken by the Communist International after 1929, when it effectively ordered its national sections in Europe to take social democratic routes to socialism.[514] Grossman says: “It would be useless to search Bukharin for any other cause of the breakdown of capitalism than the ravages created by war.... If like Bukharin, we expect the breakdown of capitalism to flow from a second round of imperialist wars, then it is necessary to point out that wars are not peculiar to the imperialist stage of capitalism. They stem from the essence of capitalism as such, during all its stages, and have been a constant symptom of capital since its historical inception.... far from being a threat to capitalism, wars are a means of prolonging the existence of the capitalist system as a whole.” Grossman was at pains to show that Kautsky’s was a subjective analysis and that the opposite was true: that massive overaccumulation brought about a systemic breakdown and world war followed necessarily because it was the only way to sufficiently devalue capital, to “ward off imminent collapse” and “create a breathing space” for accumulation to restart. Grossman cites the figure from Wladimir Woytinsky’s 1925 book The World In Numbers that “around 35% of the wealth of mankind was destroyed and squandered in the four years” of the First World War, which had been preceded by a worldwide Long Depression – like the one we’re experiencing now – a series of economic ‘panics’ in the US, and intensifying inter-imperialist rivalries over trade routes and colonial territories. By the end of the war, says Grossman, the mass of living labour “confronted a reduced capital, and this created new scope for accumulation”. And yet it wasn’t enough – the 1929 Wall Street Crash followed, “a continuation of the unresolved economic crisis preceding World War One”, as Mattick says.[519] The New Deal attempted to resolve the crisis in the US and fascism attempted to resolve it in Germany (the equivalent of a New Deal in Germany through the SPD’s reforms having already failed before 1929). Neither worked. It would take an even more destructive global war to end the depression. This after Kautsky had claimed in 1927 that capitalism stood, “from a purely economic point of view, stronger than ever”.[520] The First World War – “legalised slaughter” in the apt words of Harry Patch, the last surviving combat soldier of that war from any country – killed 37 million people. The Second World War killed between 70 million and 85 million, 3% of the 1940 world population of an estimated 2.3 billion. The equivalent today from a world population of 7.53 billion would be 226 million. But given that today’s total accumulation and overaccumulation are considerably greater than before World War Two, it follows that it would take a considerably greater level of destruction to – again, temporarily – resolve the crisis. Given that and the fact that every major war following economic breakdown is decided only by total war (the US Civil War, the Peninsular War and the Crimean War being other prime examples), it could be argued that the amount of destruction required is so high now that today’s deepening crisis may at some point necessitate nothing short of a nuclear exchange between the imperialist powers. The Second World War ended with the US dropping the A-bomb on Japan, after all. If World War Three was not sufficiently destructive, then a bigger crisis would follow necessitating World War Four, just as World War Two followed World War One. And of course a Fourth World War would be necessitated at some point anyway. This is all assuming that the crisis that preceded a World War Three wasn’t the final breakdown, the absolute historical limit of capital accumulation. If it were then no amount of destruction could save capitalism. As we said earlier, this is surely now the case – there can be no 1945 productivity boom that breathes another century of life into the system, for automation has already all but abolished the law of value. The current arms race is in fact already accelerating the development of automation and therefore the rate of profit’s historical fall towards zero. We therefore assert that – aside from the fact that a world war today would end life on Earth and destroy the climate for good – even a world war cannot save capitalism this time. Rather than trying to destroy itself in order to renew itself this time, capitalism is now preparing to either destroy or wind itself up for good. Trade wars will continue to intensify. Protectionism becomes an increasingly inevitable reflex as nations attempt to defend domestic and overseas assets; combined with stagnant productivity, this tends to manifest politically in a parochial, ‘anti-globalisation’ nationalism, ie right-wing populism or proto-fascism, as capitalists which rely more on the domestic market – determining their conservatism – finally gain the upper-hand over the more liberal exporting sectors, only to deepen the overall economic crisis by making trade increasingly expensive and centralising capital into yet fewer hands. As Michael Pettis wrote in the FT in 2009, the fact that “nearly everyone agrees that a world that retreats into direct and indirect forms of trade protection is a world that is worse off... should not allay our worries. In the 1930s, it was also well understood that the crisis would be exacerbated by plunging international trade. This did not stop a descent into the protectionism which put the ‘Great’ into the Great Depression.” In February 2019, a senior European Commission economist warned that a Third World War is an increasingly “high probability” due to the “disintegration of global capitalism”.[523] Professor Hanappi, Jean Monnet Chair for Political Economy of European Integration , noted that the emerging trade wars, massive growth of military spending and return of ‘populism’ bear unnerving similarities with trends that beset the world before the outbreak of the first two world wars. Marx wrote that as soon as capital feels itself threatened it will “seek refuge in other forms”, which appear to perfect its rule as capital “through curbs on free competition”; although the curbs on competition “appear to complete the mastery of capital, they are at the same time, by curbing free competition, the heralds of its dissolution, and of the dissolution of the mode of production based on it”.[524] This applies to both the monopolistic stage of capitalism and the inevitability of protectionism. As mentioned, in 2015-16, the G20 economies introduced a record number of trade-restrictive measures. Globalisation was in retreat before Brexit and Trump, because its ability to expand capital is increasingly exhausted. Just as protectionism and trade wars were precursors of the first two world wars, Brexit and Trump’s trade wars threaten to be precursors of a Third World War. Just as the first two world wars were fought between the biggest imperialist rivals, so would a third. That would mean a conflict between the US and its strongest competitor, the German-led EU. On 6 November 2018 France President Emmanuel Macron called for the creation of a “true European army” so that the EU could defend itself from “China, Russia and even the United States of America”, adding: “When I see President Trump announcing that he’s quitting a major disarmament treaty[525] which was formed after the 1980s Euro-missile crisis that hit Europe, who is the main victim? Europe and its security.” Germany already provides the most troops for the UN’s so-called peacekeeping missions. Building on the Permanent Structured Cooperation on security and defense (PESCO) agreement – which allows co-operation on joint military projects for 25 EU member states, established through the Lisbon Treaty in December 2017 – the European Commission provisionally agreed the founding of a €13bn European Defence Fund (EDF) in February. This is to allow joint R&D projects for European companies. Though no formal agreement is to come into effect until November 2019, it is already known that the fund will exclude both post-Brexit Britain and the US. In response the US complained that the moves undermine the NATO alliance and threatened sanctions on EU firms if either project goes ahead. The EU told the the US not to concern itself with Europe's defence plans. In December 2019 Macron said NATO was already “brain dead”, because “you have no co-ordination of decision-making whatsoever between the US and its NATO allies”. In reality, Europe is still reliant upon the US in military matters, a point made clear by, for example, the dominance of US firms in international contracts or the US’s role in NATO. Accordingly, the EU is, to some degree, split upon the US’s INF withdrawal, with key US allies Britain and Poland offering their unwavering support for the move. While disagreement in Europe over the Treaty itself is small, this reflects broader splits within the EU imperialist bloc, more evident in regard to trade and inter-European political discussions. More significantly in military terms, the US’s dominance over Europe’s military capacity means that Europe requires both time and new alliances if it is to stand on its own feet. Europe is now waking up to this. In July, Macron announced that France would build “a large space command within the Air Force, which will eventually become the Air and Space Force... to better protect our satellites, including in an active way”. Analysts called the move a switch from a defensive to an offensive posture. Macron's proposal follows similar moves by the US, China and Russia in recent years. In 2018, Trump ordered the formation of a sixth branch of the US’s armed forces – a "space force”. Europe's imperialists may have once hoped that the end of Trump's Presidency could see a reconciliation with the US bourgeoisie on more advantageous terms, but such hopes seem to be nothing but a fantasy. On 13 November 2018, a bipartisan panel for the US Congress issued a report stating its approval of the Trump administration's pursuit of “great power competition”. In March 2019, Nicole Gibson, Deputy Director of the US State Department’s office for Europe, warned that European companies would “risk significant sanctions” if they resume laying pipe for the Nord Stream 2 (NS2) natural gas pipeline running from Russia to Germany. Construction work was suspended in the December because of winter weather. The deal has infuriated the US because it undermines the potential for its energy giants to export surplus shale gas to Europe as liquified natural gas (LNG). Furthermore, US clients in central Europe are also set to lose out. Snaking under the Baltic Sea, NS2 replaces an older pipeline, stripping Ukraine of gas transit fees worth $2.5bn a year, 4% of its GDP. Ukraine president Petro Poroshenko[526] fears NS2 would allow Russia to switch off gas to Ukraine and Central Europe to blackmail its nearer neighbours without disrupting supplies to Western Europe, enabling the Kremlin to exert greater political influence. Russia supplies more than one-third of the natural gas Europe uses, a figure that is expected to reach nearly 50% in the next decade. German businesses say NS2 will slash their energy costs. German Chancellor Angela Merkel has said that “geostrategically, Europe cannot have an interest in cutting off all relations with Russia”. In 2017 she said that “the times in which we could completely depend on [the US and Britain] are, to a certain extent, over. We Europeans truly have to take our fate into our own hands.” With the relative decline of the US and Britain’s pending departure from the EU, Germany either sees an opportunity to become dominant or the need to find more reliable allies. It may see an alliance with Russia as an extension of European imperialism, and as a replacement for Britain, which itself has reportedly sought to spread misinformation in Europe in an attempt to weaken relations between Germany and Russia.[527] Turkey too, a long time client state of the US, appears to be forming a new alliance with Russia and Germany. In June 2019, the EU and Russia started talks on transitioning to using the rouble and euro in bilateral payments instead of the US dollar. China and Turkey are also investing heavily in the euro. The US is gradually being isolated and the grip on the world economy that the dollar as the world currency anchor gives the US is slipping. In the same week, it emerged that the US had been stepping up its ability to wage a cyberwar on Russia’s power grid, something it had deployed against Venezuela several times, depriving hospitals, factories and residential areas of electricity, earlier in the year. These cyber attacks are acts of war by the US’s own definition. A similar situation is developing with regards to Iran.[528] When Trump pulled the US out of the 2013 Iran nuclear deal, in which Iran agreed to roll back parts of its nuclear programme in exchange for relief from sanctions, Germany, France and even, to the chagrin of the US, Britain – all desperate for outlets for profitable investment – denounced the move and vowed to find ways to circumvent the US ban on trading with Iran, which applies to third parties. In July Russia expressed interest in the EU’s proposed Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges (INSTEX) mechanism, backing Iran’s demand that it would have to include the oil trade. Significantly, this would see the EU violating US sanctions on two fronts. Trump claims he is trying to stop a nuclear arms race in the Middle East but he is really motivated by competition. In March 2019, Miguel Berger, the Director-General for Economic Affairs and Sustainable Development at Germany’s Federal Foreign Office, complained that, while everyone else was banned from trading with Iran, US trade with Iran in 2018 had in fact doubled. The US says it wants a new deal that curbs Iran’s ballistic missile programme and ends Iran’s supposed influence in Syria, Iraq and Yemen, the latter in which it is accused of backing the anti-imperialist Houthi movement. But it also wants to control Iran’s oil. The US’s increasingly belligerent client-states Israel and Saudi Arabia see Iran as a threat to their regional dominance and welcomed Trump’s move. [529] In May 2019 Trump warned Iran of “severe consequences” as the US, joined by Britain, began to build up naval and air power in the Persian Gulf. Fears of military conflict grew after Trump blamed Iran for Houthi attacks on tankers in the Gulf of Oman. While Britain – which, in a blatant act of piracy at the request of the US, later seized an Iranian oil tanker bound for Syria – sided with the US, the EU demanded an independent inquiry. Japan, which had a tanker involved in the controversy, also questioned the veracity of the US’s account. The same week, Iran shot down a US drone. Trump claimed that he called off a retaliatory airstrike at the last minute, instead imposing further suffocating sanctions and launching a cyberattack on Iran’s defence infrastructure. Sanctions have resulted in inflation in Iran of 40% and the IMF predicted a 6% contraction in its economy. Iran said it would have to develop its uranium enrichment levels if Europe did not do more shield Iran from sanctions.[530] Iran could be the spark that ignites conflict between the US and Europe.[531] Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia’s US-UK-backed war on Yemen has resulted, after four years, in what the UN called the world’s worst humanitarian crisis; and rising tensions between India and Pakistan at the beginning of 2019 threaten to spill over into a full-scale war, with the US generally backing the former and China the latter. Pakistan has taken out billions of dollars in loans from China in recent years as part of Beijing's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), an ambitious trade and infrastructure network connecting China to Europe, Africa, Southeast Asia and other regions. China has pledged to provide economic assistance to Pakistan, which has been bailed out by high- interest IMF loans some 14 times since 1980. The task of communists As we have said, Leninists have long predicted that these deepening splits would emerge. They have been proven correct, and the defeatist pseudo-Marxist theories of ‘ultra-imperialism’ – that the imperialist powers in fact form an unshakeable alliance – have been proven wrong. Existing divisions in NATO have been widening since the election of Trump, who has been unsurprisingly delighted by Brexit and its destabilising effect on the EU. Denouncing the EU’s “treatment” of Britain in the negotiations, Trump said at the start of April 2019 that “the EU is likewise a brutal trading partner with the US, which will change”. On 9 April he said the US planned to impose tariffs of $11bn (£8.4bn) on EU goods, partly because “EU subsidies to Airbus have adversely impacted the US”.[532] He must have known what was coming: on 10 April the EU and China announced a very significant trade deal in which they vowed, in a thinly veiled rebuke to the US, “to fight against unilateralism and protectionism”. China and Germany are now engaged in concrete military co-operation, with China deploying armoured vehicles on German soil for joint drills on 11 July, something that has been unthinkable until now.[533] At the same time, the potential for realignment with the US is also contained within the German approach. For example, the nation is considering sending a warship through the Taiwan Strait, escalating tensions with China and easing them with the US. As Trump is so fond of saying, “all options are on the table”. France has vowed to retaliate tit-for-tat against US sanctions. In Tony Kennedy’s foreword to the abridged 1992 English reprint of Grossman’s book, he says: “For Grossman, re-presenting Marx’s theory was no mere academic exercise. Nor was he concerned merely with describing tendencies towards periodic economic crises, of a more or less restricted character, nor even with trends towards more systematic and global recessions. He aimed to show that the essence of Marx’s analysis of capitalist society was the identification of the inexorable tendency towards breakdown as the fundamental characteristic of the social system as a whole.... Grossman contended that the socialist movement’s commitment to the overthrow of capitalism required theoretical proof of the system’s tendency towards breakdown.” This is now the task facing communists today. The first appeal that the Communist International made in 1920 to the international working class was to “Remember the imperialist war!”, warning that the repetition of such destructive wars, when the workers of different countries are coerced by the ruling classes to “cut each other’s throats” is not only possible but inevitable if capitalism is not overthrown.[536] The First World War confirmed what was written in the statutes of the First International, that the emancipation of the working class is not a local, nor a national, but an international question. And given that national bourgeoisies are inevitably pitted against each other in a world war, it follows that the only class that is capable of solidarity internationally is the working class. Nation-states will either respond to the looming crash as it deepens by cutting military expenditure drastically or waging war in a bid to offset economic losses – or perhaps by doing both. We are being haunted by the failure to turn the breakdowns that precipitated the first two world wars into the world revolution that Lenin expected to follow on the heels of the one he led in Russia. Only world socialism can ensure humanity’s survival.

#### **Capitalist crises fuel the rise of fascism---hypernationalism greatly increases the odds of conflict**

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In the broader picture, fascism, whether in its 20th- or 21st-century variant, is a particular, far right response to capitalist crisis, such as that of the 1930s and the one that began with the financial meltdown of 2008 and has now been greatly intensified by the pandemic. Trumpism in the United States; Brexit in the United Kingdom; the increasing influence of neo-fascist and authoritarian parties and movements throughout Europe (including Poland, Germany, Hungary, Austria, Italy, the Netherlands, Denmark, France, Belgium and Greece), and around the world (such as in Israel, Turkey, the Philippines, Brazil and India), represent just such a far-right response to the crisis. Trumpism and Fascism The telltale signs of the fascist threat in the United States are in plain sight. Fascist movements expanded rapidly since the turn of the century in civil society and in the political system through the right wing of the Republican Party. Trump proved to be a charismatic figure able to galvanize and embolden disparate neo-fascist forces, from white supremacists, white nationalists, militia, neo-Nazis and Klansmen, to the Oath Keepers, the Patriot Movement, Christian fundamentalists, and anti-immigrant vigilante groups. Since 2016, numerous other groups have emerged, from the Proud Boys and QAnon to the Boogaloo movement (whose explicit goal is to spark a civil war) and the terrorist Michigan group known as Wolverine Watchmen. They are heavily armed and mobilizing for confrontation in near-perfect consort with the extreme right wing of the Republican Party, which long since has captured that party and turned it into one of utter reaction. Encouraged by Trump’s imperial bravado, his populist and nationalist rhetoric, and his openly racist discourse, predicated in part on whipping up anti-immigrant, anti-Muslim and anti-Black sentiment, they began to cross-pollinate to a degree not seen in decades as they gained a toehold in the Trump White House and in state and local governments around the country. Paramilitarism spread within many of these organizations and overlapped with state repressive agencies. Racist, far right and fascist militia, identified by the FBI and the Department of Homeland Security as the most lethal domestic terrorist threat, [operate inside law enforcement agencies](https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/hidden-plain-sight-racism-white-supremacy-and-far-right-militancy-law). As far back as 2006, a [government intelligence assessment](http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/402521/doc-26-white-supremacist-infiltration.pdf) had warned of “white supremacist infiltration of law enforcement by organized groups and by self-initiated infiltration by law enforcement personnel sympathetic to white supremacist causes.” The fascist insurgency reached a feverish pitch in the wake of the mass protests sparked by the police-perpetrated murder of George Floyd in May. Among recent incidents too numerous to list, fascist militia members have routinely showed up heavily armed at anti-racist rallies to threaten protesters, and in several instances, have carried out assassinations. Trump has refused to condemn the armed right-wing insurgency. To the contrary, he [defended a self-described vigilante and “Blue Lives Matter” enthusiast](https://www.npr.org/sections/live-updates-protests-for-racial-justice/2020/08/31/908137377/trump-defends-kenosha-shooting-suspect) who shot to death two unarmed protesters in Kenosha, Wisconsin, on August 25. On September 3, federal marshals carried out an extra-judicial execution of [Michael Reinoehl](https://truthout.org/articles/trump-appears-to-admit-extrajudicial-killing-of-michael-reinoehl-was-planned/), who admitted to shooting a few days earlier a member of the white supremacist group Patriot Prayer during a confrontation between Trump supporters and counterprotesters in Portland, Oregon. “There has to be [retribution](https://www.vox.com/2020/9/14/21436216/trump-michael-reinoehl-protests-portland-shooting),” declared Trump in a chilling interview in which he seemed to take credit for what amounted to a death squad execution. Particularly ominous was the plot by a domestic terrorist militia group, broken up on October 8, to storm the Michigan state capitol to kidnap and possibly kill the Democratic governor of Michigan and other officials, a conspiracy that the White House refused to condemn. While there are great differences between [20th- and 21st-century fascism](http://robinson.faculty.soc.ucsb.edu/Assets/pdf/FascismbeyondTrump.pdf) and any parallels should not be exaggerated, we would do well to recall the 1923 [“beer hall putsch”](https://www.britannica.com/event/Beer-Hall-Putsch/The-Munich-Putsch) in Bavaria, Germany, which marked a turning point in the Nazis’ rise to power. In that incident, Hitler and a heavily armed group of his followers hatched a plot to kidnap leaders of the Bavarian government. Loyal government officials put down the putsch and jailed Hitler but the fascist insurgency expanded in its aftermath. The fascist putsch now hinges on the November election. The rule of law is breaking down. Trump has claimed, without any credible evidence, that the vote will be fraudulent, has refused to commit to a peaceful transfer of power should he lose, and has all but called on his supporters to be prepared for an insurrection. Himself a [transnational capitalist](http://robinson.faculty.soc.ucsb.edu/Assets/pdf/TheTransnationalCapitalistClass.pdf), a racist and a fascist, Trump took advantage of the protests over the murder of George Floyd to bring the project to a new level, inciting from the White House itself the fascist mobilization in U.S. civil society, manipulating fear and a racist backlash with his “law and order” discourse, and threatening a qualitative escalation of the police state. Widespread and systematic voter suppression, especially of those from marginalized communities, has already [disenfranchised](https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/aug/07/americans-voting-rights-disenfranchisement) millions. Donald Trump Jr. [called in September for](https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-election/donald-trump-jr-video-2020-election-ballot-fraud-b605186.html) “every able-bodied man and woman to join an army for Trump’s election security operation.” Morphology of the Fascist Project The current crisis of global capitalism is both structural and political. Politically, capitalist states face spiraling crises of legitimacy after decades of hardship and social decay wrought by neoliberalism, aggravated now by these states’ inability to manage the health emergency and the economic collapse. The level of global social polarization and [inequality is unprecedented](https://oi-files-d8-prod.s3.eu-west-2.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/file_attachments/ib-wealth-having-all-wanting-more-190115-en.pdf). The richest 1 percent of humanity control more than half of the world’s wealth while the bottom 80 percent had to make do with just 5 percent of this wealth. Such extreme inequalities can only be sustained by extreme levels of state and private violence that lend themselves to fascist political projects. Structurally, the global economy is mired in a crisis of overaccumulation, or chronic stagnation, made much worse by the pandemic. As inequalities escalate, the system churns out more and more wealth that the mass of working people cannot actually consume. As a result, the global market cannot absorb the output of the global economy. The transnational capitalist class cannot find outlets to “unload” the trillions of dollars it has accumulated. In recent years, it has turned to mind-boggling levels of financial speculation, to the raiding and sacking of public budgets, and to militarized accumulation or accumulation by repression. This refers to how accumulation of capital comes increasingly to rely on transnational systems of social control, repression and warfare, as [the global police state](https://www.plutobooks.com/9780745341644/the-global-police-state/) expands to defend the global war economy from rebellions from below. Fascism seeks to rescue capitalism from this organic crisis; that is, to violently restore capital accumulation, establish new forms of state legitimacy and suppress threats from below unencumbered by democratic constraints. The project involves a fusion of repressive and reactionary state power with a fascist mobilization in civil society. Twenty-first-century fascism, like its 20th-century predecessor, is a violently toxic mix of reactionary nationalism and racism. Its discursive and ideological repertoire involves extreme nationalism and the promise of national regeneration, xenophobia, doctrines of race/culture supremacy alongside a violent racist mobilization, martial masculinity, militarization of civic and political life, and the normalization — even glorification — of war, social violence and domination. As with its 20th-century predecessor, the 21st-century fascist project hinges on the psychosocial mechanism of dispersing mass fear and anxiety at a time of acute capitalist crisis toward scapegoated communities, whether Jews in Nazi Germany, immigrants in the United States, or Muslims and lower castes in India, and also on to an external enemy, such as communism during the Cold War, or China and Russia currently. It seeks to organize a mass social base with the promise to restore stability and security to those destabilized by capitalist crises. Fascist organizers appeal to the same social base of those millions who have been devastated by neoliberal austerity, impoverishment, precarious employment and relegation to the ranks of surplus labor, all greatly aggravated by the pandemic. As popular discontent has spread, far right and neo-fascist mobilization play a critical role in the effort by dominant groups to channel this discontent away from a critique of global capitalism and toward support for the transnational capitalist class agenda dressed in populist rhetoric. The fascist appeal is directed in particular to historically privileged sectors of the global working class, such as white workers in the Global North and urban middle layers in the Global South, that are experiencing heightened insecurity and the specter of downward mobility and socioeconomic destabilization. The flip side of targeting certain disaffected sectors is the violent control and suppression of other sectors — which, in the United States, come disproportionately from the ranks of surplus labor, communities that face racial and ethnic oppression, or religious and other forms of persecution. The mechanisms of coercive exclusion include mass incarceration and the spread of prison-industrial complexes; anti-immigrant legislation and deportation regimes; the manipulation of space in new ways so that both gated communities and ghettos are controlled by armies of private security guards and technologically advanced surveillance systems; ubiquitous, often paramilitarized policing; “non-lethal” crowd control methods; and mobilization of the culture industries and state ideological apparatuses to dehumanize victims of global capitalism as dangerous, depraved and culturally degenerate. Racism and Competing Interpretations of the Crisis We cannot under-emphasize the role of racism for the fascist mobilization in the United States. But we need to deepen our analysis of it. The U.S. political system and the dominant groups face a crisis of hegemony and legitimacy. This has involved the breakdown of the white racist historic bloc that to one extent or another reigned supreme from the end of post-Civil War reconstruction to the late 20th century but has become destabilized through capitalist globalization. The far right and neo-fascists are attempting to reconstruct such a bloc, in which “national” identity becomes “white identity” as a stand-in (that is, a code) for a racist mobilization against perceived sources of anxiety and insecurity. Yet many white members of the working class have been experiencing social and economic destabilization, downward mobility, heightened insecurity, an uncertain future and accelerated precariatization — that is, ever more precarious work and life conditions. This sector has historically enjoyed the ethnic-racial privileges that come from white supremacy vis-à-vis other sectors of the working class, but it has been losing these privileges in the face of capitalist globalization. The escalation of veiled and also openly racist discourse from above is aimed at ushering the members of this white working-class sector into a racist and a neo-fascist understanding of their condition. Racism and the appeal to fascism offer workers from the dominant racial or ethnic group an imaginary solution to real contradictions; recognition of the existence of suffering and oppression, even though its solution is a false one. The parties and movements associated with such projects have put forth a racist discourse, less coded and less mediated than that of mainstream politicians, targeting the racially oppressed, ethnic or religious minorities, immigrants and refugees in particular as scapegoats. Yet in this age of globalized capitalism, there is little possibility in the United States or elsewhere of providing such benefits, so that the “wages of fascism” now appear to be entirely psychological. The ideology of 21st-century fascism rests on irrationality — a promise to deliver security and restore stability that is emotive, not rational. It is a project that does not and need not distinguish between the truth and the lie. The Trump regime’s public discourse of populism and nationalism, for example, bears no relation to its actual policies. Trumponomics involves a sweeping deregulation of capital, slashing social spending, dismantling what remains of the welfare state, privatization, tax breaks to corporations and the rich, anti-worker laws, and an expansion of state subsidies to capital — in short, radical neoliberalism. Trump’s populism has no policy substance. It is almost entirely symbolic — hence the significance of his fanatical “build the wall” and similar rhetoric, symbolically essential to sustain a social base for which the state can provide little or no material bribe. This also helps to explain the increasing desperation in Trump’s bravado as the election approaches. But here is the clincher: Deteriorating socioeconomic conditions and rising insecurity do not automatically lead to racist or fascist backlash. A racist/fascist interpretation of these conditions must be mediated by political agents and state agencies. Trumpism represents just such a mediation. To beat back the threat of fascism, popular resistance forces must put forward an alternative interpretation of the crisis, involving a social justice agenda founded on a working-class politics that can win over the would-be social base of fascism. This would-be base is made up of a majority of workers who are experiencing the same deleterious effects of global capitalism in crisis as the entire working class. We need a social justice and working-class agenda to respond to its increasingly immiserated condition, lest we leave it susceptible to a far right populist manipulation of this condition. Joe Biden may well win the election. Yet even if he does so and manages to take office, the crisis of global capitalism and the fascist project it is stoking will continue. A united front against fascism must be based on a social justice agenda that targets capitalism and its crisis.

### 1AC---Innovation

#### Advantage 2 is Innovation:

#### **DPS unleashes faster and better aligned innovation than either capitalism or state socialism**

Kotz 2 - economics professor at Amherst (David, <https://people.umass.edu/dmkotz/Soc_and_Innovation_02.pdf>, emuse) \*DPPS = DPS

3. Capitalist Innovation Mainstream Western economics gives capitalism high marks for innovation. The pursuit of profit is supposed to assure a strong incentive to engage in the invention, development, and production stages of innovation, while also inducing investors to provide potential innovators with the necessary financial means. Free entry into markets compels rapid diffusion of innovations. An optimal contribution to human welfare is assured, given the assumption that profitability reflects the ultimate value to society of any economic activity. While capitalism does promote a certain kind of rapid technological change, the above account has serious flaws. The pursuit of profit does not play such a big role at the important invention stage of innovation. Studies show that a large majority of economically important inventions come from university scientists, government researchers, and independent inventors, for whom pecuniary considerations are not typically dominant.6 At the development stage, the still-high risks, plus the sometimes substantial external (and hence uncapturable) benefits from innovation, lead to (successful) demands for government subsidization.7 The profit incentive for innovation is profoundly contradictory. For the profit incentive to operate, innovators must be able to gain monopoly control over the innovation and bar competitors, or else the first innovator’s profit will be small and fleeting. However, the legal and extra-legal means that capitalist innovators use to gain such monopoly power (patents and predatory tactics) prevent the rapid diffusion of new products and processes. The greatest flaw in the capitalist innovation process has to do with the third question, that of the contribution of innovative activity to human welfare. As capitalist innovators follow the guide of profits, the following problems arise: 1) innovations are disproportionally directed at upper income consumers;8 2) public goods are largely ignored in the innovation process; 3) external benefits and costs of innovation, which may loom very large, are not taken into account in innovation decisions; 4) the monopoly power required to stimulate innovation leads to high monopoly prices for the resulting product, limiting the use of the new innovation and hence reducing the benefit from it;9 5) much innovation activity is pure waste, as firms devote innovation resources toward the end of defeating rivals rather than benefitting consumers.10 While capitalism does promote the development of the forces of production, it does so in a manner that is severely flawed. Capitalism can promote innovation only if the state and other non-capitalist institutions play an active role in organizing and financing the innovation process, particularly the invention stage. It can do so only with significant monopoly power and barriers to entry that simultaneously promote and hinder technical progress. And it produces a severely distorted innovation process that, after a certain stage of development, may subtract as much from human welfare as it contributes, or even more. 4. Innovation under Soviet State Socialism The Soviet system was, at best, a highly flawed and distorted version of socialism. However, it was the first large-scale effort to build a modern economy based on public ownership of productive property and coordination of the economy by economic planning. For this reason, the experience of the Soviet economy in the area of innovation is relevant to our concerns here Spokespeople for the Soviet system claimed that, as a socialist system, it would, and did, outperform capitalism in promoting technical progress. The key advantages cited were the absence of commercial secrecy, the avoidance of the wasteful duplication of R&D effort of capitalism, and the ability to directly incorporate technological advances into the central plan rather than having to rely on the indirect incentive of profitability. However, the Soviet leadership soon discovered that innovation was not as straightforward a process as had been assumed. In the postwar decades the system was frequently adjusted and reformed to improve innovation performance. The mature Soviet system had various institutional components to its innovation system, including the incorporation of major planned new technologies into the central plan by Gosplan each year. However, two institutions were most important in Soviet innovation performance: 1) a system of R&D Institutes, which had innovation as their sole mission; and 2) the individual enterprises, which typically had a design department for new product development and, at larger enterprises, a research laboratory. The Soviet system did have significant strengths in innovation performance.11 Soviet R&D Institutes were staffed with well-trained and dedicated researchers and were reasonably well funded, and they and the enterprises did produce many important innovations. The success was best known in military and space technology, but it extended to some civilian industrial technologies.12 Output per labor hour in the Soviet economy grew rapidly until 1975, much faster than in the U.S. during that period (Kotz and Weir, 1997, p. 46). However, Soviet innovation performance never lived up to expectations. Understanding the problems encountered in the Soviet innovation process -- and the institutional sources of those problems -- is relevant to evaluating the potential innovation performance of a DPPS system, including potential problems that it might encounter. There was a serious incentive problem in the Soviet innovation process. The incentive problem was not located at the R&D Institutes but rather at the enterprises. Soviet enterprises were relatively good at minor innovations. The incentive problem involved larger changes in the production process and the development of new products that differed substantially from what had been produced before. The Soviet enterprise director faced a context of relatively low rewards (in the director’s bonus) for successful innovations while the risks attendant upon major innovations were quite high. This tended to make Soviet enterprise directors conservative about innovation, with reluctance to develop new products or processes or to introduce those that emerged from the R&D Institutes. The risk of innovation was not just the result of the inevitable delays and unforseen costs that arise when trying something new. The key factor was the difficult supply relations in the Soviet planning system. Enterprises always worried about whether sufficient supplies would be delivered on time to enable the enterprise to meet its goals. This was a result of the policy of “taut planning,” aimed at achieving the maximum possible output from available inputs. Innovation necessitates unforeseen changes in required inputs, and the taut planning system made it difficult to change the input mix in mid-plan. The hierarchical relations of Soviet planning meant that enterprises did not have close relations with their suppliers, which compounded the problem. These conditions made innovation very risky, with a likelihood of interruption of the enterprise’s regular production, resulting in financial punishment for the director. Another incentive problem was an absence of penalties for failure to introduce available new technologies. A laggard enterprise with outmoded technology might find its costs rising above the industry average, but the ministry tended to protect its enterprises and made subsidies available. There were also problems of the means available for innovation. Innovations that involve radically new products typically entail either the entry by an existing enterprise into a new line of production or the creation of new enterprises. The Soviet planning system had relatively rigid boundaries between industries, and entry into a different line by an existing enterprise was discouraged, as poaching on the territory of others.13 While new enterprises were created from time to time, this was limited and usually faced opposition from existing enterprises. Individual inventors were greatly underutilized in the Soviet system. Most enterprises had an official policy of making small-scale facilities available to aspiring inventors. However, this program was not very effective at drawing out creative individual inventors, perhaps because the passivity bred into individuals by the repressive, centralized, hierarchical Soviet system discouraged individual inventive activity. In the matter of the effectiveness of innovative activity at advancing human welfare, the Soviet system did avoid some of the problems of capitalist innovation. There was no bias against innovation in public goods. There was no problem of monopoly pricing of new products and processes, with the attendant limitation of their use. However, the Soviet system had significant weaknesses in the effectiveness of innovative activity. We will cite three problems in this area. First, while irrational profit criteria largely guide the allocation of innovative effort in a capitalist system, in the Soviet system the “planners’ preference” guided this allocation. The top leadership favored certain sectors, particularly the military, space exploration, and certain industrial sectors, while consumer goods occupied a lowly place in their priorities. Second, there was a problem stemming from the poor relations between the two key institutions involved in innovation, the R&D Institutes and the enterprises. The R&D Institutes had the best researchers and facilities, and they produced a large volume of plans for new products and processes. However, the enterprises, which had to produce the new product or introduce the new process, complained that plans arrived that were incomplete, unrealistic, or unworkable. R&D Institutes complained that enterprises were uninterested in their proposals. The result was that much innovative effort failed to bear fruit. This seemed to be a result of the hierarchical character of the system, in which relations between institutions at the same level of the hierarchy were very poorly structured.14 Third, and perhaps most serious, innovation in the Soviet system generated major external costs, particularly for workplace and environmental health. The reason for this in the Soviet case was not the pursuit of profit but the single-minded emphasis on growth in output and the undemocratic and repressive character of the system which prevented the affected parties from defending their health interests. 5. Innovation in a Democratic Planned Participatory Socialist System What kind of innovation performance would be expected under a DPPS system, by comparison to that of capitalism and state socialism? Three features of DPPS, as laid out in Devine (1988), are relevant to innovation performance. First, the main features of the overall economic plan would be determined by a democratic process (Devine, 1988, p. 190). Second, the planning and coordination of the economy would take place, not through market forces or top-down central planning, but through a process of “negotiated coordination” (Devine, 1988, ch. 8-10). This means that resource allocation decisions would be made by boards -- industry boards and local and regional negotiated coordination bodies -- that have representation of all affected constituencies, including workers, consumers, suppliers, the local community, and even “cause” groups such as environmentalists, job safety activists, feminists, etc. These bodies would arrive at decisions through compromise among the interests represented on them. In addition, the basic units of social production, or enterprises, are considered social property and have governing boards that include representatives of all groups affected by the activity of the enterprise, including workers, consumers, suppliers, and the local community. Third, each individual would be expected to spend part of her/his work life in each of the main types of labor, which Devine defines as planning and managing labor, creative labor, nurturing labor, skilled labor, and unskilled/repetitive labor (Devine, 1988, 171). This would eliminate the social division of labor, while preserving the technical division of labor with its efficiency advantages In the absence of competitive pursuit of profits, or a Politburo demanding innovation, what would be the source of innovation under DPPS? First, the democratic, participatory institutions of that system would empower the population to demand innovations aimed at its own benefit. Under such a system, people would stand to benefit from innovation, in the three roles that people occupy – that of consumer, worker, and community member. Consumers can benefit from new, better, and cheaper products. Workers can benefit from less arduous toil and a more satisfying experience at work. Members of the community can benefit from products and work processes that improve, rather than harm, community life. DPPS, like every economic system, can also tap a second potential source of innovation. That is the species trait of human beings of having a propensity to look for ways to change and improve their methods of doing things, entirely apart from any desire for more goods or less labor. This drive, present in most people, although not in equal measure in all, represents an important source of innovative behavior at the stage of invention, if the economic system allows it to operate freely. How would a DPPS economy translate the potential benefits of innovation into actual effective innovative activity? How would it encourage, within the economy, the expression of human beings’ natural tendency to create new things? If the populace wants innovation, they would have to build into the system significant incentives for those who are in a position to carry it out. Enterprise managers, along with everyone else who participates in any of the stages of innovation, should be eligible for rewards for successful innovation. It is not sufficient to assume that decision-makers will automatically innovate -- it must be communicated to them, via a reward system, that society values innovation. Such rewards would be needed regardless of the mix of material versus moral incentives. Pay incentives need not be huge to elicit innovative behavior, as long they are large enough to bring a noticeable consumption benefit to the innovator. As the Soviet experience indicates, a planned economy can increase the risk associated with innovation, deterring innovative activity. However, DPPS should not suffer from the problems of uncertain supplies and inflexibility that characterized Soviet planning. With representatives on one another’s decision-making boards and with opportunities to communicate on negotiated coordination bodies, there should be reliable and flexible relations between suppliers and customers. It would be necessary to eschew the Soviet policy of taut planning and operate the economy with sufficient excess productive capacity to accommodate the unforeseen changes in inputs that innovation requires. Without the spur of competition to compel laggard enterprises to adopt the best technology in the industry, could an enterprise management, perhaps backed up by a workforce unenthusiastic about change, simply refuse to make improvements? As was noted above, an enterprise under DPPS is not the sole property of its workers but is social property, upon which constituencies outside the enterprise have a legitimate claim. Industry boards would have to keep track of laggard enterprises, and consumer representatives on both industry and enterprise boards would have to be powerful enough to exert pressure to make appropriate changes, imposing financial penalties where necessary. In order for this system to work effectively, it would be desirable to have more than one enterprise in each industry, except in cases of natural monopoly.15 The purpose is not to impose a market form of competition in which the cheapest producer drives out the rest, a process which often yields socially irrational outcomes. Rather, the purpose is to permit the gathering of comparative information about enterprise performance, from market exchange as well as other sources, so as to make informed decisions about what changes enterprises should be asked to make. It would not always turn out that the higher-cost producer is the one asked to change; the lower-cost producer might be found to have achieved low costs by anti-social practices rather than superior technology. Long ago Adam Smith complained that the detailed division of labor tends to make workers stupid. The DPPS practice of assuring everyone participation in the highest types of labor should have the opposite effect. This practice, along with the widespread participation in decision-making fostered by a DPPS society, should encourage the creative, innovative behavior that is natural to our species. DPPS should create conditions for a substantial outpouring of creativity from the population, some of which would take the form of innovation in the economic sphere. In the matter of assuring adequate means for innovation, DPPS would face a serious problem. The basic institutions of DPPS would not necessarily provide sufficient opportunities for creative individuals to work out new economically relevant ideas. More generally, there would be a danger that the decision-making boards of DPPS would tend to represent existing ways of doing things and offer resistance to innovation. The citizens of a DPPS society could solve this problem by establishing an Innovation Facilitation Board (IFB), dedicated to the promotion of innovation throughout the economy.16 The IFB would be given substantial financing from the central treasury. It would take applications from enterprises, informal groups, or individuals that wanted to work on inventing a new product or process or to engage in the development stage of an innovation. It would be able to make grants covering a long enough time period to provide a chance of success. Determining the membership of the IFB represents a serious problem for DPPS. If the IFB included representatives of all the constituencies that are affected by innovation, this would be likely to subvert its intended function. Major innovations typically have victims, and the potential costs may be more apparent than the potential benefits when the innovation is still at an early stage.17 A simple application of the principle of wide representation might block the development of new products and processes before their potential benefits became apparent. In order to be capable of carrying out its mandate, the IFB would have to be constituted as an independent board, perhaps made up of consumer representatives and experts of various kinds. Such a departure from the usual practice would be consistent with the underlying principle of DPPS, as long as the final decision to implement an innovation rested with a representative board. The IFB would facilitate and encourage the invention and development stages for new products and processes. It seems justified to protect the early stages of innovation from a final social decision, until it has been developed to the point where a well-informed judgment can be made about benefits and costs. However, the decision to implement an innovation should have to pass the test of the system’s core process of evaluation by, and compromise among, all affected constituencies. This calls for a second institution, an Innovation Approval Board (IAB). It would be constituted in the usual way, with representation of all relevant interests. Its role would be to determine whether a proposed new product or process, which emerged from a grant from the IFB, should be given the green light for production/introduction. While contemporary capitalism does place some after-the-fact restraints on socially harmful innovation, through state regulation and individual or class-action lawsuits, DPPS would place social interests at the heart of the innovation process. While the research and development stages of a potentially harmful project could not be readily blocked by opponents, the project could not be implemented, and the costs actually imposed, without social approval. Furthermore, those engaging in invention or development on an IFB grant would know the criteria by which the implementation of the innovation would eventually be judged by the IAB, which should have a positive impact on the direction of invention and development. A remaining problem is the possible need to allow an existing enterprise to enter a new line of production, or to permit the founding of a new enterprise, in order to implement a major innovation. This might encounter resistence from existing interests. To avoid this problem, once the IAB has given its approval, the innovators should have the right to request permission to start a new enterprise, or enlist an existing enterprise to move outside its previous line of work, in order to implement the innovation. A decision to grant such a request might require a joint meeting of the IFB and the IAB. The social effectiveness of innovation under DPPS should be free of each of the five problems of capitalist innovation cited above. Innovation would not be directed disproportionately to satisfy the rich, since there would be no rich class, nor would profits from sale guide innovation. The balance between innovation in public and private goods should reflect the citizenry’s priorities, since representative bodies would allocate innovation resources between the two types of goods, and the incentives for innovation should operate equally for the two. External benefits and costs, including those affecting workers and the environment, should be fully considered by the representative boards that make decisions about the introduction of new technologies and products. Such decisions would not face the pressure to impose costs on third parties that results from competitive profit-seeking. There would be no problem of monopoly pricing restricting the application of innovations and no waste of innovative effort due to oligopolistic competition. The three problems that undermined the effectiveness of innovation under state socialist planning should be absent from DPPS. No Politburo officials would dictate priorities for innovation. Instead, democratic decision-making would determine the amount and allocation of innovation. The waste-generating disconnection between R&D Institutes and enterprises should not be present in DPPS, since horizontal relations among institutions would be strong. If R&D Institutes were designed as part of the innovation system of DPPS, then cross representation between them and the enterprises should permit an effective interface between the two types of institutions. Last, the causes of the severe external costs of innovation under state socialism – a single-minded focus on growth of output and a lack of democracy – should not characterize DPPS. Our conclusion is that the basic defining institutions of DPPS are generally favorable for innovation, but these institutions alone would not be sufficient to guarantee successful innovation performance. By adding the set of additional institutions and policies mentioned above, DPPS should display an innovation performance far superior at meeting human needs to that of either capitalism or state socialism. Of course, such a system would not guarantee that every innovation would contribute to human welfare. It is not always possible to predict in advance what the eventual consequences of a new product or process will be. However, such a system would be far superior to earlier systems at making such decisions.

#### An innovation process centered on social interests is key to avert extinction from black-ball technology

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Achieving stabilization The truth of VWH would be bad news. But it would not imply that civilization will be devastated. In principle at least, there are several responses that could stabilize the world even if vulnerability exists. Recall that we defined the hypothesis in terms of a black-ball technology making civilizational devastation extremely likely conditional on technological development continuing and the semi-anarchic default condition persisting. Thus we can theoretically consider the following possibilities for achieving stabilization: 1. Restrict technological development. 2. Ensure that there does not exist a large population of actors representing a wide and recognizably human distribution of motives. 3. Establish extremely effective preventive policing. 4. Establish effective global governance. We will discuss (3) and (4) in subsequent sections. Here we consider (1) and (2). We will argue they hold only limited promise as ways of protecting against potential civilizational vulnerabilities. Technological relinquishment In its general form, technological relinquishment looks exceedingly unpromising. Recall that we construed the word ‘technology’ broadly; so that completely stopping technological development would require something close to a cessation of inventive activity everywhere in the world. That is hardly realistic; and if it could be done, it would be extremely costly – to the point of constituting an existential catastrophe in its own right (Namely, ‘permanent stagnation’ (Bostrom, 2013)). That general relinquishment of scientific and technological research is a non-starter does not, however, imply that limited curtailments of inventive activities could not be a good idea. It can make sense to forego particularly perilous directions of advancement. For instance, recalling our ‘easy nukes’ scenario, it would be sensible to discourage research into laser isotope separation for uranium enrichment (Kemp, 2012). Any technology that makes it possible to produce weapons-grade fissile material using less energy or with a smaller industrial footprint would erode important barriers to proliferation. It is hard to see how a slight reduction in the price of nuclear energy would compensate. On the contrary, the world would probably be better off if it somehow became harder and more expensive to enrich uranium. What we would ideally want in this area is not technological progress but technological regress. While targeted regress might not be in the cards, we could aim to slow the rate of advancement towards risk-increasing technologies relative to the rate of advancement in protective technologies. This is the idea expressed by the principle of differential technological development. In its original formulation, the principle focuses on existential risk; but we can apply it more broadly to also encompass technologies with ‘merely’ devastational potential: Principle of Differential Technological Development. [slow] the development of dangerous and harmful technologies, especially ones that raise the level of existential risk; and accelerate the development of beneficial technologies, especially those that reduce the existential risks posed by nature or by other technologies (Bostrom, 2002). The principle of differential technological development is compatible with plausible forms of technological determinism. For example, even if it were ordained that all technologies that can be developed will be developed, it can still matter when they are developed. The order in which they arrive can make an important difference – ideally, protective technologies should come before the destructive technologies against which they protect; or, if that is not possible, then it is desirable that the gap be minimized so that other countermeasures (or luck) may tide us over until robust protection become available. The timing of an invention also influences what sociopolitical context the technology is born into. For example, if we believe that there is a secular trend toward civilization becoming more capable of handling black balls, then we may want to delay the most risky technological developments, or at least abstain from accelerating them. Even if we suppose that civilizational devastation is unavoidable, many would prefer it to take place further into the future, at a time when maybe they and their loved ones are no longer alive anyway.32 Differential technological development doesn’t really make sense in the original urn-of-creativity model, where the color of each ball comes as a complete surprise. If we want to use the urn model in this context, we must modify it. We could stipulate, for example, that the balls have different textures and that there is a correlation between texture and color, so that we get clues about the color of a ball before we extract it. Another way to make the metaphor more realistic is to imagine that there are strings or elastic bands between some of the balls, so that when we pull on one of them we drag along several others to which it is linked. Presumably the urn is highly tubular, since certain technologies must emerge before others can be reached (we are not likely to find a society that uses jet planes and flint axes). The metaphor would also become more realistic if we imagine that there is not just one hand daintily exploring the urn: instead, picture a throng of scuffling prospectors reaching in their arms in hopes of gold and glory, and citations. Correctly implementing differential technological development is clearly a difficult strategic task (Cf. Collingridge, 1980). Nevertheless, for an actor who cares altruistically about long-term outcomes and who is involved in some inventive enterprise (e.g. as a researcher, funder, entrepreneur, regulator, or legislator) it is worth making the attempt. Some implications, at any rate, seem fairly obvious: for instance, don’t work on laser isotope separation, don’t work on bioweapons, and don’t develop forms of geoengineering that would empower random individuals to unilaterally make drastic alterations to the Earth’s climate. Think twice before accelerating enabling technologies – such as DNA synthesis machines – that would directly facilitate such ominous developments.33 But boost technologies that are predominantly protective; for instance, ones that enable more efficient monitoring of disease outbreaks or that make it easier to detect covert WMD programs. Even if it is the case that all possible ‘bad’ technologies are bound to be developed eventually, it can still be helpful to buy a little time.34 However, differential technological development does not on its own offer a solution for vulnerabilities that persist over long periods – ones where adequately protective technologies are much harder to develop than their destructive counterparts, or where destruction has the advantage even at technological maturity.35 Preference modification Another theoretically possible way of achieving civilizational stabilization would be to change the fact that there exists a large population of actors representing a wide and recognizably human distribution of motives. We reserve for later discussion of interventions that would reduce the effective number of independent actors by increasing various forms of coordination. Here we consider the possibility of modifying the distribution of preferences (within a more or less constant population of actors). The degree to which this approach holds promise depends on which type of vulnerability we have in mind. In the case of a Type-1 vulnerability, preference modification does not look promising, at least in the absence of extremely effective means for doing so. Consider that some Type-1 vulnerabilities would result in civilizational devastation if there is even a single empowered person anywhere in the world who is motivated to pursue the destructive outcome. With that kind of vulnerability, reducing the number of people in the apocalyptic residual would do nothing to forestall devastation unless the number could be reduced all the way to zero, which may be completely infeasible. It is true that there are other possible Type-1 vulnerabilities that would require a somewhat larger apocalyptic residual in order for civilizational devastation to occur: for example, in a scenario like ‘easy nukes’, maybe there would have to be somebody from the apocalyptic residual in each of several hundred cities. But this is still a very low bar. It is difficult to imagine an intervention – short of radically re-engineering human nature on a fully global scale – that would sufficiently deplete the apocalyptic residual to entirely eliminate or even greatly reduce the threat of Type-1 vulnerabilities. Note that an intervention that halves the size of the apocalyptic residual would not (at least not through any firstorder effect) reduce the expected risk from Type-1 vulnerabilities by anywhere near as much. A reduction of 5 percent or 10 percent of Type-1 risk from halving the apocalyptic residual would be more plausible. The reason is that there is wide uncertainty about how destructive some new blackball technology would be, and we should arguably use a fairly uniform prior in log space (over several orders of magnitude) over the size of apocalyptic residual that would be required in order for civilizational devastation to occur conditional on a Type-1 vulnerability arising. In other words, conditional on some new technology being developed that makes it easy for an average individual to kill at least one million people, it may be (roughly) as likely that the technology would enable the average individual to kill one million people, ten million people, a hundred million people, a billion people, or every human alive. These considerations notwithstanding, preference modification could be helpful in scenarios in which the set of empowered actors is initially limited to some small definable subpopulation. Some black-ball technologies, when they first emerge from the urn, might be difficult to use and require specialized equipment. There could be a period of several years before such a technology has been perfected to the point where an average individual could master it. During this early period, the set of empowered actors could be quite limited; for example, it might consist exclusively of individuals with bioscience expertise working in a particular type of lab. Closer screening of applicants to positions in such labs could then make a meaningful dent in the risk that a destructive individual gains access to the biotech black ball within the first few years of its emergence.36 And that reprieve may offer an opportunity to introduce other countermeasures to provide more lasting stabilization, in anticipation of the time when the technology gets easy enough to use that it diffuses to a wider population. For Type-2a vulnerabilities, the set of empowered actors is much smaller. Typically what we are dealing with here are states, perhaps alongside a few especially powerful nonstate actors. In some Type-2a scenarios, the set might consist exclusively of two superpowers, or a handful of states with special capabilities (as is currently the case with nuclear weapons). It could thus be very helpful if the preferences of even a few powerful states were shifted in a more peaceloving direction. The ‘safe first strike’ scenario would be a lot less alarming if the actors facing the security dilemma had attitudes towards one another similar to those prevailing between Finland and Sweden. For many plausible sets of incentives that could arise for powerful actors as a consequence of some technological breakthrough, the prospects for a non-devastational outcome would be significantly brightened if the actors in question had more irenic dispositions. Although this seems difficult to achieve, it is not as difficult as persuading almost all the members in the apocalyptic residual to alter their dispositions. Lastly, consider Type-2b. Recall that such a vulnerability entails that ‘by default’ a great many actors face incentives to take some damaging action, such that the combined effects add up to civilizational devastation. The incentives for using the black-ball technology must therefore be ones that have a grip on a substantial fraction of the world population – economic gain being perhaps the prime example of such a near-universal motivation. So imagine some private action, available to almost every individual, which saves each person who takes it a fraction X of his or her annual income, while producing a negative externality such that if half the world’s population takes the action then civilization gets devastated. At X = 0, we can assume that few people would take the antisocial action. But the greater X is, the larger the fraction of the population that would succumb to temptation. Unfortunately, it is plausible that the value of X that would induce at least half of the population to take the action is small, perhaps less than 1 per cent.37 While it would be desirable to change the distribution of global preferences so as to make people more altruistic and raise the value of X, this seems difficult to achieve. (Consider the many strong forces already competing for hearts and minds – corporate advertisers, religious organizations, social movements, education systems, and so on.) Even a dramatic increase in the amount of altruism in the world – corresponding, let us say, to a doubling of X from 1 percent to 2 per cent – would prevent calamity only in a relatively narrow band of scenarios, namely those in which the private benefit of using the destructive technology is in the 1–2 per cent range. Scenarios in which the private gain exceeds 2 per cent would still result in civilizational devastation. In sum, modifying the distribution of preferences within the set of actors that would be destructively empowered by a black-ball discovery could be a useful adjunct to other means of stabilization, but it can be difficult to implement and would at best offer only very partial protection (unless we assume extreme forms of worldwide re-engineering of human nature).38 Some specific countermeasures and their limitations Beside influencing the direction of scientific and technological progress, or altering destruction-related preferences, there are a variety of other possible countermeasures that could mitigate a civilizational vulnerability. For example, one could try to: • prevent the dangerous information from spreading; • restrict access to requisite materials, instruments, and infrastructure; • deter potential evildoers by increasing the chance of their getting caught; • be more cautious and do more risk assessment work; and • establish some kind of surveillance and enforcement mechanism that would make it possible to interdict attempts to carry out a destructive act.

#### Black-ball technology causes extinction

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Full-scale nuclear war. There is roughly 0.02-7% chance per year of accidental full-scale nuclear war between the US and Russia (Barrett, Baum, & Hostetler, 2013). With fairly high probabilities of nuclear winter and civilization collapse given nuclear war, this is order of magnitude 10% this century. We should also take into consideration that despite reductions in nuclear weapons, a new nuclear arms race is possible in the 21st century. Such a race may include more devastating weapons or cheaper manufacturing methods. Nuclear war could include the creation of large cobalt bombs as doomsday weapons or attacks on nuclear power plants. It could also start a chain of events which result in civilization collapse. Nanotechnology risks. Although molecular manufacturing can be achieved without self-replicating machines (Drexler & Phoenix, 2004), technological fascination with biological systems makes it likely that self-replicating machines will be created. Moreover, catastrophic uses of nanotechnology needn’t be due to accident, but also due to the actions of purposeful malignant agents. Therefore, we estimate the chance of runaway self-replicating machines causing “gray goo” and thus human extinction to be one per cent in this century. There could also be extinction risks from weapons produced by safe exponential molecular manufacturing. See also (Turchin, 2016). Artificial pandemic and other risks from synthetic biology. An artificial multipandemic is a situation in which multiple (even hundreds) of individual viruses created through synthetic biology are released simultaneously either by a terrorist state or as a result of the independent activity of biohackers (Turchin, Green, & Dekenbergern, 2017). Because the capacity to create such a multipandemic could arrive as early as within the next ten to thirty years (as all the needed technologies already exist), it could overshadow future risks, like nanotech and AI, so we give it a higher estimate. There are also other possible risks, connected with synthetic biology, which are widely recognized as serious (Bostrom, 2002). Agricultural catastrophe. There is about a one per cent risk per year of a ten per cent global agricultural shortfall occurring due to a large volcanic eruption, a medium asteroid or comet impact, regional nuclear war, abrupt climate change, or extreme weather causing multiple breadbasket failures (Denkenberger 2016). This could lead to 10% mortality. Red AI risks. The risks connected with the possible creation of non-aligned Strong AI are discussed by (Bostrom, 2014), (Yudkowsky, 2008), (Yampolskiy & Fox, 2013) and others. It is widely recognized as the most serious X risk. AI could start an “intelligence explosion wave” through the Universe, which could prevent appearance of the other civilizations before they create their own AI. Purple Something like the Caribbean crisis in the past, but larger size. Currently, there are no known purple risks. If we could be sure that Strong AI will appear in the next 100 years and would probably be negative, it would constitute a purple risk. Another example would be the creation of a Doomsday weapon that could kill our species with global radiation poisoning (much greater ionizing radiation release than all of the current nuclear weapons) (Kahn, 1959). A further example would be a large incoming asteroid being located, or an extinction level pandemic has begun. These situations require quick and urgent effort on all levels.

#### Capitalism locks in existential climate change---only socialism can achieve the absolute decoupling necessary to solve

Reese 20 - author of Socialism or Extinction and The End of Capitalism: The Thought of Henryk Grossman (Ted, https://grossmanite.medium.com/socialism-or-extinction-is-a-fact-not-a-slogan-3cb97b198c50, emuse)

Socialism or extinction is not just a slogan, though; it is a statement of scientific fact. If XR does not stand for socialism, then it must necessarily stand for extinction, rendering its own alleged purpose redundant. In short: capitalism is a profit-dependent system, and must therefore continue to expand production in order to keep investment flowing and profits rising (in absolute terms). And since profit arises from capital’s exploitation of commodity-producing labour, the intensity of the production based on fossil fuel and toxic, fuel-intensive metal mining is (increasingly) necessary. To flesh this out a bit more: capital’s exploitation of commodity-producing labour is the [sole source of profit](http://gesd.free.fr/kliman99.pdf) — the capitalist appropriates surplus value (surplus labour time) from the worker, i.e the worker keeps less value than they create, covering their living costs (necessary labour time), and surplus value is then realised through commodity sales. This social relation is obscured by the money-wage relation. Therefore, capital’s evermore demanding need to accumulate is based on the continual expansion of intensive production, i.e. the extraction of fossil fuel and metals, deforestation, intensive farming, etc., that is releasing carbon and other ‘greenhouse’ emissions — not to mention that they are fuel-intensive practices in the first place and toxic to the local environment — trapped in nature into the atmosphere, making the planet warmer and threatening runaway global heating that, according to numerous scientific studies, will make the planet uninhabitable for humans, probably before the end of the present century. (Capital’s exploitation of labour is therefore also the root cause of [alleged plummeting sperm counts](https://grossmanite.medium.com/declining-sperm-counts-polluted-breast-milk-autoimmune-disorders-the-diabolical-legacy-of-53462aa1245d) (down a reported 59% from 1973 to 2011), further threatening extinction. The microplastics, nanoparticles and toxic chemicals sourced from fossil fuels and metal mines and consumed in everyday products penetrate and damage human cells.) Although extractive industries are usually now very capital-intensive — the source of capitalism’s ([now existential) economic crisis](https://grossmanite.medium.com/with-hyperinflation-looming-and-capitalism-dying-socialism-is-becoming-an-economic-necessity-a031f9a746e0) — the rate of exploitation of the remaining workers is very high. It is not capitalism’s need for ‘infinite growth on a planet of finite resources’, as most leftists seem to put it, that is the central or immediate problem; rather, it is the pace of production and its expansion — determined by the size of an ever-larger total capital and its need to expand yet further by feeding off labour — relative to nature’s ability to replenish itself (something capitalism’s dependence on intensive extraction obviously hinders). Just as surplus value is converted into capital faster than it is produced — resulting in (on average) decennial recessions and, eventually, a historical limit to capital accumulation — so nature is converted into capital faster than it can be replenished. Compound accumulation Fossil fuels (petroleum, coal, natural gas and orimulsion) would shrink to roughly half of total primary energy supply in 2050, from about 77% in 2020 — [down from 81% in 2010](https://www.iea.org/data-and-statistics/charts/share-of-total-primary-energy-demand-by-fuel-2010-2019) — if the world meets the ‘minimum’ internationally agreed target of 2 degrees Celsius warming, [according to S&P Global Platts Analytics](https://www.spglobal.com/platts/en/market-insights/latest-news/oil/062320-fossil-fuels-energy-mix-infographic-interactive). (Even 1C has already seen a reported [400,000 people (and counting) a year dying from climate-related causes](https://www.inquirer.com/philly/blogs/public_health/Death-toll-from-climate-change-estimated-at-400000-In-2010.html); while the Arctic permafrost — containing 1.8 trillion tonnes of carbon, more than twice as much as is currently suspended in Earth’s atmosphere — is, we are told,[2] melting [70 years sooner than previously expected](https://bigthink.com/surprising-science/canada-permafrost). While fossil fuel may fall to 50% of the mix of energy production, its absolute production may rise, since economic output under capitalism tends to double every 20 years.[3] As Jason Hickel writes in his book Less Is More, there was “a steady rise of material use in the first half of the 1900s, doubling from 7 billion tons per year to 14 billion tons per year. But then, in the decades after 1945, something truly bewildering happens… material use explodes: it reaches 35 billion tons by 1980, hits 50 billion tons by 2000, and then screams up to an eye-watering 92 billion tons by 2017… This increase in material use tracks more or less exactly with the rise of global GDP. The two have grown together in lockstep. Every additional unit of GDP means roughly an additional unit of material extraction. “There has been a radical acceleration of fossil fuel use since 1945, rising along with the explosion in both GDP and material use. And carbon emissions have gone up right along with it. Annual emissions more than doubled from 2 billion tons per year to 5 billion tons per year during the first half of the 1900s. During the second half of the century they rose fivefold, reaching 25 billion tons by the year 2000. And they have continued to rise since then, despite a string of international climate summits, reaching 37 billion tons in 2019. Of course, there is no intrinsic relationship between energy use and CO2 emissions. It all depends on what energy source we’re using. Coal is by far the most carbon-intensive of the fossil fuels. Oil — which has grown much more quickly than coal since 1945 — emits less CO2 per unit of energy. And natural gas is less intensive still. As the global economy has come to rely more on these less polluting fuels, one might think that emissions would begin to decline.… [But] because GDP growth is driving total energy demand up at such a rapid pace … these new fuels aren’t replacing the older ones, they are being added on top of them. The shift to oil and gas hasn’t been an energy transition, but an energy addition. “The same thing is happening right now with renewable energy… To keep energy flowing when the sun isn’t shining and the wind isn’t blowing will require enormous batteries at the grid level. This means 40 million tons of lithium — an eye-watering 2,700% increase over current levels of extraction… It takes 500,000 gallons of water to produce a single ton of lithium. Even at present levels of extraction this is causing real problems. In the Andes, where most of the world’s lithium is located, mining companies are burning through the water tables and leaving farmers with nothing to irrigate their crops. Many have had no choice but to abandon their land altogether. Meanwhile, chemical leaks from lithium mines have poisoned rivers from Chile to Argentina, Nevada to Tibet, killing off whole freshwater ecosystems. The lithium boom has barely started, and it’s already a catastrophe… “Today the world is producing 8 billion more megawatt hours of clean energy each year than in 2000. That’s a lot — enough to power all of Russia. But over exactly the same period, economic growth has caused energy demand to increase by 48 billion megawatt hours. “There’s also something else going on. With every year that goes by, it becomes more and more difficult to extract the same amount of materials from the earth. Today, three times more material has to be extracted per unit of metal than a century ago.”[4] There is no such thing as ‘green capitalism’. The ‘Green New Deal’ proposed by social democrats — which actually involves privatising the last areas of common land — is species suicide. Socialism and non-intensive production Under capitalism, commodities are only produced if they are profitable, i.e. if labour is exploitable enough to expand capital. They are use-values/utilities and exchange-values. Under socialism, goods (having been decommodified) are produced if we deem them to be useful, via democratic regulation and demand. They are just use-values and socially owned, so no exchange of ownership takes place, i.e. exchange value and profit are abolished. If we deem that a good is not useful since it is damaging the environment or contributing to climate change too much, we can decide not to make it. Or we can find a way of making it that does not damage or exhaust nature. Rather than fossil fuel (which disappears into thin air and so has to be extracted anew by exploited labour, making it perfect for the needs of capital) or metals (which are finite), we could use non-labour-intensive renewables — sunlight, wind and especially (for physical products) fibrous plants ([especially hemp](https://medium.com/@Grossmanite/the-green-new-deal-is-species-suicide-only-a-hemp-based-industrial-revolution-can-save-earths-f9c3dc29c4e3), which can replace steel, concrete, graphene, lithium and fossil fuel) and [mycelium](https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/observations/the-mycelium-revolution-is-upon-us/) (from which we can even make [computers](https://royalsocietypublishing.org/doi/10.1098/rsfs.2018.0029)). And because socialism can plan and co-ordinate production as a whole on a break-even basis, instead of having to bow to the demands of capital accumulation and anarchic competition between private producers, we can grow economic output at the rate nature replenishes (or slower) — something that socialism could help instead of hinder. Achieving the abundant material wealth for all promised by communism (as it develops into its higher stage, when production becomes fully automated and, eventually, free) is part of the solution. Fibrous plants like hemp [quickly draw down and sequester CO2](https://www.huffpost.com/entry/hemp-and-lots-of-it-could_b_328275?guccounter=1) while reviving the soil, reversing desertification; and the products made from them (including bioplastic that is 10 times stronger than steel; batteries that [outperform lithium and graphene](https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-28770876); and highly-insulating [carbon-negative hempcrete](https://www.ukhempcrete.com/services/better-than-zero-carbon-buildings/)) keep that carbon sequestered indefinitely. Abundant material wealth for all includes abundant vegetation, permaculture, afforestation, etc. There is also the potential for micro-organisms to supply a near-infinite source of energy. In 2018, scientists in the US confirmed a theory first proposed by Soviet geologists when they found [huge populations of bacteria living in the extreme temperatures of Earth’s crust](https://www.independent.co.uk/news/science/deep-life-microbes-underground-bacteria-earth-surface-carbon-observatory-science-study-a8677521.html), despite the lack of photosynthesis and nutrients, living solely from chemical reactions fuelled by geothermal energy. They estimated that up to 23 billion tonnes of micro-organisms live in this “deep biosphere”, making it the largest ecosystem on the planet and accounting for nearly 400 times the amount of carbon found in all living humans. Here lies a potential source of abundant energy (although we will have to assess whether the benefits outweigh the impacts of drilling). Other scientists have even found that the Geobacter bacteria found in human waste can convert sewage into fresh water and [produce electricity in the process](https://www.nasa.gov/vision/earth/technologies/18may_wastenot.html). It is now thought that one day [microbial fuel cells](https://www.nasa.gov/feature/ames/could-electricity-producing-bacteria-help-power-future-space-missions/) could power our phones, household appliances — and even spaceships. Investment in microbial fuel cells will remain seriously limited, however, until value-creation is based solely on utility instead of exploitation and profit, since capital cannot exploit the labour time of microbes! Modern science — which is looking more and more ‘presocialist’, i.e. systematic, holistic and dialectial-materialist (the Marxist method of assessing history as moving forward through material and social interactions)— has proven that humans depend on plants and bacteria for everyday life, [smashing the myth of The Individual](https://aeon.co/essays/science-and-metaphysics-must-work-together-to-answer-lifes-deepest-questions) — the world is powered by collectivism. Indeed, trees, plants and bacteria are our relatives. The world is one interconnected whole. The socialisation of the means of production, whereby the means of production are owned by humanity instead of capital, will thus be a ‘naturalising’ humanisation, plantification and microbiolisation of production. Other forms of existing carbon-negative production that could be scaled up include ‘sky mining’ for diamonds that are chemically identical to earth diamonds, another industry that only exists on a small scale under capitalism because of the lack of labour exploitation involved. Emissions-free, energy-dense nuclear power, is also an option. The initial impact of mining uranium on the environment must be re-assessed by an independent socialist state, but to prove our earlier point, nuclear has not been abandoned because of safety fears, but because its capital-intensity has become unprofitable as ever-growing total capital becomes harder and harder to expand by the relatively diminishing pool of human labour. In terms of worker safety, nuclear is [the safest form of energy production](https://amp.theguardian.com/science/political-science/2015/nov/04/why-eco-austerity-wont-save-us-from-climate-change). There is also the prospect of space-based solar power and associated wireless transmission, without the intermittency of night time or winter suffered by solar panels and wind turbines on Earth. This, too, however, has proven too expensive for investors who won’t invest without the prospect of a higher return. Reverting to overly local, small-scale production—which would make everything more expensive — is not an option. Sea levels are rising and we probably need to build incredibly vast dikes on every continent. Rising temperatures will also massively increase the demand for air conditioning, which will have to be powered by something abundant and emissions-free, like nuclear. But socialism never works? Clearly, we need world socialism. Countries that are arguably ‘semi-socialist’ or that are supposedly ‘working towards’ socialism, like China and Venezuela, still work to some extent on the basis of commodity-production. But even ‘fully’ socialist countries still have to trade with capitalist countries, and that means having to make concessions to capital, working within a world capitalist system and having to maintain military defences at the expense of the civilian economy. Nor can they fully plan their economies due to fluctuating, unpredictable foreign prices. The need to build up foreign currency also incentivises black markets. Again, because socialist production is based on utility, socialism will also be able to invest in things like mineralising CO2 (turning it permanently into basalt rock). This is not a silver bullet since it is water-intensive, but it could certainly be scaled up significantly where water scarcity is not an issue (or if [water can be ‘artificially’ produced](https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2007/10/071031125457.htm)). That we are not doing this is a travesty — but where it would be a productive industry under socialism, it is an unproductive industry under capitalism, since it does not offer a commodity that can be sold for profit (unless it is sold to the state using public debt, thereby creating no new value and contributing to money devaluation that [will eventually (imminently) cause hyperinflation](https://grossmanite.medium.com/with-hyperinflation-looming-and-capitalism-dying-socialism-is-becoming-an-economic-necessity-a031f9a746e0)). It would therefore have to be funded by taxes that eat into already thinning profit margins, and so these taxes are resisted by capitalists, who anyway run the capitalist state. They are incapable of changing the system, even as it threatens to produce an ecocidal holocaust. Capitalism is now effectively an extinction cult and can only continue to steer Earth into the sun. Socialism — which is anyway [becoming an economic necessity](https://fleetworld.co.uk/road-test-hyundai-i30/) for the first time — gives humanity the chance of steering Earth to safety, in the nick of time.

### 1AC---Plan

#### The United States federal government should substantially increase prohibitions on anticompetitive business practices by the private sector in accordance with Democratically Planned Socialism.

### 1AC---Solvency

#### Solvency:

#### DPS is the optimal economic structure---avoids the challenges that accompanied the Soviet model

Kotz 8 - economics professor at Amherst (David, https://people.umass.edu/dmkotz/What\_Ec\_Struc\_Soc\_08\_03.pdf, emuse)

The economic problems of actually existing socialism were not inherent in socialism, or in economic planning. They were structural problems of the particular form of planning that first arose in the Soviet Union and later appeared in other Communist Party ruled states. All of the economic problems listed in section 2 above were due to a key feature of that form of socialism: an absence of popular participation in decision-making in the economy and the state. There were various problematic policies, but the foregoing structural feature was the underlying source of the economic problems.5 Economic activity in any system will serve the needs of those who have power within that system. In a market economy ordinary consumers have a limited power -- they can decide not to purchase something. Hence, producers have be concerned with what ordinary consumers want to buy, since that is something they cannot fully control, try though they may. In Soviet-type planning, those actors with power were able to get high quality goods produced for them. No one ever claimed that Soviet weapons were of low quality, yet they were produced via the system of central planning. Soviet military leaders, and the ministers in charge of production of military equipment, were powerful and could demand high quality products. Similarly, some of the industrial ministers in civilian sectors had the power to demand high quality products, and some Soviet industrial products were world class.6 Special enterprises produced housing for high officials, and the quality of such housing was excellent.7 Powerful Soviet officials exercised their power by their ability to discipline or demote top enterprise officials if product quality was deemed unsatisfactory. It was an effective incentive. By contrast, ordinary households had almost no power in the Soviet planning system. Enterprise managers were not rewarded and punished based on how well they satisfied household consumers. The environmental damage from Soviet-type central planning resulted from an unaccountable leadership's focus on economic growth. The absence of democratic rights for the population prevented the emergence of a strong environmental movement that could have insisted on changed priorities. For economic planning to work effectively, power must be dispersed among all of the relevant groups in the economy, not monopolized by unaccountable high officials. Models of participatory planning have been elaborated by a number of authors (Devine, 1988, 2002; Albert and Hahnel, 1991). They involve democratic participation both in the economy and the state, which must be closely intertwined in a socialist system. These models share the following five principles: 1) wide participation in decision-making by those affected by a decision; 2) representation of the population as workers, community members, and consumers on decision-making bodies; 3) a decision-making process based on negotiation and compromise, to handle the inevitable existence of opposing interests among different groups; and 4) an equitable sharing of the benefits and burdens of economic and political life. If consumer representatives sat on enterprise boards and on regional and national level planning bodies, they could insist that enterprises produce high quality consumer goods that people would like to purchase, with the power to set rewards and penalties to back up their demands. If the top political leaders are dependent on popular support for staying in office, they would be under pressure to make the system work to meet the needs of ordinary people. Democratic institutions, which in a capitalist system are always limited by the enormous political power of the rich, would work far better in a socialist system that has no class of wealthy property owners. The promise of getting rich is not necessary to build an efficient, innovative economy. "Innovation Institutes" could fund the testing out of new ideas, new products, and new services. Someone with a proposal for a new restaurant or service establishment could apply for funds and leasing rights to carry out their proposal, without departing from the principle of public ownership of productive property. Modest material rewards should be sufficient to encourage innovation and new and varied services, given the presence in any population of many individuals who are personally inclined to launch new projects. By providing representation for all constituencies in the making of allocation decisions, participatory planning would provide channels for all groups to see that their needs are addressed. It also recognizes the existence of conflicting interests even in a socialist society and provides institutions in which groups can negotiate and reach compromises. For example, enterprise boards having representatives of workers, consumers, and the community could strike a reasonable balance among workers' interest in not being overworked, consumers' interest in affordable and well-made products, and the community's interest in avoiding pollution of air and water. In a country having a relatively low living standard, a system of participatory planning would allow the population to demand a high rate of economic growth though democratic decisions about the resources to be devoted to investment and improved technologies. For participatory planning to work effectively, economic decisions should be as decentralized as possible to facilitate maximum participation by affected parties. Old-style central planning was overly centralized. Some economic decisions must be made at the center, but many can be made at a regional or local level. The claim that a system based on free markets is superior to any other in efficiency, innovation, and growth has no foundation. While a capitalist market economy can develop the forces of production and bring a rising level of material consumption for part of the population, history shows that it has been unable to build a society that meets the needs of the entire population. Only socialism can assure everyone material comfort, security, and a guaranteed opportunity to participate in productive labor, without some exploiting others. Only socialism can build a society based upon the better aspects of human nature, rather than its baser aspects, and finally enable people to become the real masters of their fate. But socialism can carry out this historic mission only if it embraces democracy and popular participation as the basis of its institutions.

#### American DPS goes global---serves as a shining city on a hill, removes obstacles, and offers assistance

PSL 8 (Party for Socialism and Liberation, [https://liberationschool.org/the-goal-of-socialism-peace-and-equality-amid-plenty/#](https://liberationschool.org/the-goal-of-socialism-peace-and-equality-amid-plenty/), emuse)

Experiences in socialist construction Thanks in great part to the practical experience of Lenin in making revolution, 21st-century socialists have a wealth of experience on which to base further conclusions. Marxists have been able to use accumulated theory and practice in order to lead revolutions in Russia, China, Korea, Yugoslavia, Cuba and many other countries. While there have been vast differences in the experiences of those socialist revolutions, they share one common feature: The socialist revolutions of the 20th century took place in countries where the level of productive forces was very low compared to the imperialist countries. Every successful revolution faced the primary task of developing their economies—while under constant military threat by world imperialism. For that reason, Lenin described the challenges of building communism in 1920 in very practical terms: “Communism is Soviet power plus the electrification of the whole country.” There was no hope in building socialism if the economy remained underdeveloped. Because of the combined challenges of developing the productive forces under the gun of world imperialism, no socialist revolution has yet reached a stage where the “withering away of the state” could be imagined. Imperialism has seized on any weakness in the revolutionary states in order to foment counterrevolution. Nevertheless, the working classes in the countries that have set out to build socialism have made tremendous gains. Russia’s working class in 1917 was 4 percent of the population. Within 50 years, it was the second-most powerful economy in the world. China had never been able to feed its entire population prior to the revolution. Millions died during famines in China prior to 1949. Yet after the 1949 revolution, for the first time the economy was able to feed the largest population in the world. Despite immense pressure from imperialism, Cuba has been able to achieve tremendous gains—despite the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Cuban workers enjoy among the highest living standards of any of their counterparts in Latin America or much of the oppressed world. The continued military and economic dominance by world imperialism—first and foremost by U.S. imperialism—has made the transition to socialism that Marx and Lenin described so far impossible. The workers’ states have needed to devote a considerable part of their social development toward the strengthening of the proletarian dictatorship—the army and police—in order to defend against invasion or counterrevolution. Taking that next step will require a society based on the dictatorship of the proletariat in the United States. Toppling the world’s dominant capitalist power would not only lift a tremendous burden from the workers around the world who are trying to engage in socialist construction. It would put at the disposal of the world working class the tremendous wealth produced by the U.S. working class. All the social wealth extracted from the oppressed world by U.S. corporations and mines could be used to reverse the effects of centuries of colonial and imperialist exploitation. A revolution in the United States would undercut the economic basis for divisions among the working class that promote racism, sexism and homophobia. Socialism is a system of peace, justice and equality. The road to socialism begins with revolution in the United States.

#### Proletarianization makes class struggle inevitable---the aff accelerates and properly directs movements

Reese 20 - author of Socialism or Extinction and The End of Capitalism: The Thought of Henryk Grossman (Ted, <https://www.amazon.com/Socialism-Extinction-Automation-Capitalist-Breakdown-ebook/dp/B081FHF2ZQ>, emuse)

Those who are lucky enough to find or remain in work as the capitalist crisis deepens will see their pay and conditions savagely forced down. In April 2018, the World Bank recommended yet more deregulation in a report that said “high minimum wages, undue restrictions on hiring and firing and strict contract forms all make workers more expensive vis-à-vis technology”.[437] International capital is preparing a major assault on international labour in order to accelerate moves towards automation. Even if the next crash is not a final breakdown, significant sections of the middle classes would be proletarianised and impoverished and the reserve army of labour would swell. Class struggle would explode. Capitalists could be forced to slow down or stop the introduction of new automation by, say, a strong and militant neo-Luddite or trade union movement and – the usual driver for concessions – the desire for social peace. But the contradiction persists: capital accumulation, and staying ahead of or keeping up with competitors, requires higher productivity and therefore labour-saving innovation. The deeper capitalism sinks into crisis the more necessary it becomes to raise productivity. That is, the more workers are replaced by robots, the greater the underproduction of surplus value becomes, and yet the system will need to respond by replacing more workers with robots. If it cannot do this then capital goes unvalorised and the economy crashes. From the perspective of the bourgeoisie, a strong neo-Luddite or trade union movement would sooner or later have to be crushed. In an article in January 2018 headlined “When the next recession hits, the robots will be ready”, the Washington Post pointed out that innovations happen quickest “when employers slash payrolls going into a downturn and, out of necessity, turn to software or machinery to take over the tasks once performed by their laid-off workers”.[438] Pointing to growing expectations by economists of a financial crisis in 2020, the paper adds that the “next wave of automation won’t just be sleek robotic arms on factory floors. It will be ordering kiosks, self- service apps and software smart enough to perfect schedules and cut down on the workers needed to cover a shift. Employers are already testing these systems. A recession will force them into the mainstream.” Striking statistics from an upcoming paper by economists Nir Jaimovich and Henry Siu “found that 88% of job loss in routine occupations occurs within 12 months of a recession. In the 1990- 1991, 2001 and 2008-2009 recessions, routine jobs accounted for ‘essentially all’ of the jobs lost. They regained almost no ground during the subsequent recoveries.”[439] Automation under capitalism is therefore accelerating the trend towards proletarianisation, higher levels of poverty and the underproduction of surplus value. It is the sharpest of sharpening contradictions, a vicious circle from which capitalism cannot escape. It is a trend which increasingly threatens a final breakdown. The ‘Leninist’ road to socialism[440] – whereby working class organisations (soviets (workers’ councils), communes etc) effectively form an independent state and then, when strong enough, destroy what is left of the capitalist state – of course seems to be dismissed now more than ever – by liberals who claim that the demise of the Soviet Union signalled the end of history;[441] by the anarchists and autonomists who believe a leap into ‘full communism’ can be achieved without the socialist stage; and by ‘democratic socialists’ who claim socialism can be built via bourgeois democracy by voting through ‘socialist policies’. Then there is the notion that Marx and Lenin are redundant because the supposed protagonist of their revolutionary strategy – the industrial proletariat – is dead or irrelevant. There are several problems surrounding this. The accusation about the industrial proletariat is made, in slightly different ways, not just by liberals but by some anarchists, who do not claim that the industrial proletariat is dead but persist with the myth that it is the protagonist of the Leninist revolution. The Bolsheviks focused on agitating among the urban or industrial proletariat because that was the most efficient use of scarce resources, with the intention that the message would then spread outwards to the wider proletariat as a whole. This accusation that Leninists ignore the wider proletariat is often a projection of valid criticisms of some ‘Trotskyists’, who, while posing as Leninists, or at least distorting Leninism, do overemphasise the importance of the industrial worker. This is because Trotskyists – who for the same reason tend to be de facto pro-imperialist (by giving critical support to the Labour Party, for example) – tend to derive from labour aristocratic positions in trade unions and universities. Lenin though is renowned for criticising socialists who limited their agitation to “trade union consciousness” or “economism” – ie, simply supporting, or tailing, working class demands, without advocating an independent (non-social democratic) working class party or proletarian dictatorship (or, before that, the overthrow of tsarism) – and for his ruthless criticism of a labour aristocratic minority which misled the masses with solely reformist demands. Hence why he said revolutionaries had to “dig deeper into the real masses” of the poorest workers, who had the least to lose and the most to gain. This meant that, in Russia, he saw the need for an alliance between workers and poor peasants, an alliance that Leon Trotsky initially rejected. Today, real Leninists still see the poorest and most oppressed workers as the main protagonists of revolution. The claim that the industrial proletariat is dead is either dishonest or smacks of ‘first world’ myopia. The industrial proletariat may have shrunk in the imperialist nations over the past 40 years but internationally it has grown spectacularly. In 2010, 79%, or 541 million, of the world’s industrial workers lived in ‘less developed regions’, up from 34% in 1950 and 53% in 1980, compared to the 145 million industrial workers, or 21% of the total, who in 2010 lived in the imperialist countries.[442] This shift is even greater in the manufacturing industry, since in emerging nations manufacturing forms a much higher proportion of total industrial employment than in imperialist countries, and therefore, as John Bellamy Foster et al point out, “the broad category of ‘industrial employment’ systematically understates the extent to which the world share of manufacturing has grown in developing countries”, citing figures for the US and China showing these ratios to be 58.1% and 75.2% respectively.[443] “Extrapolating these two ratios to ‘more developed’ and ‘less developed’ countries as a whole, 83% of the world’s manufacturing workforce lives and works in the nations of the Global South,” says John Smith in Imperialism in the Twenty First Century.[444] Based on the integration of ‘Southern’ workers into the global economy, the IMF has also attempted to take into account qualitative as well as quantitative changes, calculating an “export-weighted global workforce” by multiplying the numerical growth of the workforce by the increasing degree to which they produce for the global market rather than the domestic market. Since Southern-manufactured exports grew more than twice as fast as GDP during the quarter-century leading up to the global crisis in 2007, the IMF estimates that the effective global workforce quadrupled in size between 1980 and 2003. But even within the imperialist nations, where the industrial working class has declined both absolutely and relatively, Smith points to “deepening proletarianisation”, saying that “the proletarians have increased their already overwhelming predominance within the economically active population [EAP].... Between 1980 and 2005 the proportion of waged and salaried workers in total EAP in ... the developed nations steadily rose, from 83% to 88% (in 2005, around 500 million people), indicating deepening proletarianisation in these countries.”[445] In the US, it is even higher, with waged workers as a proportion of the EAP increasing from 90.6% in 1980 to 93.2% in 2011.[446] Because of distortions made by the ILO’s methods, this undoubtedly underestimates or obscures the size of the labour aristocracy, something we will come back to further on, but the trend is nevertheless clear, with more and more workers being forced into low-paid services work. Obviously with China, India and the former Soviet bloc being integrated into the global economy, 1.47 billion workers joined the global capitalist workforce very suddenly. But this does not distort the overall trend. With their supposed bias for the industrial proletariat, Leninists are accused of failing to recognise the multiple sections of the working class or its fragmentation. But far from ignoring the heterogeneous make-up of the working class, this is one of the factors that contribute to the Leninist conclusion that a vanguard party is necessary – to unite the disparate and sectional struggles of the working class into one unstoppable force. Likewise, the fact recognised across the left that technological advances have fragmented the working class, that they have increased unemployment and underemployment and therefore reduced workers’ leverage in their struggles against their bosses, reflected in the imperialist countries by the low number of strikes since the 1980s, must mean that the state is the primary battleground. We are already seeing this in the re-emergence of social democratic movements (see the previous chapter), whereby downwardly mobile labour aristocracies are becoming slightly more antagonistic towards the ruling class, and are attempting to harness the power of the working class as a whole, in what is essentially a fight with the middle and ruling classes over allocations of surplus value. These strawman accusations against Lenin misrepresent or misinterpret his definition of the proletariat, which followed Marx’s. The main feature of the proletariat as a class is not its direct link with the means of production but rather its separation from them. In other words, the proletariat is first and foremost characterised as a class by the fact that it does not own the means of production and has to work for wages. The salient feature is not what differentiates them, but what unites them. The more a worker is dependant on selling their labour power for survival the deeper their proletarianisation. Indeed, it is the fact that the industrial proletariat is shrinking relative to the working class as a whole, relegating a significant proportion of previously privileged workers into the poorer sections of the working class, that sees the mass of the latter grow numerically in strength. As the mass of exploited manual workers decreases due to scientific and technological progress, particularly automation, the mass of exploited intellectual workers, ie white collar employees, engineers and scientists (who increasingly contribute to commodity production) also increases in reverse proportion. The casualisation of university employment in the past few years is a case in point. In the US, although union membership stood at a lowly 10.7% of the workforce at the start of 2019, the unionisation of traditionally non- unionised white collar labour almost doubled between 2010 and 2017.[447] According to the Pew Research Center, the median wealth (assets minus debts) of the US middle class fell by 28% from 2001 to 2013.[448] People on middle incomes[449] accounted for 50% of the US adult population in 2015, down from 61% in 1971, while the poorest tier of the working class comprised 20% of the population in 2015 compared to 16% in 1975. The number of people receiving supplemental nutritional assistance, or food stamps, exploded from 26 million in 2007 to 46 million in 2012.[450] And 63% of the population say they have less than $500 in personal savings.[451] At the same time private and household debt has gone through the roof. In the 1970s, personal and credit card debts shot up by 238% relative to the 1960s. In the 1980s it shot up on the previous decade by another 318% and by another 180% in the 1990s.[452] According to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, household debt rose to a record $13.5 trillion in the fourth quarter of 2018, nearly 7% higher than in the third quarter of 2008. Even more troublingly, a record number of US Americans were three months or more behind on repayments for car loans (more than 7 million). As New York Times journalist Amy Chozick noted in May 2015, “the once ubiquitous term ‘middle class’ has gone conspicuously missing from the 2016 [presidential] campaign trail, as candidates and their strategists grasp for new terms for an unsettled economic era [in which] the middle class has for millions of families become a precarious place to be”.[453] Capitalism in the age of automation increasingly turns the majority of the population into proletarians and, in doing so, creates all economic, social and political prerequisites for the system’s downfall. The deeper the system sinks into crisis, the more proletarians are created, through unemployment, wage cuts and so on, and the more radical they are likely to become. This is borne out by the real development of the international proletariat. While we have already seen that the industrial proletariat has grown enormously, according to the ILO, the world’s “economically active population” (EAP) grew from 1.9 billion in 1980 to 3.1 billion in 2006.[454] Almost all of this numerical growth took place in the ‘emerging nations’, now home to 84% of the global workforce, 1.6 billion of whom worked for wages. The other one billion were small farmers and a multitude of people working in the ‘informal economy’,[455] which is, according to Mike Davis “the fastest growing social class on earth”.[456] While the industrial proletariat in the ‘Global South’ has grown enormously since 1980, its share of the South’s total workforce has been much more modest, rising from 14.5% in 1980, to 16.1% in 1990, to 19.1% in 2000, to 23.1% in 2010[457] – because the absolute growth of the non-industrial proletariat is even greater. Meanwhile, agricultural employment in the Global South has declined to 48% of its EAP, down from 73% in 1960, and from “approximately one-third” to just 4% of EAP in developed countries. However, the ILO reports: “Despite the declining share of agricultural workers in total employment, the absolute numbers of those engaged in agriculture are still rising, most notably in south Asia, east Asia, and sub-Saharan Africa.”[458] The other significant component of the growing proletariat? The unemployed. Smith reports that, apart from China, “no economy has grown fast enough to provide jobs to the legions of young people entering the labour market and the rural exodus to swollen cities in search of work. Even at the zenith of export-oriented industrialisation the ILO reported that ‘in the late 20th century, manufacturing ceased being a major sector of employment growth, except in east and southeast Asia’.” Senior ILO economist Nomaan Majid said the commerce sector, not manufacturing, “is the main employment growth sector in both low- and middle-income groups”.[459] This links back to what we saw in chapter four – that even in the developing nations, the trend towards automation is accompanied by growing unproductive work and unemployment. The numerical growth of the working class has been coupled with a massive attack on its wages, further deepening proletarianisation. In a striking example of how constant capital rises relative to variable capital, John Lanchester writes in the London Review of Books that in the US: “In 1960, the most profitable company in the world’s biggest economy was General Motors (GM). In today’s money, GM made $7.6bn that year. It also employed 600,000 people. Today’s most profitable company employs 92,600. So where 600,000 workers would once generate $7.6bn in profit, now 92,600 generate $89.9bn, an improvement in profitability per worker of 76.65 times. Remember, this is pure profit for the company’s owners, after all workers have been paid. Capital isn’t just winning against labour: there’s no contest. If it were a boxing match, the referee would stop the fight.”[460] Whereas wages in the US rose by 350% between 1927 and 1977, real terms growth has since been in decline. In Britain, wages grew at an annual average of 2.9% in the 1960s and 70s, 1.5% in the 90s and 1.2% in the 2000s. Between 2007 and 2015 that trend accelerated at an unprecedented rate, with real household wages falling by 10.4%.[461] The Resolution Foundation said the 2010s would be the worst decade for UK wage growth since the late 18th century. But as bad as the attack on wages in imperialist countries has been, it has been even worse in the countries imperialism plunders, where workers are of course already paid much less. According to the ILO’s World of Work Report 2011, since the early 1990s the “share of domestic income that goes to labour ... declined in nearly three-quarters of the 69 countries with available information”. While “the wage share among advanced economies has been trending downward since 1975”, it “occurred at a much more moderate pace than among emerging and developing economies – falling roughly nine percentage points since 1980”.[462] In contrast, the fall in Asia between 1994 and 2010 was around 20%. The imperialist countries have also seen a decline in full-time self- employment and self-employed income. This has included a continuing shrinkage in the number of small family farmers, indicating the proletarianisation of portions of the lower middle classes. Michael Elsby’s study The Decline of US Labor Share reports that the “rise in inequality is even more striking for proprietors’ income than it is for payroll income. In 1948 the bottom 90% of employees earned 75% of payroll compensation. By 2010 this had declined to 54%. For entrepreneurial income, however, this fraction plummeted from 42% in 1948 to 14% in 2010.”[463] A separate study of 2014 data by the US Small Business Administration suggests the same pattern regarding millennials (generally defined as people born between 1985 and 2004). “Fewer than 4% of 30 year-olds reported they were in full-time self-employment – a proxy for entrepreneurship – compared with 5.4% of Generation X-ers [1965 and 1984] and 6.7% of Baby Boomers [1945 and 1964] at the same age,” the FT reported.[464] Furthermore, the pace of decline in wages has accelerated in recent years, “with the wage share falling more than 11 percentage points between 2002 and 2006. In China, the wage share declined by close to 10 percentage points since 2000.”[465] Africa’s workers saw their share of national income reduced by 15% in the two decades since 1990, again “with most of this decline – 10 percentage points – taking place since 2000. The decline is even more spectacular in north Africa, where the wage share fell by more than 30 percentage points after 2000.”[466] Latin America saw the lowest decline, of 10% since 1993, and most of it before 2000, undoubtedly due to strong workers’ organisation and resistance, represented by the left-wing ‘Pink Tide’ in Venezuela,[467] Bolivia, Brazil and Argentina. As mentioned, mainstream economic accounting methods underepresent the size of the middle classes and labour aristocracy – which are bound to be proportionately bigger in imperialist nations – and do not take account of sharply increasing inequality between skilled/professional and unskilled workers or of income to capital that has been classified as income to labour, such as bonuses paid to bankers and wages and sponsorship of sports professionals etc, meaning the real extent of the fall in labour’s share is even higher, and considerably so. Elsby attempts to challenge these distortions, writing that in the US, the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ (BLS) calculation of a decline of 3.9% in the share of national income for labour over 1987-2013 becomes a 10% decline when the highest paid 1% of employees are excluded, and a 14% decline when the highest paid 10% are excluded. Based on this more honest method, the lowest 90% of wage earners (84% of the US’s total economically active population) actually earned 42% of the total payroll in 1980 and just 28% in 2011. Elsby also found that the fall for labour has accelerated as time has progressed, declining by twice as much between 2000 and 2011 as in the previous two decades.[468] Again, the trend towards deepening proletarianisation is clear. The material basis for a position of relative privilege among the lower middle classes and labour aristocracy is disappearing. The proletariat is numerically stronger than ever, especially as an international class. ‘Neoliberal globalisation’, which promised to produce prosperous nations of entrepreneurs and homeowners, has instead produced capitalism’s grave-diggers. All this is confirmed by the fact that inequality has hit record levels. In 2018 and 2019, Oxfam found that the 26 richest billionaires owned as much in assets as the 3.8 billion people who make up the poorest half of the planet’s population. The number had been 61 in 2016 and 43 in 2017, showing again that capital continues to centralise. Marx wrote that the concentration of wealth at one pole depended on the concentration of poverty at the other. And lo: the wealth of more than 2,200 billionaires across the globe increased by $900bn in 2018, a 12% increase against a fall of 11% in the wealth of the poorest half of the world’s population. Between 1980 and 2015, the global economy grew by 380%, yet the number of people living in poverty on less than $5 (£3.20) a day increased by more than 1.1 billion. In 1980, $2.20 of every $100 went to the world’s poorest 20%, but in 2003 that figure had fallen to 60 cents.[469] Inequality is most acute between rich and poor countries but it is growing within rich countries as well. In the US, for example, according to the Federal Reserve, the richest 1% owned a record-high 38.6% of the country’s wealth in 2016, nearly twice as much as the bottom 90%. Anti-socialists will still ignore all this or proclaim that the proletariat is no longer a revolutionary class because living standards are generally much higher than 100 years ago, claiming that really “we are all middle class now” or making shallow observations such as “capitalism works because workers have mobile phones!” as if cracking some kind of insightful gotcha that disproves Marxism. This ignores how as the rate of exploitation increases, the value of necessary labour falls, making the commodities workers need to buy to live cheaper. It ignores how the needs of the working class change as capitalism develops: workers need smartphones and laptops in this day and age of 24-hour connectivity if they are even to be considered employable, and so the cost of a smartphone is included in the value of labour power. It also ignores that workers in some countries may have access to better infrastructure than in others (indeed, although no technology has ever scaled as quickly as the mobile phone, while five billion people now have mobile phones, only around 2.5 billion of world’s population presently have a smartphone). But most of all, it is ignorant of the fact that capitalism is breaking down, which will impoverish and radicalise the working class. The revolutionary power of the working class is latent.

# 2AC

## Adv---Crisis

### 2AC---Crisis---PCTT

#### Overwhelming evidence proves that the rate of profit controls investment

Roberts 21 - London economist (Michael, <https://thenextrecession.wordpress.com/2021/06/17/profits-call-the-tune-2/>, emuse)

[I have argued in many posts that ‘profits call the tune’ in capitalist accumulation](https://thenextrecession.files.wordpress.com/2018/03/the-profit-investment-nexus.docx).  What I mean by that is that any change in business profits (and profitability) will lead to changes in business investment – and not vice versa over time. Profits are key to capitalist investment, not ‘effective demand’ as Keynesians argue, or changes in interest rates or money supply as Monetarists and the Austrian school argue.  I differ strongly from [the post-Keynesian view that profits are a ‘residual’ generated by investment;](https://thenextrecession.wordpress.com/2012/06/13/keynes-the-profits-equation-and-the-marxist-multiplier/)or as Keynesian-Marxist Michal Kalecki put it: ‘capitalists earn what they invest, while workers spend what they earn’.  Yes, workers spend what they earn from wage labour ie (consume and save little); but capitalists do not ‘earn’ profits from their investment in capital (means of production and labour).  [This theory denies Marx’s law of value that only labour produces value and surplus value (profit) for the capitalist.](https://thenextrecession.wordpress.com/2021/04/26/post-keynesianism-the-principles/) It turns profit into the ‘gift of capital’; ie there is no profit without capitalists investing.  Yet profits can be generated out of the exploitation of labour power and capitalists may not invest.  Indeed, that is what we can see now in the expansion of ‘fictitious capital’ at the expense of productive investment. And it’s not just the theory; the empirical evidence is overwhelming that profits lead investment.  In[several posts and papers,](https://thenextrecession.wordpress.com/2019/05/11/productivity-investment-and-profitability/) I have cited empirical work done by Marxist economists like Alan Freeman, Andrew Kliman, Peter Jones, Jose Tapia, Guglielmo Carchedi and others including myself that show this.  Moreover, there are also many mainstream economic studies from prestigious sources that deliver the same story.Recently, [in an article for the Financial Times,](https://www.ft.com/content/882dd72f-56a3-4482-87c8-e95bc54be27c?accessToken=zwAAAXoO4hdAkdOILdcvVqNEgtOHyOlbxUvifA.MEQCICkjFQY683NFnjfEf7kU--n77-a2JHn5n9T_pMTPBs1LAiA-CbFwsnR1ivHQfieKazWsDXjkLpPPxxVfro7ufDbLDQ&sharetype=gift?token=2b11918b-2fb9-4af6-98bd-938b2d469bcb) more evidence that profits call the tune has been presented.  Ian Harnett, co-founder and chief investment strategist at Absolute Strategy Research, a macro financial research company, finds that global business investment in the ‘means of production’ tends to follow global profits growth.  Harnett’s study is global and not just the US, where most empirical work has been done up to now. In the graph below, he measures the year-on-year change in global non-financial sector investment after depreciation.  In effect, this means new investment over and above that needed to replace worn out equipment and structures.  The graph shows that earnings (profits) growth in the non-financial sector from the 1990s leads changes in new non-financial investment: profits call the tune. When earnings growth rises as in the 1990s, investment follows it upwards and then down in the later 1990s.  Earnings growth started slowing as early as 2005, leading to a decline in investment, and eventually to the Great Recession.

[Chart, histogram

Description automatically generated](https://thenextrecession.files.wordpress.com/2021/06/cap1.png)

Several studies [(including my own](https://thenextrecession.wordpress.com/2020/09/20/more-on-a-world-rate-of-profit/)) show that the global rate of profit (profitability not profits) has been in secular decline over the last 70 years and in particular since the late 1990s.

[Chart

Description automatically generated](https://thenextrecession.files.wordpress.com/2021/06/cap2.png)

Source: Penn World Tables 10.0 IRR series

If the theory is right, then falling profitabilty long term should lead to a secular fall in business investment; and Harnett’s global data confirm that. Harnett’s data show that new investment relative to depreciation has declined globally from a multiple of 2 in the 1990s to less than one now.  In other words, annual global investment is now less than that needed to replace worn out fixed assets!

[Chart, histogram

Description automatically generated](https://thenextrecession.files.wordpress.com/2021/06/cap3.png)

‘Non-financial investment’ includes public sector investment, so it could be that the decline is partly due to fall in public investment as a share of GDP in the last 30 years and not due to a fall in business investment.  But while the reduction in public spending in infrastructure etc is a factor, it is clear from the first graph that investment has been falling in line with profitability and not mainly because of ‘austerity’. If we look at investment rates (as measured by total investment to GDP in an economy), we find that in the last ten years, total investment to GDP in the major economies has been weak; indeed in 2019, total investment (government, housing and business) to GDP is still lower than in 2007. In other words, even the low real GDP growth rate in the major economies in the last ten years has not been matched by total investment growth. And if you strip out housing, business investment has performed even worse. In his FT piece, Harnett wants to argue that post-COVID things are about to change. There will now be a focus of investing productively by ‘capital-heavy’ businesses through ‘reshoring’; spending on infrastructure especially on environmental targets; and on global protectionist measures to avoid reliance on China’s production etc. Harnett reckons this rise in investment will be driven by a new political will to keep interest rates low and a reversal of neoliberal austerity through extra government spending. But this conclusion runs against his own evidence that investment is driven by profits, not by government spending or ‘effective demand’.

### 2AC---C/T---CPT

#### Empirics prove developed socialist countries are the most peaceful

Oren and Hays 97 - poli sci professors (Ido and Jude, <https://sci-hub.se/10.2307/40645008>, EM)

We find that during the cold war, developed socialist states were, by a wide margin, less war-prone than all other states. Developing socialist states were the most war-prone, while developed capitalist and developing capitalist states were respectively the second and third most war-prone groups. These findings are highly robust. They hold across three different counts of war (based on three separate data sets) , and they hold whether we measure war propensity in terms of wars engaged in annually or in terms of wars entered into. Now, one might question our conclusion regarding the pacific nature of the developed socialist camp on the ground that most of this camp's members were mere satellites of the Soviet Union and that, therefore, their peacefulness reflects lack of political ability to wage war, more than lack of political will. To this objection we offer two responses. First, arguments that stress the coercive character of Soviet policy toward Eastern Europe implicitly tend to compare the rigidly hierarchical intrasocialist relations with a mythical West in which allies of the United States were allegedly unconstrained in their conduct of foreign policy. But once intrasocialist relations are compared with a more realistic image of intracapitalist relations - properly acknowledging that allies of the United States were not fully free to act as they pleased either - the contrast between East and West blurs considerably, although it does not dissolve entirely. Secondly, let us compare directly the war-frequency records of the United States and the Soviet Union alone. As the leading superpowers of the era, these countries were the least fettered by alliance constraints in their decisions for war and peace. If the Soviet Union, the leader of the socialist camp, is found to have been more peaceful than its capitalist counterpart, the proposition that advanced socialist states are most peaceful would gain added credibility. The number of wars in which the United States and the Soviet Union were involved during the period 1949-1989 (through 1988 for the Tillema data), are reported in the top row of table 11. Clearly, the Soviet Union fought fewer wars than did the United States. The ratios of Soviet to US wars are .50, .27, and .54 for the COW, Gantzel, and Tillema data, respectively. If we take war-duration into consideration, adding up the number of wars each superpower was involved in every year (see the bottom row of table 11), the difference between the war propensities of the two countries becomes even starker: the ratios of Soviet to US war-years are .08, .28, and .39 for the COW, Gantzel, and Tillema data sets, respectively.39 Thus, it appears that not only did advanced socialist countries as a group fight much more rarely than the advanced capitalist counterparts, so did their leader in comparison with the leader of the capitalist world. Conclusion In this study we analyzed the comparative war propensities of groups of states classified in accordance with the analytical categories of the Soviet theory of international relations. We found that during the period 1949-1989, developed socialist states went to war very rarely. The foreign-policy behavior of developed socialist states was significantly more peaceful than the behavior of any other socioeconomic group of states, including capitalist states. On the other hand, the group of developing socialist states was more war-prone than any other group of states during the same period. In other words, our results show that during the Cold War, advanced socialist countries were far more peaceful than the developing and the developed capitalist countries (in that order), who in turn were more peaceful than developing socialist states. Our goal is not to romanticize or resurrect the Soviet theory of international relations, but to "normalize" US social-scientific claims about the peacefulness of democratic countries.

#### Profit motive drives nuclear security mismanagement---makes inadvertent escalation structurally inevitable

Jay ‘20 [Paul Jay, founder of The Real News Network, “Risking the Apocalypse for Dollars,” July 3, 2020, https://theanalysis.news/risking-the-apocalypse-for-dollars-paul-jay/]

The people I have interviewed, from Daniel Ellsberg to Larry Wilkerson, who used to be Colin Powell’s chief of staff; I’ve seen interviews with the former diplomats, military people. They all think that nuclear war is not likely. They think it is assured. It’s not that there’s a chance, they think, of nuclear war. They think there is 100 % certainty that if things continue as they are at some point sooner, it could be today or tomorrow or later, it could be some years from now, there will be, at the very least, accidental nuclear war. The safeguards simply aren’t safe enough, and that this new investment, the new nuclear arms race that has started under Obama, but it’s also happening under Putin, driven by the military-industrial complexes of Russia and the United States, although the Americans are certainly more the instigators. But these whole new whack of nuclear weapons are coming online and the old ones that still exist and in deteriorating situations that are not safe, the possibility of accidental nuclear war is not possible, it is certain. They think the possibility of some kind of terrorist attack using dirty bombs could be mistaken for an attack by a major power. And if the dirty bomb went off in New York, as someone would have put a small nuclear bomb in a container ship and it blows up in New York Harbor, there’s only a 10 second window. We’re still on a hair-trigger alert between Russia and the United States. 10 seconds for the militaries of both countries to decide, if what just happened was an attack or terrorist attack, an accident, ten seconds.

Michael

All the people are not talking 10 minutes. You’re talking ten seconds.

Paul Jay

Ten seconds. Hair-trigger that on a radar map they see blips coming in to decide whether it’s geese or bombers. Everyone uses the same phrase. It is a miracle we are still here. The miracle is because, on several occasions, I think it’s close to a dozen If the protocols had been followed the soldiers who saw the blips or depending on the case, what the situation was. But they didn’t follow orders. And that’s why we’re still here talking about it. And I know if you want, I can give a couple examples of those cases.

Michael

Please do.

Paul Jay

I know it’s out there in the press somewhat, but I learned more about it in talking with Daniel Ellsberg. I’m working on a film with Ellsberg, which is kind of why I’m into this topic because before I started interviewing Ellsberg, I was in nuclear war denial as much as everybody else was. It was just not anywhere near the front of my consciousness. You know, all of this, I think when the Cold War ended, just kind of the whole anti-nuclear movement went away, and people thought, oh, well, you know, Russia and United States are going to get along now. They’ll figure out the old nukes and all this, and it just receded as an issue. But all the people that know the issue say it’s actually more dangerous now than it was during the Cold War. But Ellsberg woke me up to this. And one of the stories in his book, Doomsday Machine, and this documentary series I’m going to be doing is based on that book, it was during the Cuban Missile Crisis. There was a Russian submarine underneath the American ships as the American ships were blockading Cuba. What the Americans didn’t know is that the Russians had a protocol that if the submarine was out of contact with Moscow for 48 hours, if they couldn’t establish radio communication, they should assume nuclear war had broken out and fire. They had some kind of nuclear-tipped small missiles, and they were only 40 miles off the coast of the United States. And they should fire into the United States, assuming that Russia had been attacked, the Soviet Union had been attacked.

Well, while the Americans didn’t know about that protocol, what the Russians didn’t know is the Americans had figured out how to jam communication between the submarine and Moscow. So the communication does go down for 48 hours because it’s being jammed. The Russians don’t know that that’s the reason. The 48 hours go by, and it’s time to break out the envelopes that give the trigger orders to shoot order. So they bring out the envelope, and the protocol is three senior officers have to sign that they’ve agreed it’s appropriate to fire. So the captain signs, number two in command signs and then it’s up to the number three. Number three is the guy who’s the party official, and he represents the Soviet Communist Party on the ship, and he has to sign and he refuses. He says, “What if this is a technical problem?” And he actually gets disciplined when he gets home, but it’s only because he refused to sign that nuclear war didn’t break out during the Cuban crisis. And then there’s other examples like this both in Ellsberg’s book, and other places. We’re only here because a few people refused to follow orders. And it is a miracle.

Michael

Who owns the nuclear weapons production industry? And is it very profitable?

Paul Jay

Well, profit is what it’s all about, and this is what’s ridiculous. People have to understand how systemically dangerous capitalism is now. And this nothing says it more than the fact that it purely profits driving the nuclear war strategy of the United States. Daniel Ellsberg has a line which he says the nuclear weapons program after World War Two was a commercial subsidy for the aerospace industry. That there simply was no military justification to develop a nuclear weapons program after World War Two. He points to the ICBM. The whole ICBM program is obsolete. Billions and billions invested in the existing ICBM and new ICBM are coming online. But ICBM is, according to all the military experts that I’ve read, are easy targets. Intelligence on both sides, Russia and the United States and Chinese, for that matter. The Chinese are a little bit of an exception here because the Chinese have not built their nuclear force out anywhere near to the extent of Russia and the United States. But they know where the ICBM is, They’re essentially targets and they’re not that effective as a deterrent. What is effective as a deterrent are nuclear-armed submarines because they move around. It’s hard to track where they are and they have more than enough armaments to end life on Earth. But ICBM continues because they’re very expensive and the armaments industry makes tons of money out of making them. But if you want to go to the beginnings of this and understand the profit motive, I interviewed a guy named Lester Ernest and he was part of a program at M.I.T. in around 1959/1960.

He had joined the army. He got into the early computer program of the U.S. Army. When he got out, M.I.T. asked him to come and he started working on something called the Sage Radar System. And the Sage Radar System is in the Dr. Strangelove movie and maybe in some others. And you see this great big board where they can track incoming airplanes and then they supposedly know everything. And the Stage Radar System was connected to bomarc missiles. And what Sage would do is if Russian bombers were flying in, the computer system, and this was the largest gathering of computer power in the history of the world, at the time. And in fact, some of the technology that led to the creation of the Internet came out of the work done to develop the Sage radar system.

And they were going to track these bombers and then hit them with bomb arc missiles. And this gave everyone the assurance that the United States would be safe with developing their own nuclear armaments threat. And this defense system, they didn’t have to worry. There was even an underlying suggestion that the United States could conduct a first strike against the Soviet Union and still be safe because of sage and the Bomarc missiles.

So anyway, Lester goes to work at M.I.T. and he gets there in two or three days. And he turns to one of his colleagues and he says, ‘How did you guys figure out the radar jamming systems?’ Because we know the Soviet planes and our planes, everybody’s got radar jamming now. And Lester told me and I have this on camera, Lester says, ‘There’s a long silence. And the guy says to him, well, we didn’t really figure that out. And Lester says, ‘Well, then none of this works. And the guy says, well, we don’t talk about that,’. The whole thing was a fraud. They spent in today’s dollars a trillion dollars over about 25 years. And the whole thing was a scam. And the manufacturers of the Sage Radar System, the manufacturer of the bomarc missiles, which they then, this is another great one. I love this one. Lesters has to go to Congress. And this is asked by the armaments people, some of the Pentagon people, to go to Congress and get them to agree that the Bomark missiles that are going to shoot down these Soviet planes should be armed with nuclear missiles, nuclear warheads. I said to Lester, I said, ‘hold on for a second, so you’re gonna go to Congress and get them to recommend that Soviet bombers flying over Canada and the United States with nuclear weapons are going to be hit by missiles with nuclear weapons’. And all this is going to happen over Canadian and American territory. And this is making everyone safe. I said, I’m sorry excuse my language, ‘That’s F’ing insane’, and Lester says, ‘Of course it’s insane’. I said, ‘did you do it?’ He said, ‘yeah, I went and they agreed. And the Bomarc missiles were armed with nuclear-tipped nuclear missiles’. I said, ‘why did you do it?’. He said, ‘you know, we were just at that point in it for the money. We all thought we were all going to die. We all thought nuclear war was going to end everything. And we were just so cynical and we were getting paid so much. And the whole culture was about money sloshing around the manufacturers of the radar, the weapons and so on. The Pentagon, everybody was in on it and we went along with it’. He’s since regrets at all. He became the founder of the artificial intelligence lab at Stanford University and fought for open source and against trademark and copyrights and things. It kind of woke him up eventually.

But this whole fraud is at the heart of nuclear war planning. As we know that that nuclear war doesn’t now just mean the destruction of all the major cities of the United States, the Soviet Union, of course, Europe is gone. But it used to be thought, oh, well, that’s only the northern hemisphere. At least humans will survive in the southern hemisphere. Well, that’s not true either. It’s now pretty clear that there’ll be something called nuclear winter and that the firestorms created by the burning of the cities will create so much smoke and ash in the atmosphere, that will be the end of agriculture all around the globe. And this business, the manufacturing of the nuclear weapons, the Pentagon strategists, Congress that buys into it, Obama and then Trump and of course, all of the presidents since Truman. They go along with this because of the pressure of the military-industrial complex and the whole culture of proving that America’s the greatest Hegemon and so on. It’s put life on Earth at risk. But while there are political considerations, geopolitical considerations, this is still the grand chessboard for the people that think about these things. The heart of it is money making.

Michael

We’ve got about ten more minutes, Paul. I’ve got three more questions for you. Does America’s dominant global commercial position depend on military might, including the nuclear arsenal?

Paul Jay

That’s a good question. It certainly doesn’t depend on the nuclear arsenal, really. But that’s not to say the nuclear arsenal isn’t used. It is used as a threat against non-nuclear countries. Take Iran. There’s always sort of in the back of the confrontational discourse between the United States and Iran, the threat that a tactical nuclear weapon could be used against Iran. And in fact, Sheldon Adelson, the billionaire who is the big supporter of the far-right forces in Israel, and he helped elect Trump, he’s the one that financed Trump. He’s actually said on a panel in 2013, in New York, that the United States should seriously consider dropping a tactical nuclear weapon in an Iranian desert to send the Iranians a message of what’s in store for them. And as insane as that is, and insane as Sheldon Adelson is. Sheldon Adelson has the ear of Donald Trump. And even before that, Adelson had the ear of very powerful Republicans that he would donate money to. So nuclear weapons are a threat to help enforce American dominance but it’s not needed. Is the military might needed? Well, look at the inroads China’s making. China’s become the greatest trading partner of Brazil. It’s the number two or number one trading partner of every other country in Latin America. It’s ahead of the United States now in Africa. It certainly competes with and in many countries is ahead of commercial relationships throughout Asia. So where is this great military machine preventing the growth of the commercial power of China? It’s not. So the competition for a commercial hegemony, commercial global dominance, the military may be in the older days played that kind of role where Americans would directly go intervene with American troops and do regime change and get a pro-American regime. But how’d that work out in Iraq? They not only did not get a pro-American government, they did not even get control of the oil in Iraq. Interestingly enough, Chinese oil companies last I saw had more contracts than the American ones did because of the great anti-American sentiment amongst the Iraqi people. They got a government in Iraq that’s at least as aligned with Iran as it is with the United States.

You know, those days of being able to just go in and get regime change, like look at Libya. Libya was a grab. Libyan war was about Libyan oil, obviously. Well, whichever’s chaos and the Russians are making a big inroad in Libyan oil. So where is it that the military supports such commercial dominance? I’m not saying it doesn’t do anything. I’m sure in some situations the power of the American armed forces, certainly in the Middle East, where they in Bahrain, where they have a big fleet. The fact that the army is right there, it helps prop up the monarchy of Bahrain and Saudi Arabia. It’s not that it doesn’t play any role, but it doesn’t play that significant role because every time they actually try to use the military to intervene, it’s a debacle.

Michael

Paul Jay. Why, in this time of the COVID 19 pandemic, the great civil unrest, 40 million people unemployed, why is this a good time to raise the issue of nuclear disarmament?

Paul Jay

Well, because the threat is so imminent and most people have no sense of it at all. Even on the left, when I tell people I’m working on a film with Ellsberg about the Doomsday Machine, they raise their eyebrows and say, well, we’ve lived we’ve survived it this long. There’s no reason to think we won’t survive it longer. And the climate is far more dangerous an issue with the climate crisis. And, well, I would say the answer’s two things. One is, would you do want to trust a class political institutions that couldn’t deal with a virus with nuclear weapons and Armageddon? You’re going to trust our fate to those people? They couldn’t prepare for a virus that they knew about for years. These are the people you’re going to trust with the survival of humans. The second reason I say why now is I think the pandemic has made the unthinkable thinkable. This idea, even though we knew there was a pandemic coming, it just wasn’t real, it was abstract. The same way climate change is still abstract for so many people. But it’s a dose of reality and it’s a shredding of the sort of bubble that entertainment culture creates that we’re all, you know, as long as you’re not poor, as long as you’re not a poor person of color, life is OK and okay, enough that it’s better to just live in the comfort of denial. Well, the pandemic has broken down a lot of that comfort of denial. The other thing about the issue of nuclear weapons, while there are some immediate issues that need to be demanded, for example, the elimination of ICBM’s, the reduction at the very least of nuclear weapons down to 10 or 20 at the max, enough that you could say there’s a deterrent because Ellsberg believes you just can’t win the argument at this stage of not having any weapons at all. But you make the situation so much safer if you’re down to 10 or 20 and not thousands.

So that’s an immediate issue. But when you go beyond that kind of issue, the solution to the problem of the nuclear threat is the same solution as it is for climate crisis. Frankly, it’s the same solution for dealing with future pandemics. It’s the same solution for dealing with poverty. We have to deal with who has power. We have to deal with democratizing the economy and the development of converting military production to green production and democratizing politics. And it’s all about developing, I think, public economic institutions, starting with banking as a public utility and eroding the power of Wall Street. Because you asked who owns the nuclear armaments manufacturing companies?

Well, the same companies that interesting enough on the media, the same institutional investors, BlackRock, Vanguard, State Street, the other big asset managers and financial institutions that own 93% of the New York Times own Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, Boeing, the 12 companies that are the major manufacturers of nuclear weapons are all primarily owned by the same institutional investors that control, ready for this, 90% of the S&P 500. The concentration of ownership that’s taken place since 2007/08 crisis where these massive asset management companies like BlackRock, led by this guy, Larry Fink, who might be Biden’s secretary of the Treasury.

BlackRock is the company that just got handed the contract by the Federal Reserve to dole out this trillion to 700 billion or trillion. I can’t remember the number, to corporations, and so on. They own the companies that make all the weapons, including nuclear weapons. The same companies own the majority controlling interest of all the major fossil fuel companies, except for Total from France. They owned all the major corporate media, with the exception of Bloomberg, which is privately owned, and the Washington Post, which is privately owned. But everything that’s publicly owned is controlled by the same massive asset management companies. And it’s not like this is the evil Dr. Strangelove. These guys are just, that’s what they do.

They invest and they need maximum return on their capital. Like whose money is BlackRock investing? Pension funds, sovereign wealth funds, billionaires’ money. Between the three top asset management companies, they control 14 trillion dollars. That’s more than the GDP of China. Bloomberg says by 2020, their going to control more assets than the GDP of the United States. It’s a machine. It’s a blind machine. The way this capitalism works. The consciousness it creates in the people that are the elites and the people that manage these big institutions, they may individually understand how bloody insane it is, just the way Lester Earnest understood how insane the Sage Radar System was. But they can’t stop doing it. It’s just what it is and who they are. It only changes with a mass movement that demands these kinds of economic and democratic reforms with power in the streets that far surpasses what we’re seeing and far more conscious, not burning down buildings for no reason, but millions and millions of people in the streets combined with an electoral strategy to elect progressive candidates. And if we don’t do it, we’re doomed.

### 2AC---CPT---AT: Trade

#### Capitalism makes global trade collapse inevitable---transition is key

Galbraith ’18 [James K.; July 23; Professor at UT-Austin, was a delegate, at 20, to the Democratic National Convention in 1972; he teaches at the LBJ School, the University of Texas at Austin; The Nation, “Extreme Inequality Creates Global Disorder,” https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/extreme-inequality-creates-global-disorder]

The principal driver of global inequality—both within and between countries—is the global financial regime. This has been a feature since the end of the Bretton Woods system in 1971, with recurrent catastrophic effects following the onset of the 1980s debt crisis, including the collapse of the socialist nations and the 1997 Asian financial crisis. Back then, it was a conservative stroke of genius to institutionalize “market exchange rates” on a global scale. Those markets work well enough for rich nations, but they guarantee problems for everyone else. Each exchange crisis has wiped out a decade or more of progress against inequality, as anyone in Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, or much of Africa will tell you. The rise of China, on the other hand, has everything to do with its refusal to play the game of open capital markets. And while inequality in China rose rapidly for internal reasons beginning in the 1990s, it stabilized more than a decade ago.

Global inequality is a security risk—and not just because it breeds resentment, violence, and mass migrations. It also makes the entire system prone to collapse. For over 40 years, the United States has enjoyed the advantage of issuing the world’s reserve currency, running a trade deficit, and living well off the work of others. But the respect that would be due to exercising that role responsibly has been squandered by our behavior.

Reckless interventions have demonstrated the limits of military power—as our professional soldiers can attest, and as the current state of Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya demonstrate. A self-centered economic strategy is only a bit more subtle. Yes, even when a financial crisis originates in the United States, as happened with the subprime-mortgage debacle of 2007–09, funds still flow to the safety of the US dollar and government bonds. So long as this pattern holds, the United States actually benefits from economic insecurity and instability, both at home and abroad. But you have to be very optimistic—or flat-out crazy—to think that this can go on indefinitely.

Controlling inequality—like controlling blood pressure—is good for your economic health. Economies with less inequality generally have lower unemployment and stronger productivity growth, and some researchers also claim better human health and social cohesion. In terms of the rest of the world, the peculiar organization of the United States into a boom/bust economy based on finance and high technology is the exception rather than the rule: We combine record-breaking inequality with low unemployment. But this is a formula that generates massive instability, as well as the resentments that gave us President Trump. Countries with stronger stabilizing institutions built on the principle of countervailing power may be less rich over the short term, but they are better-governed and built to last.

Our long-term safety and prosperity will therefore depend on creating a more just and stable world banking and monetary system. We can either get to work on this ourselves, or accept that other large countries and blocs will take up the task, creating regional alliances that will restructure global trade and finance—as is already beginning to happen. If we are not part of a common process, then ultimately we will be cut out and cut back. No one should think that a policy of provoking and destabilizing Russia, China, and Iran is going to work for us, over the long or even the medium run. No one should think that Europe and Japan will stay US economic allies forever if their interests dictate otherwise. No one should imagine that military power provides enduring safety in a world of multiple major powers with their own resources, technologies, and ideas.

In the United States, the key driver of inequality is capital-asset prices. This is because in a capitalist nation, capitalists and not workers own such assets and get their income from dividends, interest, stock options, and capital gains. Capitalist booms yield prosperity—often a wasteful prosperity—along with instability; as the bankers say, it’s not the speed that kills, it’s the sudden stop. Concentrated ownership of capital assets is therefore a central issue. Spreading the wealth sensibly over time means more public investment at every level and more investment by nonprofits with longer time horizons and sensible social objectives. It means fostering cooperatives and other stabilizing private economic forms that are not dependent on Wall Street. Instead of boosting the economic growth rate—a measure largely disconnected from social well-being—we should have a strategy to live better: more sustainably, more equally, with less waste and more common spaces, more public goods and enjoyments.

## Adv---Innovation

### 2AC---AT: Courts Fail

#### Its fast and nationalization has an empirical basis---no new court doctrine needed

**Alperovitz 12** [Gar Alperovitz, a professor of political economy at the University of Maryland, “Wall Street Is Too Big To Regulate,” July 23, 2012, Section A, Page 21 of the New York Times]

Some economists in and around the University of Chicago, who founded the modern conservative tradition, had a surprisingly different take: When it comes to the really big fish in the economic pond, some felt, the only way to preserve competition was to nationalize the largest ones, which defied regulation.

This notion seems counterintuitive: after all, the school’s founders provided the intellectual framework for the laissez-faire turn against market regulation over the last half-century. But for them, “bigness” and competition could easily become mutually exclusive. One of the most important Chicago School leaders, Henry C. Simons, judged in 1934 that “the corporation is simply running away with our economic (and political) system.”

Simons (a hero of the libertarian idol Milton Friedman) was skeptical of enormity. “Few of our gigantic corporations,” he wrote, “can be defended on the ground that their present size is necessary to reasonably full exploitation of production economies.”

The central problem, then as now, was that very large corporations could easily undermine regulatory and antitrust strategies. The Nobel laureate George J. Stigler demonstrated how regulation was commonly “designed and operated primarily for” the benefit of the industries involved. And numerous conservatives, including Simons, concluded that large corporate players could thwart antitrust “break-them-up” efforts — a view Friedman came to share.

Simons did not shrink from the obvious conclusion: “Every industry should be either effectively competitive or socialized.” If other remedies were unworkable, “The state should face the necessity of actually taking over, owning, and managing directly” all “industries in which it is impossible to maintain effectively competitive conditions.”

At the height of the Depression, eight major economists (including Frank H. Knight) put forward a “Chicago Plan” that called for outright ownership of Federal Reserve Banks, the nationalization of money creation, and the transformation of banks into highly restricted savings-and-loan-like institutions.

To be sure, Simons later revised some of his views, and in the main he and others weren’t focused on financial crises. After all, in the mid-20th century, banks were far less concentrated than they are today, when the five biggest — JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America, Citigroup, Wells Fargo and Goldman Sachs — dominate the industry, with combined assets amounting to more than half of the nation’s economy.

It’s also true that not all Chicago School economists (not to mention their descendants) agreed with Simons, especially on the controversial issue of nationalization. But the logic of his argument remains: With high-paid lobbyists contesting every proposed regulation, it is increasingly clear that big banks can never be effectively controlled as private businesses. If an enterprise (or five of them) is so large and so concentrated that competition and regulation are impossible, the most market-friendly step is to nationalize its functions.

What about breaking up the banks, as many on the left favor? Recent history confirms another Chicago School judgment: while a breakup might work in the short term, the most likely course is what happened with Standard Oil and AT&T, which were broken up, only to essentially recombine a few decades later.

Nationalization isn’t as difficult as it sounds. We tend to forget that we did, in fact, nationalize General Motors in 2009; the government still owns a controlling share of its stock. We also essentially nationalized the American International Group, one of the largest insurance companies in the world, and the government still owns roughly 60 percent of its stock.

## T---Business

### 2AC---T---Business

#### 2. Function---Nationalization is an antitrust policy

**Hewitt 21** [Liane Hewitt, historian of political economy and international order at Princeton, Economic History Workshop is a monthly seminar series for Princeton students and faculty interested in the study of economic history, co-sponsored by the Department of History at Princeton and the Julis-Rabinowitz Center for Public Policy & Finance, the workshop provides a forum for scholars to present their findings and receive feedback on their research in a wide array of subfields, such as financial, business, labor, legal, intellectual, technological, and social history, Nationalization as Anti-Trust Policy: The Post-War Anti-Fascist Moment in France, Britain and West-Germany, 1944-51,” Feb 4, 2021, https://jrc.princeton.edu/events/hewitt-spring-2021]

This dissertation asks how international cartels became rejected after the Second World as the private scaffolding for organizing European capitalism and international order. After 1918, a broad consensus of actors (governments, politicians, legal and economic experts, and sectors of socialists, labor and consumer groups) boosted cartels as a near-panacea for stabilizing chaotic markets, securing the fragile peace, and building a common market that could hold its own against American Fordist mass-production and distribution. This chapter argues that the sweeping nationalization reforms enacted at the end of WW2 by Britain and France, under the Attlee Labour government and the Resistance-controlled Constituent Assembly respectively, should be seen as pivotal episodes in Western Europe’s anti-cartel turn. This interpretation brings together two traditionally separate historiographies: the first on the post-war social-democratic moment and the construction of national welfare states, and the second more technical literature on post-1945 de-cartelization. The chapter suggests that governments and activists justified nationalization as an anti-trust policy to defeat the anti-democratic, perhaps even fascistic power of private big-business over the state and national economic life. The organized Left had proposed comprehensive nationalization reforms since the end of WW1. But it was not until the anti-fascist and Liberation moment swept Britain and France in the wake of the victory of 1944-45 that governments took control of the commanding heights of their economies: notably credit, energy (gas, coal), transport, and iron and steel (in Britain, only). The chapter will conclude by briefly considering alternative national solutions to the cartel problem after 1945, which did not involve state nationalizations in Scandinavia and West Germany. American occupation and a weaker post-war anti-fascist moment in these countries may hold the key to explaining why they did not take the nationalization-as-antitrust policy route.

#### 3. Expand---if they’re right nationalization isn’t part of antitrust now, the plan changes the law to make it broader and inclusive of it

Hatter ’90 [Terry J Jr; March 20; January District Court Judge at the entral District of California; Westlaw, “In re Eastport Assocs.,” 114 B.R. 686]

Second, Eastport asserts that the presumption against retroactivity does not apply because the amendment was intended only as a clarification of existing law. Where an amendment to a statute is remedial in nature and merely serves to clarify existing law, no question of retroactivity is involved and the law will be applied to pending cases. City of Redlands v. Sorensen, 176 Cal.App.3d 202, 211, 221 Cal.Rptr. 728, 732 (1985). The evidence in this case, however, does not support the conclusion that the amendment to section 66452.6(f) was simply a clarification of preexisting law. The Legislative Counsel's Digest specifically states that “[t]he bill would expand the definition of development moratorium.” Senate Bill 186, Stats.1988, ch. 1330, at 3375 (emphasis added). Since the Legislative Counsel is a state official required by law to analyze pending legislation, it is reasonable to presume that the Legislature amended the statute with the intent and meaning expressed in the Counsel's digest. People v. Martinez, 194 Cal.App.3d 15, 22, 239 Cal.Rptr. 272, 276 (1987). By its ordinary meaning, the term “expand” indicates a change in the law, rather than a restatement of existing law. In light of the Counsel's comment, Eastport's argument is unpersuasive.

#### ‘Antitrust law’ includes behavior and enforcement

Gerber ’20 [David; October; Distinguished Professor of Law at Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology; Oxford Scholarship Online, Competition Law and Antitrust, “What is It? Competition Law’s Veiled Identity,” Ch. 1, p. 14-15]

C. A Core Definition

The Guide uses the terms “competition law” and “antitrust law” to refer to a general domain of law whose object is to deter private restraints on competitive conduct. We look more closely at the terms:

1. “General”—The laws included are those that are applicable throughout an economy and thereby provide a framework for all market operations (there are always some exempted sectors). Laws dealing only with specific markets (e.g., telecommunication) do not play that role.

2. “Domain of Law” here refers to a politically authorized set of norms and the institutional arrangements used to enforce them.

Is it law—or is it policy? The relationship between “competition law” and “competition policy” is not always clear. Often the terms are used interchangeably, but there can be important differences between them. Both can refer to norms used to combat restraints on competition, but they represent two different ways of looking at the relevant laws, and the differences can influence how norms are interpreted and applied. “Law” implies that established methods of interpretation are used to interpret and apply the norms and that established procedures are the sole or primary means of enforcing and changing the norms. In this view, the norms are a relatively stable component of a legal system. Thinking of those same norms as “policy,” on the other hand, implies that they are a tool of whatever government is in power and that it can use and modify them as it wishes.

3. “Restraint” refers to any limitation imposed by one or more private actors that reduces the intensity of competition in a market.

4. “Competition” refers to a process by which firms in a market seek to maximize their profits by exploiting market opportunities more effectively than other firms in the market.

## CP---Regs

### 2AC---AT: Boosts Competition

#### Corporate lysenkoism collapses scientific progress---its also an epistemological reason to discount neg evidence

UCS ‘12 - nonprofit science advocacy organization (Union of Concerned Scientists, <https://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/2019-09/heads-they-win-summary.pdf>, EM)

Access to the best available science allows federal decisionmakers to craft policies that protect our health and safety and the environment. Unfortunately, censorship of scientists and the manipulation, distortion, and suppression of scientific information has threatened the federal scientific enterprise in recent years. This serious problem has sparked much debate, but few have analyzed the key driver of political interference in federal science: the inappropriate influence of companies with a financial stake in the outcome. This influence affects not only the science used in decision making, but also public opinion and the decision-making process itself. By better understanding how corporations influence the use of science in federal decision making, we can both hold companies and policy makers accountable for their actions and ensure that the nation develops science-based policies that serve the public interest. The first chapter of this report explores the numerous methods corporate interests employ to inappropriately influence how the federal government uses science to make decisions. The second chapter provides an overview of the steps the Obama administration has taken to restore scientific integrity to federal policy making. The third chapter focuses on the federal reforms still essential to ensure that authoritative and independent scientific information informs policies designed to protect public health and the environment. Recognizing that solving this problem extends far beyond what the government can accomplish alone, we also suggest broader reforms that corporations, the scientific community, academic institutions, news media, and the courts can pursue to ensure transparency and accountability in the use of science. The twenty-first century presents the United States and the world with urgent science-based challenges. We must have the ability to use independent science to address problems such as the need for high-quality yet affordable health care, terrorism, climate change, rising demand for energy and natural resources, population growth, and the loss of biodiversity, and to anticipate and tackle challenges unknown today. Methods of Abuse Corporations attempt to exert influence at every step of the scientific and policy-making processes, often to shape decisions in their favor or avoid regulation and monitoring of their products and by-products at the public’s expense. In so doing, they often attempt to fundamentally alter the decision-making process and exploit executive branch agencies, Congress, and the courts. Corrupting the Science Corporations that stand to lose from the results of independent scientific inquiry have gone to great lengths to manipulate and control science and scientists by: Terminating and suppressing research. Companies have controlled the dissemination of scientific information by ending or withholding results of research that they sponsor that would threaten their bottom line. Intimidating or coercing scientists. Corporations bury scientific information by harassing scientists and their institutions into silence. Scientists have been threatened with litigation and the loss of their jobs, have had their research defunded, have been refused promotion or tenure, and have been transferred to non-research positions, leading to self-censorship and changes in research direction. Manipulating study designs and research protocols. Corporations have employed flawed methodologies in testing and research—such as by changing the questions scientists are asking—that are biased toward predetermined results. Ghostwriting scientific articles. Corporations corrupt the integrity of scientific journals by planting ghostwritten articles about their products. Rather than submitting articles directly, companies recruit scientists or contract with research organizations to publish articles that obscure the sponsors’ involvement. Publication bias. Corporations selectively publish positive results while underreporting negative results. While not directly corrupting science itself, these publishing and reporting biases skew the body of evidence. Shaping Public Perception Armed with public relations teams, private interests have launched campaigns that influence public opinion and undermine understanding of scientific consensus. Among their methods: Downplaying evidence and playing up false uncertainty. As scientific understanding of the health effects of products and substances such as tobacco and particulate emissions emerges, companies fight regulation by attacking the science, downplaying scientific consensus, exaggerating scientific uncertainty and spreading doubt. Vilifying scientists. Scientists analyzing the health and environmental effects of products such as asbestos and lead, and phenomena such as climate change, are publicly criticized and attacked. These attacks and allegations of misconduct discredit the scientists and deter them from continuing their research. Promoting experts who undermine the scientific consensus. Corporations promote individuals who overemphasize research that appears to cast doubt on the scientific consensus. Often their expertise is not in a relevant field, limiting their ability to effectively evaluate the scientific findings they are criticizing. Hiding behind front groups or “capturing” organizations. Companies use front groups, public relations firms, and other paid consultants to covertly advance corporate interests while these entities maintain the illusion of independence. Influencing the media. Corporations inaccurately portray science by feeding the media slanted reports and news stories, or biased spokespeople.

#### **Socialism is more efficient than capitalism**

Alexander 14 - acclaimed political commentator whose work is regularly praised by top academics (Scott, <https://slatestarcodex.com/2014/09/24/book-review-red-plenty/>, emuse)

There’s a very settled modern explanation of the conflict between capitalism and communism. Capitalism is good at growing the economy and making countries rich. Communism is good at caring for the poor and promoting equality. So your choice between capitalism and communism is a trade-off between those two things. But for at least the first fifty years of the Cold War, the Soviets would not have come close to granting you that these are the premises on which the battle must be fought. They were officially quite certain that any day now Communism was going to prove itself better at economic growth, better at making people rich quickly, than capitalism. Even unofficially, most of their leaders and economists were pretty certain of it. And for a little while, even their capitalist enemies secretly worried they were right. The arguments are easy to understand. Under capitalism, plutocrats use the profits of industry to buy giant yachts for themselves. Under communism, the profits can be reinvested back into the industry to build more factories or to make production more efficient, increasing growth rate. Under capitalism, everyone is competing with each other, and much of your budget is spent on zero-sum games like advertising and marketing and sales to give you a leg up over your competition. Under communism, there is no need to play these zero-sum games and that part of the budget can be reinvested to grow the industry more quickly. Under capitalism, everyone is working against everyone else. If Ford discovers a clever new car-manufacturing technique, their first impulse is to patent it so GM can’t use it, and GM’s first impulse is to hire thousands of lawyers to try to thwart that attempt. Under communism, everyone is working together, so if one car-manufacturing collective discovers a new technique they send their blueprints to all the other car-manufacturing collectives in order to help them out. So in capitalism, each company will possess a few individual advances, but under communism every collective will have every advance, and so be more productive. These arguments make a lot of sense to me, and they definitely made sense to the Communists of the first half of the 20th century. As a result, they were confident of overtaking capitalism. They realized that they’d started with a [disadvantage] – czarist Russia had been dirt poor and almost without an industrial base – and that they’d faced a further [disadvantage] in having the Nazis burn half their country during World War II – but they figured as soon as they overcame these [disadvantages] their natural advantages would let them leap ahead of the West in only a couple of decades. The great Russian advances of the 50s – Sputnik, Gagarin, etc – were seen as evidence that this was already starting to come true in certain fields. And then it all went wrong. II. Grant that communism really does have the above advantages over capitalism. What advantage does capitalism have? The classic answer is that during communism no one wants to work hard. They do as little as they can get away with, then slack off because they don’t reap the rewards of their own labor. Red Plenty doesn’t really have theses. In fact, it’s not really a non-fiction work at all. It’s a dramatized series of episodes in the lives of Russian workers, politicians, and academics, intended to come together to paint a picture of how the Soviet economy worked. But if I can impose a thesis upon the text, I don’t think it agreed with this. In certain cases, Russians were very well-incentivized by things like “We will kill you unless you meet the production target”. Later, when the state became less murder-happy, the threat of death faded to threats of demotions, ruined careers, and transfer to backwater provinces. And there were equal incentives, in the form of promotion or transfer to a desirable location such as Moscow, for overperformance. There were even monetary bonuses, although money bought a lot less than it did in capitalist countries and was universally considered inferior to status in terms of purchasing power. Yes, there were [Goodhart’s Law](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Goodhart%27s_law) type issues going on – if you’re being judged per product, better produce ten million defective products than 9,999,999 excellent products – but that wasn’t the crux of the problem. Red Plenty presented the problem with the Soviet economy primarily as one of allocation. You could have a perfectly good factory that could be producing lots of useful things if only you had one extra eensy-weensy part, but unless the higher-ups had allocated you that part, you were out of luck. If that part happened to break, getting a new one would depend on how much clout you (and your superiors) pulled versus how much clout other people who wanted parts (and their superiors) held. The book illustrated this reality with a series of stories (I’m not sure how many of these were true, versus useful dramatizations). In one, a pig farmer in Siberia needed wood in order to build sties for his pigs so they wouldn’t freeze – if they froze, he would fail to meet his production target and his career would be ruined. The government, which mostly dealt with pig farming in more temperate areas, hadn’t accounted for this and so hadn’t allocated him any wood, and he didn’t have enough clout with officials to request some. A factory nearby had extra wood they weren’t using and were going to burn because it was too much trouble to figure out how to get it back to the government for re-allocation. The farmer bought the wood from the factory in an under-the-table deal. He was caught, which usually wouldn’t have been a problem because everybody did this sort of thing and it was kind of the “smoking marijuana while white” of Soviet offenses. But at that particular moment the Party higher-ups in the area wanted to make an example of someone in order to look like they were on top of their game to their higher-ups. The pig farmer was sentenced to years of hard labor. A tire factory had been assigned a tire-making machine that could make 100,000 tires a year, but the government had gotten confused and assigned them a production quota of 150,000 tires a year. The factory leaders were stuck, because if they tried to correct the government they would look like they were challenging their superiors and get in trouble, but if they failed to meet the impossible quota, they would all get demoted and their careers would come to an end. They learned that the tire-making-machine-making company had recently invented a new model that really could make 150,000 tires a year. In the spirit of [Chen Sheng](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dazexiang_Uprising), they decided that since the penalty for missing their quota was something terrible and the penalty for sabotage was also something terrible, they might as well take their chances and destroy their own machinery in the hopes the government sent them the new improved machine as a replacement. To their delight, the government believed their story about an “accident” and allotted them a new tire-making machine. However, the tire-making-machine-making company had decided to cancel production of their new model. You see, the new model, although more powerful, weighed less than the old machine, and the government was measuring their production by kilogram of machine. So it was easier for them to just continue making the old less powerful machine. The tire factory was allocated another machine that could only make 100,000 tires a year and was back in the same quandary they’d started with. It’s easy to see how all of these problems could have been solved (or would never have come up) in a capitalist economy, with its use of prices set by supply and demand as an allocation mechanism. And it’s easy to see how thoroughly the Soviet economy was sabotaging itself by avoiding such prices. III. The “hero” of Red Plenty – although most of the vignettes didn’t involve him directly – was Leonid Kantorovich, a Soviet mathematician who thought he could solve the problem. He invented the technique of [linear programming](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linear_programming), a method of solving optimization problems perfectly suited to allocating resources throughout an economy. He immediately realized its potential and wrote a nice letter to Stalin politely suggesting his current method of doing economics was wrong and he could do better – this during a time when everyone else in Russia was desperately trying to avoid having Stalin notice them because he tended to kill anyone he noticed. Luckily the letter was intercepted by a kindly mid-level official, who kept it away from Stalin and warehoused Kantorovich in a university somewhere. During the “Khruschev thaw”, Kantorovich started getting some more politically adept followers, the higher-ups started taking note, and there was a real movement to get his ideas implemented. A few industries were run on Kantorovichian principles as a test case and seemed to do pretty well. There was an inevitable backlash. Opponents accused the linear programmers of being capitalists-in-disguise, which wasn’t helped by their use of something called “shadow prices”. But the combination of their own political adeptness and some high-level support from Khruschev – who alone of all the Soviet leaders seemed to really believe in his own cause and be a pretty okay guy – put them within arm’s reach of getting their plans implemented. But when elements of linear programming were adopted, they were adopted piecemeal and toothless. The book places the blame on Alexei Kosygen, who implemented [a bunch of economic reforms that failed](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1965_Soviet_economic_reform), in a chapter that makes it clear exactly how constrained the Soviet leadership really was. You hear about Stalin, you imagine these guys having total power, but in reality they walked a narrow line, and all these “shadow prices” required more political capital than they were willing to mobilize, even when they thought Kantorovich might have a point. IV. In the end, I was left with two contradictory impressions from the book. First, amazement that the Soviet economy got as far as it did, given how incredibly screwed up it was. You hear about how many stupid things were going on at every level, and you think: This was the country that built Sputnik and Mir? This was the country that almost buried us beneath the tide of history? It is a credit to the Russian people that they were able to build so much as a screwdriver in such conditions, let alone a space station. But second, a sense of what could have been. What if Stalin hadn’t murdered most of the competent people? What if entire fields of science hadn’t been banned for silly reasons? What if Kantorovich had been able to make the Soviet leadership base its economic planning around linear programming? How might history have turned out differently? One of the book’s most frequently-hammered-in points was that there was was a brief moment, back during the 1950s, when everything seemed to be going right for Russia. Its year-on-year GDP growth (as estimated by impartial outside observers) was somewhere between 7 to 10%. Starvation was going down. Luxuries were going up. Kantorovich was fixing entire industries with his linear programming methods. Then Khruschev made a serious of crazy loose cannon decisions, he was ousted by Brezhnev, Kantorovich was pushed aside and ignored, the “Khruschev thaw” was reversed and tightened up again, and everything stagnated for the next twenty years. If Khruschev had stuck around, if Kantorovich had succeeded, might the common knowledge that Communism is terrible at producing material prosperity look a little different? The book very briefly mentioned a competing theory of resource allocation promoted by Victor Glushkov, a cyberneticist in Ukraine. He thought he could use computers – then a very new technology – to calculate optimal allocation for everyone. He failed to navigate the political seas as adroitly as Kantorovich’s faction, and the killing blow was a paper that pointed out that for him to do everything really correctly would take a hundred million years of computing time. That was in 1960. If computing power doubles every two years, we’ve undergone about 25 doubling times since then, suggesting that we ought to be able to perform Glushkov’s calculations in three years – or three days, if we give him a lab of three hundred sixty five computers to work with. There could have been this entire field of centralized economic planning. Maybe it would have continued to underperform prices. Or maybe after decades of trial and error across the entire Soviet Union, it could have caught up. We’ll never know. Glushkov and Kantorovich were marginalized and left to play around with toy problems until their deaths in the 80s, and as far as I know their ideas were never developed further in the context of a national planned economy. V. One of the ways people like insulting smart people, or rational people, or scientists, is by telling them they’re the type of people who are attracted to Communism. “Oh, you think you can control and understand everything, just like the Communists did.” And I had always thought this was a pretty awful insult. The people I know who most identify as rationalists, or scientifically/technically minded, are also most likely to be libertarian. So there, case dismissed, everybody go home. This book was the first time that I, as a person who considers himself rationally/technically minded, realized that I was super attracted to Communism. Here were people who had a clear view of the problems of human civilization – all the greed, all the waste, all the zero-sum games. Who had the entire population united around a vision of a better future, whose backers could direct the entire state to better serve the goal. All they needed was to solve the engineering challenges, to solve the equations, and there they were, at the golden future. And they were smart enough to be worthy of the problem – Glushkov invented cybernetics, Kantorovich won a Nobel Prize in Economics. And in the end, they never got the chance. There’s an interpretation of Communism as a refutation of social science, here were these people who probably knew some social science, but did it help them run a state, no it didn’t. But from the little I learned about Soviet history from this book, this seems diametrically wrong. The Soviets had practically no social science. They hated social science. You would think they would at least have some good Marxists, but apparently Stalin killed all of them just in case they might come up with versions of Marxism he didn’t like, and in terms of a vibrant scholarly field it never recovered. Economics was tainted with its association with capitalism from the very beginning, and when it happened at all it was done by non-professionals. Kantorovich was a mathematician by training; Glushkov a computer scientist. Soviet Communism isn’t what happens when you let nerds run a country, it’s what happens when you kill all the nerds who are experts in country-running, bring in nerds from unrelated fields to replace them, then make nice noises at those nerds in principle while completely ignoring them in practice. Also, you ban all Jews from positions of importance, because fuck you.

### 2AC---AT: China

#### No China war

Shifrinson 2/8/19 [Joshua Shifrinson is an assistant professor of international relations at Boston University. The ‘new Cold War’ with China is way overblown. Here’s why. February 8, 2019. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2019/02/08/there-isnt-a-new-cold-war-with-china-for-these-4-reasons/?noredirect=on&utm\_term=.f8ca8195c4e4]

Is a new Cold War looming — or already present — between the United States and China? Many analysts argue that a combination of geopolitics, ideology and competing visions of “global order” are driving the two countries toward emulating the Soviet-U.S. rivalry that dominated world politics from 1947 through 1990. But such concerns are overblown. Here are four big reasons why. 1. The historical backdrops of the two relationships are very different When the Cold War began, the U.S.-Soviet relationship was fragile and tenuous. Bilateral diplomatic relations were barely a decade old, U.S. intervention in the Russian Revolution was a recent memory, and the Soviet Union had called for the overthrow of capitalist governments into the 1940s. Despite their Grand Alliance against Nazi Germany, the two countries shared few meaningful diplomatic, economic or institutional links. In 2019, the situation between the United States and China is very different. Since the 1970s, diplomatic interactions, institutional ties and economic flows have all exploded. Although each side has criticized the other for domestic interference (such as U.S. demands for journalist access to Tibet and China’s espionage against U.S. corporations), these issues did not prevent cooperation on a host of other issues. Yes, there were tensions over the past decade, but these occurred against a generally cooperative backdrop. 2. Geography and powers’ nuclear postures suggest East Asia is more stable than Cold War-era Europe The Cold War was shaped by an intense arms race, nuclear posturing and crises, especially in continental Europe. Given Europe’s political geography, the United States feared a “bolt from the blue” attack would allow the Soviet Union to conquer the continent. Accordingly, the United States prepared to defend Europe with conventional forces, and to deter Soviet aggrandizement using nuclear weapons. Unsurprisingly, the Soviet Union also feared that the United States might attack and wanted to deter U.S. adventurism. Concerns that the other superpower might use force and that crises could quickly escalate colored Cold War politics. Today, the United States and China spend proportionally far less on their militaries than the United States and the Soviet Union did. Though an arms race may be emerging, U.S. and Chinese nuclear postures are not nearly as large or threatening: Arsenals remain far below the size and scope witnessed in the Cold War, and are kept at a lower state of alert. As for geography, East Asia is not primed for tensions akin to those in Cold War Europe. China can threaten to coerce its neighbors, but the water barriers separating China from most of Asia’s strategically important states make outright conquest significantly harder. Of course, as scholars such as Caitlin Talmadge and Avery Goldstein note, crises may still erupt, and each side may face pressures to escalate. Unlike the Cold War, however, U.S.-Chinese confrontations occur at sea with relatively limited forces and without clear territorial boundaries. This suggests there are countervailing factors that may give the two sides room to negotiate — and limit the speed with which a crisis unfolds.

### 2AC---AT: CCS

#### Capitalism-based innovation can’t solve---empirics, rebound, outsourcing, and politics

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The first heroic assumption underpinning techno-optimist solutions is the ongoing reliance in many of the most influential large scale decarbonization strategies on CCS (carbon capture and storage). While CCS may play a valuable, albeit modest, long term role, the current state of knowledge suggests that we are still a very long way from affordable and scalable CCS deployment. Even the Global CCS Institute (2013: 5) has recently reported that, “while CCS projects are progressing, the pace is well below the level required for CCS to make substantial contribution to climate change mitigation”. The growing “emissions gap” is also providing increasing impetus for speculation about the “necessity” of geoengineering “solutions” with all their attendant concerns about ethical implications and unintended consequences (see Hamilton 2013).

The second debatable assumption is that technological innovation will necessarily and rapidly translate into global reductions in energy consumption. Important questions remain about the speed with which 100% renewable energy can realistically be achieved (see e.g. Smil 2010, 2014); the extent of fossil fuel energy consumption required to drive the initial massive expansion in renewable energy infrastructure; and the full life cycle energy return on investment (EROI) outcomes of solar and wind energy—particularly if these calculations factor in the full costs of energy storage (see e.g. Palmer 2013; Prieto and Hall 2013). Noting that emissions reductions of 4% p.a. in an economy growing at 2% p.a. are likely to require carbon intensity improvements of around 6% p.a., Anderson (2013) notes that he has yet to find any credible mainstream economist prepared to argue that prolonged emissions reductions of 3% or 4% or more are compatible with economic growth.

Indeed, as Lord Stern (2006: 231) himself has noted: There is likely to be a maximum practical rate at which global emissions can be reduced. At the national level, there are examples of sustained emissions cuts of up to 1% per year associated with structural change in energy systems... whilst maintaining strong economic growth. However, cuts in emissions greater than this have historically been associated only with economic recession or upheaval, for example, the emissions reduction of 5.2% per year for a decade associated with the economic transition and strong reduction in output in the former Soviet Union. These magnitudes of cuts suggest it is likely to be very challenging to reduce emissions by more than a few percent per year while maintaining strong economic growth.

The third reason for caution in assuming overly optimistic relationships between technological innovation, carbon intensity and emissions reductions is the impact of the “rebound effect” (see Jevons 1865; Herring and Sorrell 2009; Holm and Englund 2009; Jackson 2009). This phenomenon refers to the tendency for innovation and efficiency gains to be rapidly overwhelmed as cheaper unit costs combined with the formidable reach and power of the global advertising industry enable and encourage individuals to consume more of the same or alternative services and products. The harsh reality remains that global emissions continue to grow (IPCC 2013)—along with the global trends in the consumption of energy and resources—with apparent improvements in developed economy energy efficiency often masking the reality of energy intensive production being offshored to developing economies.

The likelihood of full and fast deployment of new technologies is the fourth problematic assumption that needs to be addressed given the formidable political and social obstacles standing in the way of rapid implementation. As noted in the recent Post Carbon Pathways review of learning from the implementation of large-scale decarbonization strategies (see Wiseman et al. 2013), experienced climate scientists and policymakers consistently come to the conclusion that the key obstacles standing in the way of rapid decarbonization are political and social rather than technological. Key roadblocks include the following.

#### CCS can’t solve warming

Kole 16 (Allison Kole, Senior legal fellow with the Climate Investigations Center, “It’s Too Late for Expensive Capture Technology to Help Climate,” The New York Times, July 7, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2016/07/07/clean-coal-or-a-dirty-shame/its-too-late-for-expensive-carbon-capture-technology-to-help-the-climate)

Despite decades of effort, carbon capture and storage for coal­fired power plants has yet to come close to offsetting the damage caused by coal and has created new hazards of its own. The term “clean coal” has always seemed like an oxymoron, and so it is no wonder that carbon capture, a technology touted by industry, has done little to clean up coal. We cannot afford further investment in a pipe dream that distracts us from developing real solutions and technologies for climate change. Yet policymakers, prodded by the coal industry, continue to invest money and precious time to try to develop carbon capture for coal­fired plants. The Department of Energy began developing carbon capture in 1997, and since 2008, Congress has allocated $7 billion for carbon capture programs. Still, no commercial­scale carbon capture power plant has gone online in the United States, and the long list of abandoned projects in the United States and abroad grows. Carbon capture is an expensive technology requiring expansive new infrastructure. This includes potentially thousands of miles of pipeline for transporting captured carbon dioxide and maintenance and monitoring of storage sites to prevent leakage. Assuming such obstacles can be overcome, it is likely too late for carbon capture to be scaled up as needed to be an effective tool for combating climate change. To achieve meaningful carbon dioxide reductions, approximately 100 carbon capture projects must be online by 2020 and 3,000 by 2050. No carbon capture project has been able to capture the quantities of carbon dioxide promised. Also, carbon capture investment is not a smart strategy for reducing carbon emissions. To recoup costs, some carbon capture power plant operators plan to sell carbon dioxide to oil companies to help them extract more oil. Also, because carbon capture reduces a coal plant’s efficiency, using carbon capture actually requires the use of more coal to produce the same amount of energy than a plant without carbon capture. Putting costs, infrastructure issues and efficiency problems aside, the use of carbon capture to reduce carbon emissions ignores the harmful effects of coal on the environment and communities. Regardless of any reduction in carbon achieved, plants with carbon capture still release harmful air pollutants and produce polluting coal ash ponds. With or without carbon capture, the burning, storage and extraction of coal disproportionately affects poor communities and communities of color. We cannot afford further investment in the carbon capture pipe dream that distracts the nation from developing real solutions and adaptive technologies for climate change. Our energy and environmental future should not be dictated by the narrow vision of the fading coal industry.

#### Leakage thumps

Chu 15 – writer for MIT News, (Jennifer, “Sequestration on shaky ground,” MIT News, Jan 20, 2015, <http://news.mit.edu/2015/carbon-dioxide-sequestration-doubts-0120>, jwg)

Carbon sequestration promises to address greenhouse-gas emissions by capturing carbon dioxide from the atmosphere and injecting it deep below the Earth’s surface, where it would permanently solidify into rock. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency estimates that current carbon-sequestration technologies may eliminate up to 90 percent of carbon dioxide emissions from coal-fired power plants. While such technologies may successfully remove greenhouse gases from the atmosphere, researchers in the Department of Earth, Atmospheric and Planetary Sciences at MIT have found that once injected into the ground, less carbon dioxide is converted to rock than previously imagined. The team studied the chemical reactions between carbon dioxide and its surroundings once the gas is injected into the Earth — finding that as carbon dioxide works its way underground, only a small fraction of the gas turns to rock. The remainder of the gas stays in a more tenuous form. “If it turns into rock, it’s stable and will remain there permanently,” says postdoc Yossi Cohen. “However, if it stays in its gaseous or liquid phase, it remains mobile and it can possibly return back to the atmosphere.” Cohen and Daniel Rothman, a professor of geophysics in MIT’s Department of Earth, Atmospheric, and Planetary Sciences, detail the results this week in the journal Proceedings of the Royal Society A. Current geologic carbon-sequestration techniques aim to inject carbon dioxide into the subsurface some 7,000 feet below the Earth’s surface, a depth equivalent to more than five Empire State Buildings stacked end-to-end. At such depths, carbon dioxide may be stored in deep-saline aquifers: large pockets of brine that can chemically react with carbon dioxide to solidify the gas. Cohen and Rothman sought to model the chemical reactions that take place after carbon dioxide is injected into a briny, rocky environment. When carbon dioxide is pumped into the ground, it rushes into open pockets within rock, displacing any existing fluid, such as brine. What remains are bubbles of carbon dioxide, along with carbon dioxide dissolved in water. The dissolved carbon dioxide takes the form of bicarbonate and carbonic acid, which create an acidic environment. To precipitate, or solidify into rock, carbon dioxide requires a basic environment, such as brine. The researchers modeled the chemical reactions between two main regions: an acidic, low-pH region with a high concentration of carbon dioxide, and a higher-pH region filled with brine, or salty water. As each carbonate species reacts differently when diffusing or flowing through water, the researchers characterized each reaction, then worked each reaction into a reactive diffusion model — a simulation of chemical reactions as carbon dioxide flows through a briny, rocky environment. When the team analyzed the chemical reactions between regions rich in carbon dioxide and regions of brine, they found that the carbon dioxide solidifies — but only at the interface. The reaction essentially creates a solid wall at the point where carbon dioxide meets brine, keeping the bulk of the carbon dioxide from reacting with the brine. “This can basically close the channel, and no more material can move farther into the brine, because as soon as it touches the brine, it will become solid,” Cohen says. “The expectation was that most of the carbon dioxide would become solid mineral. Our work suggests that significantly less will precipitate.”

## DA---Jurisprudence

### 2AC---DA---Jurisprudence

#### Antitrust judicial doctrine is incoherently steered now.

Crane 21 [Daniel A Crane. Frederick Paul Furth, Sr. Professor of Law, University of Michigan. I am very grateful for many helpful comments from Tom Arthur, Jonathan Baker, Steve Calkins, Dale Collins, Eleanor Fox, Rebecca Haw, Hiba Hafiz, Jack Kirkwood, Bob Lande, Christopher Leslie, Alan Meese, Steve Ross, Danny Sokol, and other participants at the University of Florida Summer Antitrust Workshop. "ANTITRUST ANTITEXTUALISM." https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4952&context=ndlr]

That it has been this way since the beginning does not mean that it must continue to be this way forever. At this moment of growing political and social interest in antitrust and revival of antimonopoly sentiment, the balance could tip decisively in favor of Brandeisianism and against the “Curse of Bigness.” Judges could be trained (or retrained) to begin taking the antitrust statutes seriously as statutory texts and begin applying them faithfully using the (contested) methodologies they use as to other statutes. But if judges began taking the texts of antitrust statutes seriously, query whether Congress would continue to write such broad statutes, or whether hydraulic pressures would induce a more sparing approach to antitrust legislation.

Then again, for all we know, the impulse to antitrust antitextualism may have a long tail. Words enacted today, in the fervor of another political moment for antitrust, may take on new meaning to the judges that examine them in a few years’ time. Old habits die hard, and the habit of antitrust antitextualism grows from the very roots of antitrust history.

#### No administrative state impact---it structurally fails

Demuth ’16 [Christopher; Spring; Distinguished Fellow at the Hudson Institute; Journal of Legal Analysis 8(1), “Can the Administrative State be Tamed?,”, pp. 121-190]

Specialization in government produces another kind of excess, excessive quantity. The inherent conflicts and cumbersomeness of legislative decision-making are a bulwark of limited government. Unconstrained lawmaking—the removal of limits on Congress’s legislative powers and on its ability to delegate those powers to specialized agencies—produces too much law. This is not to say that Congress is more inclined than agencies to adhere to the teachings of classical liberalism; rather, the sheer pertinacity of the modern administrative state inevitably penetrates and politicizes many areas of life better left to economic markets, social norms, private institutions, and personal judgments. Excessive law, litigation, and regulation is “the American illness.” 29 The objective performance of the federal government in domestic policy, especially regulatory policy, is consistently poor. 30 Government failure results in part from the problems of public monopoly and political decision making, and in part from the government’s simply doing many more things than can be done well. The tendency of specialized lawmaking to expand the range and detail of legal obligations weakens the rule of law in two ways: first, by subjecting citizens to excessive coercion, which weakens allegiance to law in circumstances where coercion is necessary, and, second, by producing ineffective and counterproductive law, which leads to justified popular disillusionment. Public trust in the federal government and its institutions (other than the military) has fallen dramatically during the past several decades of all-pervading government ( Pew Research Center 2014 ).

Executive government, especially in its current freewheeling unilateralism, also undermines the stability and predictability that are essential virtues of the rule of law. Legislation, because it is costly to produce, tends to be durable and slow to change. That permits business firms and individuals to organize their affairs, from legal compliance to business and personal plans, with relative confidence, and to economize on keeping up-to-date with the law’s commands. Over time even bad laws become less harmful, as citizens learn how to live with and work around them and the costs of doing so fade into “sunk costs.” Administrative law, even when it follows notice-and-comment rulemaking that may take years to complete, is more dynamic, expansionist, and unpredictable than statutory law. It requires greater expenditures on information gathering and lobbying and more frequent adjustments to private activities in response to new rules. Policy uncertainty and ever-looming change are enemies of private investment, causing firms to hoard cash and postpone hiring and capital projects. 31 And extra-statutory executive improvisation makes the problems worse by adding the element of surprise—of shifting legal obligations that cannot be anticipated even probabilistically from statutes, judicial precedents, speeches, agency notices, and other public information (“unknown unknowns”). Beyond discouraging saving and investment, legal instability encourages short-term thinking and action and compromises liberty by introducing additional contingencies into formal rights and practical expectations.

There is also a dynamic element to administrative law and uncertainty. The prolificacy of administrative law means that agencies have a large stock of old rules to draw upon as new contingencies arise over time. Health and environmental regulation is replete with discoveries of surprising new applications of old rules and statutes; the use of EPA stationary source permits to jerry-rig a program of greenhouse-gas controls, endorsed by the Supreme Court in its UARG decision, is one example. During the 2008 financial collapse, Treasury and FRB lawyers ransacked the Code of Federal Regulations and United States Code for plausible authorities for novel actions political officials were determined to pursue ( Wallach 2013 ; 2015 , ch. 3). In general, extemporaneous lawmaking creates incentives for business firms to become compliant insiders in programs that fuse regulation with collaboration, such as the ObamaCare insurance exchanges and the Dodd-Frank club of systemically important financial firms.

Finally, the modern administrative state is a regime of concentrated power. The combination of lawmaking, interpretation, surveillance, and enforcement, buttressed by opportunities for public-private partnering, creates abundant opportunities for the abuse of power, from personal corruption to policy favoritism to suppression of political and program opponents. In the American scheme, the separation of powers and competition among the three branches is a key mechanism for policing abuse. The consolidation of executive power and weakening of judicial and legislative checks will, to a certainty—as prescribed by Acton’s Axiom—lead to greater political and financial corruption. There are many plausible examples in recent years—Internal Revenue Service harassment of conservative political groups, abuse of patients at Veterans hospitals, political favoritism in the “managed bankruptcies” of General Motors and Chrysler. Beyond the headlines, highly discretionary regulation of valuable, time-sensitive corporate transactions features routine political preferment and abuse of elementary rights. Examples include the FDA’s threatened and actual criminal prosecution of pharmaceutical firms for providing doctors with truthful information about effective off-label uses of their products, 32 and the FCC’s use of its merger authority to force parties to accept “voluntary” non-germane obligations that the commission could not obtain through regular process ( Barkow & Huber 2000 , pp. 51–54; Koutsky & Spiwak 2010 , pp. 341–347; Yoo 2014 ). A particularly unsettling recent instance is the CFPB’s forcing Ally Financial to accept a $98 million settlement of flimsy charges of racial discrimination in making auto loans—the federal government was at the time a majority owner Ally as a result of TARP investments in its corporate predecessor GMAC, and the settlement was a tacit condition of Ally’s receiving urgent, unrelated regulatory approvals from the FRB and FDIC. 33

#### And West Virginia will kill it anyway.

Stoner ’2-15 [Rebecca and Jason Mark; 2022; the Sierra Club's Associate Communications Specialist; the editor of Sierra, citing Michael Gerrard, founder of the Sabin Center for Climate Change Law at Columbia Law School; the Sierra Club, “The Supreme Court v. A Livable Planet,” <https://www.sierraclub.org/sierra/supreme-court-v-livable-planet>]

Which brings us to the present, and to one of the weirdest elements of this legal saga. The Supreme Court is poised to consider a challenge to a federal regulation that never went into effect, and which the current Biden administration has no intent to revive. For environmental law experts, the court’s openness to hear the West Virginia and coal company challenge is worrisome, as it suggests that a majority of justices are willing to entertain this sweeping challenge to federal authority.

“The court went out of its way to take this case at this time, as it did in 2016,” Michael Gerrard, founder of the Sabin Center for Climate Change Law at Columbia Law School, told Sierra. “It’s extremely unusual to take a case at this procedural stage.… It’s a bad omen, I’ll say that.”

In their written arguments, the Biden administration and environmental groups have focused on the oddity of the court hearing a case in which none of the petitioners can demonstrate suffering any harm—since there’s no regulation in place at this time. “Petitioners lack standing to invoke this Court’s jurisdiction because they are not injured,” the Biden administration argues in its brief, and then goes on to state, “Petitioners' real concern is not with any extant EPA regulation, but with measures that the agency might adopt.”

In their brief, environmental and other public interest groups (including the Sierra Club), agree with the Biden administration that the court’s review of this case violates Article III of the Constitution, which states that US courts can only weigh in on actual “cases” or “controversies.” “The only truly dramatic feature of this proceeding is a conspicuous absence of Article III jurisdiction,” the public interest groups argue. “Petitioners’ primary complaints, then, are about how EPA might exercise its authority in future rulemaking. But such anticipatory claims are unripe.”

The claims by West Virginia and the coal companies may be procedurally “unripe” and therefore constitutionally dubious. But, politically, the petitioners’ arguments reflect the over-ripe culmination of a decades-long ideological campaign to dismantle the legal foundations of modern government.

“What the fossil fuel industry, as well as the red states, would ideally like [the court majority] to do is really just dispense with the EPA’s authority to regulate greenhouse gases,” Sokol said. “And if the court takes the bait, then that calls into question, not just can EPA regulate outside the fence line but also will it retain its greenhouse gas authority, period.… Taken to its logical conclusion, their argument effectively hobbles any sort of meaningful agency authority to respond to the greatest public health and safety threat we’ve ever faced."

Such talk isn’t just lawyers jumping at shadows. In their official arguments, the coal companies, Republican-controlled states, and conservative think tanks make plain that their ultimate goal is to take down what they pejoratively refer to as “the administrative state.”

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West Virginia attorney general Patrick Morrisey and his co-petitioners want the Supreme Court to place extreme limits on the federal government’s power through a radical reconsideration of the “major questions” doctrine, which, they claim, prohibits federal agencies from issuing rules of a “vast economic and political significance” unless Congress provides laser-precise statutory language authorizing them to do so. In other words, the petitioners want to stop federal agencies from having the authority to do much at all. And they want to do so via “judicial diktat” (to borrow a phrase from the dissent from Justices Breyer, Kagan, and Sotomayor in the recent case about federal COVID-related mandates). “Their petition is a bait-and-switch,” Sokol argues.

If the Supreme Court accepts the petitioners’ arguments about limits on the powers of federal agencies, every agency’s ability to do its job could be diminished. The Food and Drug Administration would have less capacity to protect us from contaminated food and drugs, the Consumer Protection Financial Bureau to crack down on fraud, and the Securities and Exchanges Commission to shield us from the consequences of Wall Street’s risky bets.

This latest conservative legal gambit is the result of nearly five decades of organizing by the extreme Right and their allies in the fossil fuel industry. The beginning of the ultra-Right’s focus on the courts was the 1971 Powell Memo, written by soon-to-be Supreme Court Associate Justice Lewis Powell. He argued that to protect American capitalism from “broad attack,” corporations had to work to gain influence over the courts. In the ensuing decades, wealthy right-wing ideologues like the Koch brothers ramped up their investments in attorneys general elections through a shadowy network of PACs and astroturf groups. In 2020, for example, Koch-funded organizations and PACs contributed a whopping $8,754,057 to Morrisey’s campaign for attorney general.

The Kochs and other wealthy free-market fundamentalists have also funded a network of academic institutes and think tanks that have brought their fringe libertarian beliefs into the mainstream—a strategy that has certainly borne fruit in West Virginia. In an amicus brief filed in this case, Democratic senators Richard Blumenthal, Bernie Sanders, Elizabeth Warren, and Sheldon Whitehouse make this point forcefully: “Almost everything about these cases … is an industrial byproduct manufactured in an effort to return to an era free from oversight by the government. The theories and arguments were incubated, grown, propagated, and distributed by a well-funded apparatus that has selfish and destructive goals.”

## DA---Heg

### 2AC---DA---Heg

#### Hegemony is collapsing now---its because of capitalism:

#### Unstable economic foundations

Solberg ‘8/30 [Klaus Solberg Søilen is a political economist and professor of Management at Halmstad University in Sweden where he teaches “History of Management Thought” among other subjects, “The Twilight of Pax Americana,” August 30, 2021, https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/the-twilight-of-pax-americana/]

To understand economics, we need to lift our heads above the daily news shows. Periods of economic decline take on different forms and are described by different terms depending on the severity. What we are witnessing now in the US is not just another recession or even economic collapse, but a hegemonic transition or in the worst-case collapse, that is, a powerful state about to lose control as we saw with the disordered withdrawal from Kabul this week.

A recession is a period of economic decline in two successive quarters. An economic collapse can last several years, as in the great depression of the 1930s but also the current COVID-19 pandemic. An economic collapse can lead to a social collapse when cultural identity breaks down, governments fall, and violence surges in the streets. A hegemon is a state that has predominance or control over all other states. During the past half-millennium Portugal, Spain, the Netherlands, France, and Britain were all at one time hegemons.

England went through a hegemonic transition in 1919 but avoided a societal collapse. As repeated occurrences of street violence, conflicts between racial groups, and the storming of the US capital showed, the US is far closer to balancing on the verge of societal collapse, suggesting hegemonic collapse.

Trump was elected because it was thought he would fight the elites. It was a populist revolt sparked by a growing middle class who have seen their living standard deteriorate over two generations. The height of the American dream was in the 50s. Since then peoples’ living standards have largely been debt-financed. The US has experienced close to 50 periods of recessions since the early 19th century and a handful of economic collapses like the 1815–21 depression, the Panic of 1873, and the Great Depression. What we are seeing now is different. A new hegemon is waiting in the corridors, just like the US did at the turn of the 20th century. The US external debt is not only the largest in the world but more importantly, it is now unpayable. And as all creditors know what cannot be paid will not be paid. To stay afloat as an economy the US has printed 40% of all dollars in existence during the past 12 months. And it is not only the economy and those whose work it is to see that it is functioning that is not delivering, but also other institutions, like the military. The US now lost another war, officially this week, withdrawing from Afghanistan while the victor, the Taliban, is already in control of most of the country, even though few experts and none of the mainstream commentators thought it possible even a week ago. The Chinese are waiting in the corridors in Afghanistan too, ready to make deals to get access to the country’s rich minerals, mainly copper, iron, and rare earth elements. Before that US troops left Iraq, preferring the term “withdrawal” themselves, but clear to much of the rest that it was a defeat. All of this signals not only a hegemonic shift but leadership in denial and out of touch with reality or so entangled in its own decline that every event must be taken as a PR opportunity.

The Chinese do not need Afghanistan as their Belt and Road Initiative – the largest infrastructure in the history of mankind – works itself around the country, in the north-west through Turkmenistan and in the southeast through Pakistan, so the Chinese have a strong negotiating position vis-a-vis the Taliban. To show Iraq that they are part of the country’s solution they buy about half of their oil even though they do not need to. Wherever the US fails China comes in and fills the void.

In little more than a century, we have gone from Pax Britannica to Pax Americana and now we see the beginning of Pax Sina. It is only about 100 years since the British pound collapsed as a world currency. The US surpassed Britain in 1919 as Britain was forced to leave the gold standard to finance its part in the First World War. The US economy had surpassed the British a few years earlier, in 1913. In comparison, China may surpass the American economy in a few years, maybe by 2028. New incumbents are always quick to take action. At the end of the Second World War America brought the victors to sign an agreement to tie their currency to the USD and to tie the USD to gold (Bretton Woods). With these signatures, US hegemony was confirmed. It was now a question of seeing how long the position could be held, drawing the parallel to Rome and Pax Romana as a yardstick of great civilizations. In hindsight now looking back at not only the economic performance of the past two generations but also to numerous disastrous military adventures around the world, the much shorter Vandal hegemony may seem like a more accurate comparison. The Bay of Pigs, the bombing of Cambodia, and the systematic support of dictators in South America do not wash away so easily.

Just like for the British, US hegemonic power only lasted until the next war, in Vietnam, as Nixon was forced to take the USD off the gold standard in 1971. Since then the world has had a broken economic system as the US exploited its fiat status to issue ever more debt while clamping down on other debtor country’s fiscal control. Thus, the moral high ground was pretty much lost from early on. That the USD was still able to dominate the economy of other countries for more than two generations was due to the quick spread of the USD. Today, still, 61% of all foreign bank reserves are in USD and 40% of all the world’s debt. This is only changing slowly for the time being and is part of the transitionary process.

Britain did not collapse completely, nor will the US if they can find other sources of income, but the parallel between the two countries’ reigns is striking. In the 1950’s Britain was still an industrial giant, but by the early 80’s after a disastrous time dominated by neoclassic economics which culminated with Margaret Thatcher as head of government most of it was gone. The last jewels like Jaguar, Rover, Rolls-Royce, and Bentley were part of the great sell-off in the ’90s and early 2000s. Desperate for alternative sources of income after the decline of the empire Britain allowed the City, a private entity with special jurisdiction in London, to take the lead. The City developed two schemes for wealth creation both based on the personal connection the country had developed with its former colonies. One was to assist new generations of leaders in these countries to transfer stolen funds out of the country. This became a major reason why Africa never experiences any real economic development. The second was to develop tax havens in other former colonies as a hiding place for dirty money and for people who wanted to avoid paying taxes, starting with the Cayman Islands. This system is well described in Tom Curtis’ book “Kletopia.” Today the tax avoidance scheme is so large that some estimates are that half of all deposits in the UK are placed in tax havens. That means that half of England’s potential taxable income is gone. Instead, the middle class is left to pay for an ever larger and more expensive social welfare state. The good news is that the tax havens can easily be shut down through a vote in the parliament. The bad news is that those who benefit from this scheme are overrepresented in parliament and will not vote against their economic interest. Instead, the public is served complicated and diffuse legal excuses.

American banks quickly drew advantage of the English scheme establishing offices in the City, but have also built their own system of setting up company headquarters in states with no or low corporate tax, states like Nevada, Delaware, Montana, South Dakota, Wyoming, and New York. As a result, there is a competition between states now that is leading to greater inequality and tensions between states which is already damaging the sense of unity which has made the country strong and prosperous. Just like England, the US has gone through a period of deindustrialization whereby jobs and investments have moved overseas. What was portrayed in business schools as “globalization” was in large part an economic suicide in the making whereby owners of companies defrauded their workers of their livelihood. I taught myself one of those courses (“international business”) for a few years at Copenhagen Business School more than two decades ago without reflecting much about the consequences of these theories. As a result of “globalization,” the majority of the jobs created in the US today are low-skilled jobs in warehouses and logistics, like at Amazon, jobs soon to be replaced by robots. The skilled craftsman jobs that were associated with an affluent middle class have to a large extent disappeared.

Both England and the US fell prey to the same homegrown political and economic ideas, the conviction that individualist ideas would lead to a prosperous society for all. This is a uniquely Anglo-Saxon idea in the history of hegemonies and one that is unlikely to be tried again soon. What started as moderate and sensible individualism with Adam Smith and John Stuart Mill, develop into ideas of excessive self-interest with Hayek, the Chicago school, and Ayn Rand. Nowhere were these ideas more spread than in the new financial elite, led by Alan Greenspan as head of the Federal Reserve. In its later stage, it was more like a cult than an ideology. The state or “commons” was seen as an enemy supported by “evil communists” associated with the USSR and China under Mao. This ideology quickly hijacked not only the entire study of economics but society at large making it unable to think rationally about large common projects, like infrastructure.

In the US it started to go seriously wrong in the 70s and 80s when “growth” was largely built on borrowed money. Focus shifted from industrial production to financial services under the disguise that “clean” services were more important than “dirty” production. A greedy elite simply could not make money fast enough and Wall Street was always willing to scam their fellow citizens, massively, again and again. Jerome Powell today is simply the latest priest of this casino-like pyramid scheme whose institution is about to go bankrupt, forced to print ever more money simply to survive the next week. Stock prices especially for US companies have since long stopped to reflect any real economic performance in the underlying assets. It’s all about pumping money into the stock market to prevent the markets from crashing. If they do not the baby boom generation who are in control of most of the assets will lose their pensions. The companies and CEOs play along, buying their own assets instead of investing in new production. There is little Powell himself can do except to try to prevent panic by spreading empty assurances of stability and growth dressed up in vague neoclassic jargon which commentators try to “interpret.” The news commentators themselves are lost, unable to ask critical questions, swinging back from restrained hopelessness to careful optimism. When they interview people who make their living investing in gold they swing towards gold, or when they argue for Bitcoin the person interviewed has invested in Bitcoin. More often now they also advise their viewers to keep cash much like the passengers on the Titanic were advised to go slowly towards the lifeboats. Cash held in USD will not solve the problem either as the USD system is at the heart of the problem. It’s systemic risk, there are no portfolio strategies that make sense with US equity or currency at this point, all will go down and this will in turn seriously affect foreign markets around the world. This also explains the absurd popularity of Bitcoin as an alternative investment. Bitcoin is backed by absolutely nothing, but at least it’s not the other stuff, or so the thinking goes. Holding Bitcoin may be a momentary rescue, but it is not likely to be around for long (of reasons we have to come back to in a separate article).

Loss of hegemonic control is natural throughout history. Portugal was surpassed by Spain, as Spain was surpassed by France, as France was surpassed by the Netherlands, as the Netherlands was surpassed by England. The only question seems to be how long a nation can hold on to power and how deep it will fall. Nations surpass each other by gaining a competitive advantage. To be a hegemon often comes down to a few variables, like the size of the population, the amount of natural resources available, the educational level, and an outward-looking mind. Competitive nations follow the SEPT process: With an interest in Science, you can build a good Educational system that can be used for increased production of goods and services which can be Traded with other nations for profit, which can be reinvested in Science. Thus, nation-states and their citizens become prosperous. Mainstream economists often call this mercantilism or neomercantilism, but that is only one part of the equation. A more inclusive term is geoeconomics. Sending gunboats was a successful strategy for England and the British empire, but only because they knew how to draw economic profits from it. The US never succeeded in copying the English geopolitical strategy. Instead, military investments became an economic burden.

The Netherlands never had enough natural resources to stay on top for long, nor a sufficient population size. Japan had the population, the science, but not the willingness to go abroad and learn about other cultures so it could not secure the natural resources it needed. Germany could have been the economic hegemon in the 20th century but got mixed up in two world wars which it lost. Sweden tried to be a European hegemon, desperately, but was never close to having a real chance. Now China has all the advantages needed for succeeding the US as a hegemon; the population, natural resources, the educational level, and a keen outward-looking mind, engaging with all nations also in places we have refused to go to, like in Africa. It even has the experience of having been a hegemon and the Confucian theories to make sure it does not go off track.

What happened to the US? After all, it still has the population, the natural resources, and to a large extent also an outward-looking mind, even though a bit rusty in geography and history. It still has most of the world’s best universities and a hard-working population. Well, like England it was persuaded by its own elites to sell out its production and with low domestic production, there was not only a lack of trade but also good jobs for the middle class. To compensate for the lack of trade the elites, who were now mostly in finance, suggested that everyone borrow for their consumption as this policy created new lucrative opportunities for themselves. That was the big betrayal. As they financed both political parties there was never an issue of persuasion. Political support was guaranteed. All of this was defended with economic ideologies as the neo-classics argued that money and debt were irrelevant for their models. The unspoken assumption was that all this was possible as the US owns and controls the world financial system. As other nations depend on the USD the US did not have to follow the same laws that it insists that other debtor nations follow. This was assured through their control of the World Bank, IMF, and a large, impressive military presence around the world. The free lunch was possible.

England declined with the loss of its empire. It simply wasn’t possible to suppress other nations with machine guns anymore. It was brought on its knees by its own elites who distanced itself from the rest of the population and dismantled and sold out its production capabilities. After that, it survived mainly as a financial center hiding the ill-begotten gains of criminals from all over the world and the fortunes of the wealthy classes. The US is declining because it outsourced production and built a strategy of growth on debt finance, a result of its own greed one could say. In the current phase of this economic system, there is no more money to be borrowed as interest rates are zero and bonds give no reasonable rate of return (below inflation). Instead, the country has been forced to print ever more USD simply to stop the stock markets from crashing. If it takes a bit longer than what many expect it’s because the USD system is so much larger. In the meanwhile, China is building parallel systems and organizations to help nations move away from US dependence, both economically and politically.

We do not know how long this hegemonic transition will take, but most indicators suggest we are at a later stage. A substantial fall in the value of the USD is possible in which case we are looking at a hegemonic collapse as opposed to a transition. Will this also lead to a societal collapse? Well, much depend on what the US will do in the coming months and years. We see that competition between states in the US is cutthroat, not only over taxes but also when competing for plants and headquarters of larger companies and highly skilled personnel. Racial and class conflicts have been increasing. In a generation, white-Caucasians will no longer be in majority. One likely scenario is that the country will look more like Mexico in a generation from now ethnically, politically, and economically, with isolated pockets of high production like we see developing in Texas today.

I enjoy living in a country with free speech, but a democratic system is not a requirement to succeed as a hegemon, like we in the West like to think. What people want is first of all a higher standard of living. Democracies can instead be vulnerable in times of economic decline. We saw this in Europe in the 20s and 30s with the rise of fascism and Nazism. We already see signs of this today in the form of populism, both in the US and Europe. Democracies always risk being ruled by the “vulguaris,” as we saw in Rome after the end of the Republic or as we have seen it in the US under Trump. This then seems to be the major weakness of democracies, they function best in times of prosperity.

#### Rising global inequality will collapse assurance and deterrence

Galbraith ’18 [James K.; July 23; Professor at UT-Austin, was a delegate, at 20, to the Democratic National Convention in 1972; he teaches at the LBJ School, the University of Texas at Austin; The Nation, “Extreme Inequality Creates Global Disorder,” https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/extreme-inequality-creates-global-disorder]

The principal driver of global inequality—both within and between countries—is the global financial regime. This has been a feature since the end of the Bretton Woods system in 1971, with recurrent catastrophic effects following the onset of the 1980s debt crisis, including the collapse of the socialist nations and the 1997 Asian financial crisis. Back then, it was a conservative stroke of genius to institutionalize “market exchange rates” on a global scale. Those markets work well enough for rich nations, but they guarantee problems for everyone else. Each exchange crisis has wiped out a decade or more of progress against inequality, as anyone in Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, or much of Africa will tell you. The rise of China, on the other hand, has everything to do with its refusal to play the game of open capital markets. And while inequality in China rose rapidly for internal reasons beginning in the 1990s, it stabilized more than a decade ago.

Global inequality is a security risk—and not just because it breeds resentment, violence, and mass migrations. It also makes the entire system prone to collapse. For over 40 years, the United States has enjoyed the advantage of issuing the world’s reserve currency, running a trade deficit, and living well off the work of others. But the respect that would be due to exercising that role responsibly has been squandered by our behavior.

Reckless interventions have demonstrated the limits of military power—as our professional soldiers can attest, and as the current state of Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya demonstrate. A self-centered economic strategy is only a bit more subtle. Yes, even when a financial crisis originates in the United States, as happened with the subprime-mortgage debacle of 2007–09, funds still flow to the safety of the US dollar and government bonds. So long as this pattern holds, the United States actually benefits from economic insecurity and instability, both at home and abroad. But you have to be very optimistic—or flat-out crazy—to think that this can go on indefinitely.

Controlling inequality—like controlling blood pressure—is good for your economic health. Economies with less inequality generally have lower unemployment and stronger productivity growth, and some researchers also claim better human health and social cohesion. In terms of the rest of the world, the peculiar organization of the United States into a boom/bust economy based on finance and high technology is the exception rather than the rule: We combine record-breaking inequality with low unemployment. But this is a formula that generates massive instability, as well as the resentments that gave us President Trump. Countries with stronger stabilizing institutions built on the principle of countervailing power may be less rich over the short term, but they are better-governed and built to last.

Our long-term safety and prosperity will therefore depend on creating a more just and stable world banking and monetary system. We can either get to work on this ourselves, or accept that other large countries and blocs will take up the task, creating regional alliances that will restructure global trade and finance—as is already beginning to happen. If we are not part of a common process, then ultimately we will be cut out and cut back. No one should think that a policy of provoking and destabilizing Russia, China, and Iran is going to work for us, over the long or even the medium run. No one should think that Europe and Japan will stay US economic allies forever if their interests dictate otherwise. No one should imagine that military power provides enduring safety in a world of multiple major powers with their own resources, technologies, and ideas.

In the United States, the key driver of inequality is capital-asset prices. This is because in a capitalist nation, capitalists and not workers own such assets and get their income from dividends, interest, stock options, and capital gains. Capitalist booms yield prosperity—often a wasteful prosperity—along with instability; as the bankers say, it’s not the speed that kills, it’s the sudden stop. Concentrated ownership of capital assets is therefore a central issue. Spreading the wealth sensibly over time means more public investment at every level and more investment by nonprofits with longer time horizons and sensible social objectives. It means fostering cooperatives and other stabilizing private economic forms that are not dependent on Wall Street. Instead of boosting the economic growth rate—a measure largely disconnected from social well-being—we should have a strategy to live better: more sustainably, more equally, with less waste and more common spaces, more public goods and enjoyments.

#### DIB is collapsing---nationalization saves it

John Stanton 6 [John Stanton is a writer specializing in political and national security matters. His last book is titled A Power But Not Super. 7-6-2006. “Nationalize the Defense Industry!” https://www.counterpunch.org/2006/07/06/nationalize-the-defense-industry/]//JM

Nearly 40 years hence, Charlie Cray and Lee Drutman have resurrected and energized Galbraith’s argument in their work titled Corporations and the Public Purpose: Restoring the Balance (Seattle Journal for Social Justice, Winter 2005). They make an exceptionally compelling case for putting the defense industrial base (DIB) into the direct service of the American public through a form of nationalization: federal chartering.

“Converting the companies to publicly-controlled, nonprofit status would introduce a key change: it would reduce the entities’ impetus for aggressive lobbying and campaign contributions. Chartering the defense contractors at the federal level would in effect allow Congress to ban such activities outright, thereby controlling an industry that is now a driving force rather than a servant of foreign policy objectives. As public firms, they would certainly continue to participate in the policy fora designed to determine the nation’s national security and defense technology needs, but the profit-driven impetus to control the process in order to best serve corporate shareholders would be eliminated. Thus, by turning defense and security firms into full public corporations, we would replace the criteria by which their performance is judged from quarterly earnings targets to criteria that is more consistent with the national interest.”

If Cray and Lutman’s notion seems radical, it’s only thanks to a fanciful story telling by those who move back and forth through the revolving, and always open, doors of the national security apparatus that link the Department of Defense, the US Congress, and the players who dot the DIB landscape. Apologists for the DIB have always distorted the importance of the defense industry to the nation’s security, particularly after the demise of the Soviet Union. They really believe that their industry should get special recognition for producing the goods and services used to wage war. To sell that concept, they’ve made sure that the difference between contractor and uniformed government employee is completely blurred. With that, it’s impossible to know who is protecting the balance sheet and who is protecting the US Constitution. In short, they’ve sold the public good.

There’s a lot of evidence to show that the DIB is not functioning in the nation’s best interest. Two interesting studies stand out. An April 2005 report by the Government Accounting Office titled Defense Logistics took a hard look at the system that supplies US troops in Iraq and concluded that it needed repair. The pipeline failed to deliver basic supplies, such as MRE rations, in a timely manner. Another from the National Defense University (see below) indicated that defense isn’t reaping broad benefits from information technology. That does not bode well for the push to network centric warfare.

The inability of the Pentagon to account for billions in missing funds here at home and in Iraq, ongoing criminal investigations spread across the entire national security landscape, and sensational resignations, arrests and convictions are unprecedented in US history. There is more here than just a few “bad apples.” It is a systemic problem made worse by the absence of leadership at the highest levels. There is self-interest, to be sure, but that is different from leadership. The American public is rapidly discovering that those running the show in the national security machinery aren’t necessarily interested in what’s best for them or the USA.

Fierce Competition? Show Me the Data!

According to a formula that measures market concentration, the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, the DIB is not a competitive industry. At a recent Center for Strategic and International Studies panel discussion on the DIB (csis.org), one participant warned that the myth of competition in the DIB might be exposed. “Some federal agencies use this index [Herfindahl-Hirschman Index] to establish guidelines for when you have to start worrying about the absence of competition. Competition is supposed to be a hallmark of the acquisition system that we’ve had since the end of World War II, but with only two big firms–which is the case for some categories of military equipment provided by our industrial base–there is little competition in the traditional sense. In fact, this situation-two firms that divide market share-has a name: duopoly. Not monopoly, but duopoly-and it’s pretty tough to brand duopoly circumstances fierce competition.”

The American public is led to believe that the DIB is unmatched in the broad applications of information technology. Not quite. An astonishing report by the National Defense University titled Bringing Defense into the Information Economy (David Gompert and Paul Bracken–March 2006) indicates that the Pentagon and its minions are still trying to figure out how to get into the information age. “One thing is clear [that] the phenomenon of increasing capability at declining cost now common in retail, financial services, telecommunications and other sectors remains uncommon in defense.” To that, DIB apologists retort that the defense industry is different. But Gompert and Bracken will not buy into the party line.

“Defense is different is a self-fulfilling excuse that perpetuates poor price-performance and deprives national defense of the benefits of larger, faster, more dynamic, and more inventive IT markets. It condones expensive adaptation and integration services. Moreover, by exaggerating the difficulty of applying IT to defense, this hypothesis legitimizes the ceding of government responsibility. It implies that the challenge of managing, adapting, and integrating IT into military capabilities is so daunting for DOD that it must be left to defense contractors”

Profiles in Protecting the Status Quo: The Voice of the DIB

Misconceptions About the Defense Industry (National Defense-July 2006, ndia.org), authored by Larry Farrell, president of the National Defense Industrial Association, is representative of defense industry’s world-view. Farrell, a retired USAF Lieutenant General, doesn’t believe the American people understand the importance of his industry to national security. He thinks that the defense industry needs to get out there and tell its story because “it will be critically important with the coming resource crunch, when the Defense Department will have to justify acquisitions and force structure costs against calls for reallocation of resources to other national needs.” OK, fair enough. But what kind of story will the American public get

He divines that the first thoughts that come to the public mind when asked about the DIB are $600 toilet seats, $400 hammers (actually they were $450 a piece), war profiteering, Eisenhower’s oft cited military-industrial complex thesis, scandals, and reports critical of the DIB. Naturally, Farrell blames the media for faulty reporting on the $600 toilet seat part and $450 hammers.

The NDIA president takes the reader back to World War I and proclaims that “the only things we took to war [WWI] that were truly American made were the Springfield rifles and our fighting spirits.” Huh?

It is true that US artillery pieces appeared late in the conflict and that the US had to buy aircraft and other weaponry from the British and French. The US Navy fought in WWI, at least according to the US Army and Navy historical offices. In 1916, American-made Navy destroyers, six of them, were escorting British cargo ships to protect the Brits from German submarine attacks. A US Navy Admiral, William Sims, convinced the British Admiralty to change its ship formations to a convoy pattern. In the end, 37 US destroyers participated in the effort significantly reducing cargo losses to the German U-Boats.

American made ships–one produced by Newport News Shipbuilding, the USS Fanning (DD 37)-and the the other by William Cramp & Sons, the USS Nicholson (DD 52), sunk a U-Boat in 1917. And, in quite a feat of industrial production, 1200 American-made M1917 Browning machine guns were used late in WWI.

It’s worth noting an event of latter day that was putting some strain on the US Army in 1916. The US Army had its attention focused on the Mexican border. The American public was more concerned about securing the Mexican border from the likes of Pancho Villa (attack on Columbus, NM killed 25 Americans) than war in Europe. At the height of the Mexican Campaign, some 150,000 national guard troops were deployed along the US and Mexico border with another 8,000 US Army infantry led by General John Pershing.

In the editorial, Farrell attempts mightily to challenge the stigma of war profiteer, but his argument about the tough “allocation of resources” ends in language that is precisely that of a war profiteer hunting for profits in the midst of resource scarcity. This argument-focused as it is on the corporate interest, ignores the lifetime-care costs for the some 18,356 wounded in Afghanistan and Iraq (and, one supposes, hundreds more wounded during Special Operations and intelligence activities all over the globe). The pay raises, increases in housing allowances and medical benefits over the past few years, for those in the military that matter most, are paltry compared with the bonuses, stock options and salary increases received by DIB leaders, and their partners throughout the national security machinery.

Finally, the American public doesn’t hear too much about the Lockheed Martin contracts to upgrade Chinese air traffic control systems. “We Never Forget Who We Work For,” says Lockheed. Boeing recently deployed the Sea Based X-Band radar system that’s floating off the coast of Hawaii. The platform for that technological marvel was built by Vyborg Shipping, a Russian firm. Is it really North Korea the Missile Defense people are interested in, or is it the Russian arsenal?

#### No liberal order or SOI impact---states won’t risk war, err towards isolation, AND mediate ties economically

Mueller ’21 [John; February 17; Adjunct Professor of Political Science and Senior Research Scientist at the Mershon Center for International Security Studies; The Stupidity of War: American Foreign Policy and the Case for Complacency, “The Rise of China, the Assertiveness of Russia, and the Antics of Iran,” Ch. 6]

Complacency, Appeasement, Self-destruction, and the New Cold War

It could be argued that the policies proposed here to deal with the international problems, whether real or imagined, presented by China, Russia, and Iran constitute exercises not only in complacency, but also in appeasement. That argument would be correct. As discussed in the Prologue to this book, appeasement can work to avoid military conflict as can be seen in the case of the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. As also discussed there, appeasement has been given a bad name by the experience with Hitler in 1938.

Hitlers are very rare, but there are some resonances today in Russia’s Vladimir Putin and China’s Xi Jinping. Both are shrewd, determined, authoritarian, and seem to be quite intelligent, and both are fully in charge, are surrounded by sychophants, and appear to have essentially unlimited tenure in office. Moreover, both, like Hitler in the 1930s, are appreciated domestically for maintaining a stable political and economic environment. However, unlike Hitler, both run trading states and need a stable and essentially congenial international environment to flourish.128 Most importantly, except for China’s claim to Taiwan, neither seems to harbor Hitler-like dreams of extensive expansion by military means. Both are leading their countries in an illiberal direction which will hamper economic growth while maintaining a kleptocratic system. But this may be acceptable to populations enjoying historically high living standards and fearful of less stable alternatives. Both do seem to want to overcome what they view as past humiliations – ones going back to the opium war of 1839 in the case of China and to the collapse of the Soviet empire and then of the Soviet Union in 1989–91 in the case of Russia. Primarily, both seem to want to be treated with respect and deference. Unlike Hitler’s Germany, however, both seem to be entirely appeasable. That scarcely seems to present or represent a threat. The United States, after all, continually declares itself to be the indispensable nation. If the United States is allowed to wallow in such self-important, childish, essentially meaningless, and decidedly fatuous proclamations, why should other nations be denied the opportunity to emit similar inconsequential rattlings? If that constitutes appeasement, so be it. If the two countries want to be able to say they now preside over a “sphere of influence,” it scarcely seems worth risking world war to somehow keep them from doing so – and if the United States were substantially disarmed, it would not have the capacity to even try.

If China and Russia get off on self-absorbed pretensions about being big players, that should be of little concern – and their success rate is unlikely to be any better than that of the United States. Charap and Colton observe that “The Kremlin’s idee fixe that Russia needs to be the leader of a pack of post-Soviet states in order to be taken seriously as a global power broker is more of a feel-good mantra than a fact-based strategy, and it irks even the closest of allies.” And they further suggest that

The towel should also be thrown in on the geo-ideational shadow-boxing over the Russian assertion of a sphere of influence in post-Soviet Eurasia and the Western opposition to it. Would either side be able to specify what precisely they mean by a regional sphere of influence? How would it differ from, say, US relations with the western-hemisphere states or from Germany’s with its EU neighbors?129

Applying the Gingrich gospel, then, it certainly seems that, although China, Russia, and Iran may present some “challenges” to US policy, there is little or nothing to suggest a need to maintain a large US military force-in-being to keep these countries in line. Indeed, all three monsters seem to be in some stage of self-destruction or descent into stagnation – not, perhaps, unlike the Communist “threat” during the Cold War. Complacency thus seems to be a viable policy.

However, it may be useful to look specifically at a couple of worst-case scenarios: an invasion of Taiwan by China (after it builds up its navy more) and an invasion of the Baltic states of Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia by Russia. It is wildly unlikely that China or Russia would carry out such economically self-destructive acts: the economic lessons from Putin’s comparatively minor Ukraine gambit are clear, and these are unlikely to be lost on the Chinese. Moreover, the analyses of Michael Beckley certainly suggest that Taiwan has the conventional military capacity to concentrate the mind of, if not necessarily fully to deter, any Chinese attackers. It has “spent decades preparing for this exact contingency,” has an advanced early warning system, can call into action massed forces to defend “fortified positions on home soil with precision-guided munitions,” and has supply dumps, booby traps, an wide array of mobile missile launchers, artillery, and minelayers. In addition, there are only 14 locations that can support amphibious landing and these are, not surprisingly, well-fortified by the defenders.130

The United States may not necessarily be able to deter or stop military attacks on Taiwan or on the Baltics under its current force levels.131 And if it cannot credibly do so with military forces currently in being, it would not be able to do so, obviously, if its forces were much reduced. However, the most likely response in either eventuality would be for the United States to wage a campaign of economic and military (including naval) harassment and to support local – or partisan – resistance as it did in Afghanistan after the Soviet invasion there in 1979. 132 Such a response does not require the United States to have, and perpetually to maintain, huge forces in place and at the ready to deal with such improbable eventualities.

The current wariness about, and hostility toward, Russia and China is sometimes said to constitute “a new Cold War.”133 There are, of course, considerable differences. In particular, during the Cold War, the Soviet Union – indeed the whole international Communist movement – was under the sway of a Marxist theory that explicitly and determinedly advocated the destruction of capitalism and probably of democracy, and by violence to the degree required. Neither Russia nor China today sports such cosmic goals or is enamored of such destructive methods. However, as discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, the United States was strongly inclined during the Cold War massively to inflate the threat that it imagined the Communist adversary to present. The current “new Cold War” is thus in an important respect quite a bit like the old one: it is an expensive, substantially militarized, and often hysterical campaign to deal with threats that do not exist or are likely to selfdestruct.134

It may also be useful to evaluate terms that are often bandied about in considerations within foreign policy circles about the rise of China, the assertiveness of Russia, and the antics of Iran. High among these is “hegemony.” Sorting through various definitions, Simon Reich and Richard Ned Lebow array several that seem to capture the essence of the concept: domination, controlling leadership, or the ability to shape international rules according to the hegemon’s own interests. Hegemony, then, is an extreme word suggesting supremacy, mastery, preponderant influence, and full control. Hegemons force others to bend to their will whether they like it or not. Reich and Lebow also include a mellower designation applied by John Ikenberry and Charles Kupchan in which a hegemon is defined as an entity that has the ability to establish a set of norms that others willingly embrace.135 But this really seems to constitute an extreme watering-down of the word and suggests opinion leadership or entrepreneurship and success at persuasion, not hegemony.

Moreover, insofar as they carry meaning, the militarized application of American primacy and hegemony to order the world has often been a fiasco.136 Indeed, it is impressive that the hegemon, endowed by definition by what Reich and Lebow aptly call a grossly disproportionate military capacity, has had such a miserable record of military achievement since 1945 – an issue discussed frequently in this book.137 Reich and Lebow argue that it is incumbent on IR scholars to cut themselves loose from the concept of hegemony.138 It seems even more important for the foreign policy establishment to do so.

There is also absurdity in getting up tight over something as vacuous as the venerable “sphere of influence” concept (or conceit). The notion that world affairs are a process in which countries scamper around the world seeking to establish spheres of influence is at best decidedly unhelpful and at worst utterly misguided. But the concept continues to be embraced in some quarters as if it had some palpable meaning. For example, in early 2017, the august National Intelligence Council opined that “Geopolitical competition is on the rise as China and Russia seek to exert more sway over their neighboring regions and promote an order in which US influence does not dominate.”139 Setting aside the issue of the degree to which American “influence” could be said to “dominate” anywhere (we still wait, for example, for dominated Mexico supinely to pay for a wall to seal off its self-infatuated neighbor’s southern border), it doesn’t bloody well matter whether China or Russia has, or seems to have, a “sphere of influence” someplace or other.

More importantly, the whole notion is vapid and essentially meaningless. Except perhaps in Gilbert and Sullivan’s Iolanthe. When members of the House of Lords fail to pay sufficient respect to a group of women they take to be members of a ladies’ seminary who are actually fairies, their queen, outraged at the Lords’ collected effrontery, steps forward, proclaims that she happens to be an “influential fairy,” and then, with a few passes of her wand, brushes past the Lords’ pleas (“no!” “mercy!” “spare us!” and “horror!”), and summarily issues several edicts: a young man of her acquaintance shall be inducted into their House, every bill that gratifies his pleasure shall be passed, members shall be required to sit through the grouse and salmon season, and high office shall be obtainable by competitive examination. Now, that’s influence. In contrast, on December 21, 2017, when the United States sought to alter the status of Jerusalem, the United Nations General Assembly voted to repudiate the US stand in a nearly unanimous vote that included many US allies. Now, that’s not influence.

In fact, to push this point perhaps to an extreme, if we are entering an era in which economic motivations became paramount and in which military force is not deemed a sensible method for pursuing wealth, the idea of “influence” would become obsolete because, in principle, pure economic actors do not care much about influence. They care about getting rich. (As Japan and Germany have found, however, influence, status, and prestige tend to accompany the accumulation of wealth, but this is just an ancillary effect.) Suppose the president of a company could choose between two stories to tell the stockholders. One message would be, “We enjoy great influence in the industry. When we talk everybody listens. Our profits are nil.” The other would be, “No one in the industry pays the slightest attention to us or ever asks our advice. We are, in fact, the butt of jokes in the trade. We are making money hand over fist.” There is no doubt about which story would most thoroughly warm the stockholders’ hearts.

### 2AC---AT: Prolif

#### Imperialism drives global proliferation

Mearsheimer 11John J. Mearsheimer, the “R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago” Jan/Feb 2011 “Imperial By Design” http://mearsheimer.uchicago.edu/pdfs/A0059.pdf

If all of this were not enough, global dominance, especially the Bush administration’s penchant for big-stick diplomacy, negatively affects nuclear proliferation as well. The United States is deeply committed to making sure that Iran does not acquire a nuclear arsenal and that North Korea gives up its atomic weapons, but the strategy we have employed is likely to have the opposite effect. The main reason that a country acquires nuclear weapons is that they are the ultimate deterrent. It is extremely unlikely that any state would attack the homeland of a nuclear-armed adversary because of the fear that it would prompt nuclear retaliation. Therefore, any country that feels threatened by a dangerous rival has good reason to want a survivable nuclear deterrent. This basic logic explains why the United States and the Soviet Union built formidable stockpiles during the Cold War. It also explains why Israel acquired atomic weapons and refuses to give them up. All of this tells you that when the United States places Iran, Iraq and North Korea on the “axis of evil” and threatens them with military force, it gives those countries a powerful incentive to acquire a nuclear deterrent. The Bush administration, for example, would not have invaded Iraq in March 2003 if Saddam had an atomic arsenal because the Iraqi leader probably would have used it, since he almost certainly was going to die anyway. It is not clear whether Iran is pursuing nuclear weapons today, but given that the United States and Israel frequently hint that they might attack it nevertheless, the regime has good reason to want a deterrent to protect itself. Similarly, Pyongyang would be foolish to give up its nuclear capability in the absence of some sort of rapprochement with Washington. And there is no good reason to think that spreading democracy would counter proliferation either. After all, five of the nine nuclear-armed states are democracies (Britain, France, India, Israel and the United States), and two others (Pakistan and Russia) are borderline democracies that retain significant authoritarian features. In short, the Bush administration’s fondness for threatening to attack adversaries (oftentimes with the additional agenda of forced democratization) encouraged nuclear proliferation. The best way for the United States to maximize the prospects of halting or at least slowing down the spread of nuclear weapons would be to stop threatening other countries because that gives them a compelling reason to acquire the ultimate deterrent. But as long as America’s leaders remain committed to global dominance, they are likely to resist this advice and keep threatening states that will not follow Washington’s orders.

#### No link---geopolitics outweigh ideology

Mark Haas 21 [Mark L. Haas is a professor and Raymond J. Kelley Endowed Chair in International Relations in the Political Science Department at Duquesne University. 7-19-2021. “When Do Ideological Enemies Ally?” https://direct.mit.edu/isec/article/46/1/104/102855/When-Do-Ideological-Enemies-Ally]//JM

Conclusion

When predicting the likelihood of cross-ideological alliances, it is tempting to believe that the famous realist dictum “the enemy of my enemy is my friend” provides an adequate guide. There is certainly much wisdom in this phrase. Mutual animosity toward pressing dangers is often sufficient to induce alliances among states, even among those founded on opposing ideological principles. The necessities of politics, including international politics, frequently result in strange bedfellows.

#### Security guarantees fail to dampen prolif

Philipp C. Bleek and Eric B. Lorber 14. Bleek is a Fellow at CNS and an Associate Professor in the Nonproliferation and Terrorism Studies Program at the Graduate School of International Policy and Management; Lorber is an adjunct Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, a Senior Associate at the Financial Integrity Network, and a senior adviser at the Center for Sanctions and Illicit Finance at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. 02/22/2018. “Security Guarantees and Allied Nuclear Proliferation.”

Two recent studies catalyzed a resurgence of interest in applying sophisticated quantitative tools to the proliferation puzzle. 5 Employing hazard analysis, Singh and Way (2004) found that states with nuclear-armed allies were neither less nor more likely to explore nuclear weapons options, launch weapons programs, or acquire weapons. Multinomial logit analysis, reported as a robustness check, similarly found no relationship between guarantees and states’ likelihood of launching weapons programs, but did find a robust negative relationship to both exploration and acquisition. Jo and Gartzke (2007) employed probit regression analysis, and concluded that states receiving security guarantees were no less likely to have active nuclear weapons programs, though they were less likely to possess nuclear weapons. Finally, two scholars tweaked Singh and Way’s earlier work. Kroenig (2009) reported that two out of three hazard models found a negative relationship between guarantees and acquisition, while one found no relationship. In a subsequent 2010 book that conducted analysis along similar lines yet came to the opposite conclusion, Kroenig (2010) reported that all four models that controlled for guarantees found no relationship to acquisition. Fuhrmann (2009)— employing probit regression analysis but, unusually, structured like Singh and Way’s hazard analysis to drop countries from the data set once they reach a given threshold—reported that all of his models found no relationship between guarantees and nuclear weapons program initiation or acquisition.

#### No spread AND no impact

Schneider, Senior Researcher, 19 (Jonas, at the Center for Security Studies, 9-7-19 “Chapter 26: Nuclear Proliferation and International Security.” Understanding Global Politics: Actors and Themes in International Affairs, edited by Klaus Larres and Ruth Wittlinger, Routledge, pp. 409–425.

Other analysts have sounded a much less alarmist tone, however. Some scholars even suggested that an Iranian bomb held great potential for stabilising an unbalanced and volatile Middle East (Waltz, 2012). Closer to the mainstream of Western strategic discourse, various experts have argued that despite the risks of proliferation, nuclear weapons, and the deterrent they provide should get (more) credit for contributing, in combination with other factors, to what has been labelled ‘the Long Peace’ among the great powers since 1945 (Gaddis, 1999, p. 268–271; Gavin, 2012a, p. 164; Acton 2010, pp. 16–17). Still others have contended that because nuclear proliferation is such a rare phenomenon, and since robust nonproliferation measures tend to be disruptive, the net destabilising effect of new nuclear countries is quite small and, therefore, manageable (Mueller 2010, pp. 95–99; Hymans 2013, pp. 293–296). The question of whether nuclear proliferation has stabilising or destabilising effects is not just fascinating for scholars of the nuclear age, but also highly consequential for practical policy issues. For in order to debate the merits of particular policy choices – such as preventive military strikes against nuclear facilities, grand bargains with potential proliferators or complete nuclear disarmament – we need to understand first how the spread of nuclear weapons impacts regional and global security. The chapter proceeds in three steps. The first section provides the foundation for the other parts by summarising what we know about empirical patterns of proliferation and the utility of nuclear weapons for statecraft. The second section then engages the literature on the consequences of proliferation, focusing in particular on how proliferation has influenced international stability. The final section explores whether some states have been more affected than others, and what measures these states have taken to prevent proliferation, or at least mitigate its negative consequences. Patterns of nuclear proliferation and the utility of nuclear weapons Nuclear proliferation is commonly defined as the spread of nuclear weapons to states that did not previously have them. Within a broader conceptual framework that is rarely used by scholars, yet popular in the arms control community, this diffusion of nuclear weapons to additional states is labelled horizontal proliferation. It is conceptually accompanied by the notion of vertical proliferation, which refers to qualitative improvements and increases in the number of nuclear weapons in the stockpiles of existing nuclear weapon states. In accordance with the typical usage of the term in the scholarly debate, this chapter focuses only on how the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons affects international stability. One important empirical pattern that has shaped how nuclear proliferation is understood concerns the way in which nuclear weapons have spread. The word ‘spread’ appears to suggest that the established nuclear powers have provided other interested nations with (at least a few) operational nuclear warheads. Yet such transfers have never been undertaken. Certainly, states that sought nuclear weapons have often received significant assistance from other nations (Schofield, 2014; Fuhrmann, 2012), sometimes in the form of highly sensitive technologies (Kroenig, 2010). Nonetheless, since all these transfers remained well below the weapons threshold, nations seeking nuclear weapons always had to build them indigenously. Hence, in reality, the spread of nuclear weapons has meant that merely the ambition to possess a nuclear arsenal has spread to additional states, each of which then had to pursue that goal primarily through indigenous efforts. Importantly, since a state’s national efforts to turn its desire for nuclear weapons into reality naturally span several (and sometimes many) years, nuclear proliferation must be conceived of as a process, as opposed to just a single step (Meyer, 1986). This point is reinforced by the fact that 29 out of 39 states that have embarked upon that path (Müller and Schmidt, 2010, p. 157; Mikoyan, 2012; Santoro, 2017) have not acquired a nuclear arsenal. Hence, a lot of nuclear proliferation activity has been undertaken by nations that did not ultimately become nuclear weapon states. Three patterns explain this situation. First, owing not just to the technological, but also the institutional and managerial challenges of the task, some nations simply failed in their efforts to build the bomb (Hymans, 2012; Braut-Hegghammer, 2016). Second, a few countries have chosen a nuclear ‘hedging’ strategy, intentionally confining their efforts to developing the technological capability to build an arsenal quickly while refraining from exercising that option (Narang, 2016–17, p. 134). Third, several states have undertaken a ‘nuclear reversal’, abandoning their nuclear weapons activities before developing nuclear explosive devices (Müller and Schmidt, 2010).

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#### All metrics show the US innovation is way behind

**Kersten ’21** [Alexander; 4/14/21; Director of the Renewing American Innovation Project @ Center for Strategic and International Studies; Master of Arts in Law and Diplomacy from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy @ Tufts University; “Why Renewing American Innovation? The “Endless Frontier Act” and Biden’s Bid for Maintaining U.S. Global Competitiveness”; <https://www.csis.org/analysis/why-renewing-american-innovation-endless-frontier-act-and-bidens-bid-maintaining-us-global>; AS]

The China Challenge

China today poses both a technological and security threat to the United States that no country has in modern history. U.S. companies operating under free market rules struggle to compete against state-backed Chinese firms that can ignore a poor quarter while enjoying one of the largest, most-protected markets in the world. With the support of the central government, key Chinese firms are free to **innovate** and compete in the global market without **financial worries** while Chinese scientists can focus on **r**esearch a**n**d **d**evelopment instead of seeking grants for their university or research institution. According to Tulane University professor and former Aspen Institute CEO Walter Isaacson in 2019, China has modeled its approach along the lines of U.S. scientist Vannevar Bush’s 1945 report Science: The Endless Frontier, which, besides being the inspiration behind the name of the proposed legislative package, promoted government funding of basic research together with universities and industry—a priority of the Franklin D. Roosevelt administration. As the Chinese government sets long-term **strategic goals** like **Made in China 2025**, which was part of China’s 13th Five-Year Plan of 2016-2020, the United States needs to return to its post-World War II values of equating leadership in science and **tech**nology with **national security** and prosperity.

Today, U.S. companies locked in close competition **lack the incentives** to maintain in-house capabilities for **innovation**, like they did in the mid-century era of AT&T’s Bell Labs, DuPont’s central R&D unit, Xerox PARC, and others. Heightened competition, shareholder pressures, and new incentives pushed firms to cut these in-house research units back in the 1980s. Since then, the share of **applied research** in total corporate R&D expenditures fell from **30 percent** in 1985 to **below 20 percent** in 2015—all well below the peak of almost 40 percent in the 1950s. Of course, the Harvard Business Review in 2014 famously suggested that, despite being the source of great inventions throughout history, China today is a “land of rule-bound rote learners” where breakthroughs are rare. Because of this, some argue the Chinese are not great innovators and China’s state-backed system could itself breed complacency and come back to bite it in the near future. However, even by then, experts warn, the United States will have **missed the train** on many important technologies and will be **struggling** to catch up.

Despite **Silicon Valley** and the millennial generation**’s** supposed penchant for innovative disruption, U.S. total factor productivity has been **slowing** since the 1970s. **Productivity** today is the lowest in more than a century. **Innovation**, historically a **clear driver** of U.S. productivity, means the creation of ideas and inventions that are translated into practical value and improve the quality of people’s lives directly or via their ability to grow the economy. Whether measured in terms of triadic **patents** (patents filed in the United States, Europe, and Japan), most available measures of **productivity**, or even **startup** company **creation**, the United States’ trademark innovative spirit has been **gradually dampening** for decades. And if not for China’s meteoric rise this century, the United States might still be sleepwalking—optimistically but without a serious plan—instead of waking up to the need for a coherent national strategy.

U.S. Complacency, and How We Got There

Noted George Mason University economist Tyler Cowen and other **experts** have recognized a growing “complacency” in American life as the indicator of a **societal shift** from the United States’ early dynamism. From the turn of the twentieth century until roughly the moon landing of 1969, the breakneck pace of groundbreaking technologies that directly affected the quality of life and the structure of U.S. society was simply astounding. Yet, since the first moon landing in 1969, only the **internet** and its application to more and more parts of our lives can claim to have made any meaningful impact—meaning that **physically** the world of 1969 is much more like that of **2021** than 1969 was of the early twentieth century. This, of course, is not meant to discredit the great advances in medicine and human genomics made in the last few decades, for example, but to show how the rate of society-changing innovations has **not maintained** the pace that existed from the mid-nineteenth century until roughly 1969.

In the developed world, this slowdown has unfortunately contributed to **wage stagnation**, the shrinking of the **middle class**, and greater political **polarization** domestically. Coinciding with the waning days of the Soviet Union’s power in the 1980s, the U.S. **innovation decline** was masked at home. Further, the Soviets of that period no longer posed a technological threat to the United States. Japan on the other hand, posed a great technological threat in the 1980s but was and is a staunch U.S. ally, and not a security threat. Unchallenged abroad and riding the dual-edged optimism of the internet boom of the 1990s and the victory over communism, the United States **missed the ways** in which it was giving up the advantages that made it such a powerhouse in the mid-twentieth century.

**Industry experts** have also suggested that the **U**nited **S**tates put its position up for grabs when it began to **outsource** important production—which President Biden alluded to during the signing of a February 2021 executive order aimed at reducing supply chain bottlenecks. Starting in the 1970s and 1980s, the United States began to outsource production of **semiconductors** and **displays** mostly to Taiwan and South Korea, which today account for almost half of all semiconductor manufacturing capacity in the world. Further, adding in mainland China and Japan shows that a whopping **three-quarters** of all semiconductor manufacturing capacity comes from East Asia—a **sharp departure** from 1990, when the United States still provided about **50 percent** of all global manufacturing capacity. Removing itself from the production process means the United States misses out on important chances for innovating as well as for developing a strong high-tech manufacturing workforce.

### 1AR---AT: China War

#### Empirics are decisive in favor of de-escalation

Taylor 14 Brendan – Head of the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian and PhD – National Australian University, “The South China Sea is Not a Flashpoint,” The Washington Quarterly, Spring 2014, Volume 34, Issue 1, Taylor & Francis

Finally, the capacity of Beijing and Washington to navigate crises in their bilateral relationship further suggests that the South China Sea is not a flashpoint. Over the past two or more decades, the United States and China **have gone to great lengths** to manage bilateral tensions and prevent them from spiraling out of control. A recent example occurred in May 2012, when the two arrived at a mutually acceptable solution after the blind Chinese activist Chen Guangcheng sought refuge at the U.S. embassy in Beijing.48 In the South China Sea, two major, modern Sino–U.S. crises have been successfully managed. The first occurred in April 2001, when a U.S. EP-3 conducting routine surveillance in airspace above the South China Sea collided with a Chinese J-8 jet fighter and was forced to make an emergency landing on Hainan Island. To be sure, efforts to address this crisis did not initially proceed particularly smoothly, as Chinese officials refused to answer incoming calls from the U.S. Embassy. Ultimately, however, those most intimately involved in the crisis—such as then-Commander of the U.S. Pacific Command, Admiral Dennis Blair—have written subsequently how top U.S. officials “**made every effort to exercise** prudence and **restraint** while they collected more information about the nature of the incident.” They have also acknowledged that their Chinese counterparts “made a series of grudging concessions that ultimately resulted in success…after they decided that **it was important to overall Sino–U.S. relations to solve the incident**.”49 Again in March 2009, while diplomatic tensions between Beijing and Washington heightened in the immediate aftermath of an incident involving the harassment of the USNS Impeccable by five Chinese vessels, good sense also prevailed as senior U.S. and Chinese officials issued statements maintaining that such incidents would not become the norm and pledging deeper cooperation to ensure so.50 Added to these examples of effective crisis management, it is also worth noting that Washington reportedly facilitated a compromise to the April 2012 Scarborough Shoal standoff.51

#### Doesn’t go nuclear

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I read with interest Caitlin Talmadge’s article “Beijing’s Nuclear Option” (November/December 2018), in which she quotes me estimating in 2015 that the odds of a U.S.-Chinese nuclear exchange were “somewhere between nil and zero.” She then goes on to make a case against remaining complacent in the face of the risk of escalation, with no discussion of what is in fact a very high nuclear threshold in a U.S.-Chinese confrontation or conflict. I continue to believe that the chances of nuclear use are very small. Talmadge’s basic argument is that in any conflict with China, the United States will immediately launch a full-scale air and missile assault against military targets in mainland China and against Chinese attack submarines at sea. In so doing, she argues, the United States will inadvertently hit either China’s ballistic missile submarines or its mobile nuclear missiles. That, in turn, will present Chinese leaders with a “use it or lose it” dilemma concerning their nuclear arsenal, and they may well decide to launch a nuclear attack against the United States. Such a scenario is extremely unlikely; indeed, I would say the odds are somewhere between nil and zero. A U.S.-Chinese conflict would be a maritime campaign in which the two sides tried to conquer or defend islands. Attacks on land targets beyond the contested islands and the waters around them, whether carried out by the United States against Chinese territory or by China against U.S. overseas bases, would be aimed at military installations and systems that supported the maritime campaign—ports, air bases, and command-and-control centers. The intercontinental nuclear deterrent forces of both countries are physically separate from these facilities. In addition, U.S. planners are very mindful of the danger of attacking any state’s nuclear arsenal and take extraordinary precautions to avoid doing so. Although there is always a chance for an isolated mistake, it is in fact possible to distinguish nuclear-armed submarines from conventional ones. Likewise, it is possible to distinguish the shorter-range, dual-use missiles that threaten Taiwan, China’s neighbors, and U.S. bases in the Pacific from the intercontinental missiles that threaten the United States. If by mistake a U.S. strike destroyed a land-based medium-range nuclear missile or sank a ballistic missile submarine, China would be greatly concerned, but it is highly unlikely that Beijing would respond by reflexively launching a nuclear attack against the United States. Rather, before even considering violating their long-held “no first use” doctrine, Chinese leaders would wait to see if a concerted, sustained U.S. campaign against their nuclear arsenal was under way. The United States has no incentive to attempt such a campaign and in fact would take every precaution to avoid it. The real danger of escalation in these conflicts would be when a Chinese attempt to capture a disputed island—Taiwan, one of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, or an island in the South China Sea—was failing. A failed attempt to regain territory that the Chinese government has claimed as its own would undermine the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party and could make Beijing desperate enough to threaten the use of nuclear weapons. Again, U.S. planners are aware of that danger and would seek to manage the end of a maritime conflict with China in a way that minimized the incentives for escalation.

### 1AR---AT: Heg

#### No correlation between hegemony and peace

Fettweis ‘17 – Christopher J. Fettweis, Associate Professor of Political Science at Tulane University. [“Unipolarity, Hegemony, and the New Peace,” 5/8/2017, <https://doi-org.proxy.lib.umich.edu/10.1080/09636412.2017.1306394>] KS

Conflict and Hegemony by Region

Even the most ardent supporters of the hegemonic-stability explanation do not contend that US influence extends equally to all corners of the globe. The United States has concentrated its policing in what George Kennan used to call “strong points,” or the most important parts of the world: Western Europe, the Pacific Rim, and Persian Gulf.64 By doing so, Washington may well have contributed more to great power peace than the overall global decline in warfare. If the former phenomenon contributed to the latter, by essentially providing a behavioral model for weaker states to emulate, then perhaps this lends some support to the hegemonic-stability case.65 During the Cold War, the United States played referee to a few intra-West squabbles, especially between Greece and Turkey, and provided Hobbesian reassurance to Germany's nervous neighbors. Other, equally plausible explanations exist for stability in the first world, including the presence of a common enemy, democracy, economic interdependence, general war aversion, etc. The looming presence of the leviathan is certainly among these plausible explanations, but only inside the US sphere of influence. Bipolarity was bad for the nonaligned world, where Soviet and Western intervention routinely exacerbated local conflicts. Unipolarity has generally been much better, but whether or not this was due to US action is again unclear.

Overall US interest in the affairs of the Global South has dropped markedly since the end of the Cold War, as has the level of violence in almost all regions. There is less US intervention in the political and military affairs of Latin America compared to any time in the twentieth century, for instance, and also less conflict. Warfare in Africa is at an all-time low, as is relative US interest outside of counterterrorism and security assistance.66 Regional peace and stability exist where there is US active intervention, as well as where there is not. No direct relationship seems to exist across regions.

If intervention can be considered a function of direct and indirect activity, of both political and military action, a regional picture might look like what is outlined in Table 1.

These assessments of conflict are by necessity relative, because there has not been a “high” level of conflict in any region outside the Middle East during the period of the New Peace. Putting aside for the moment that important caveat, some points become clear. The great powers of the world are clustered in the upper right quadrant, where US intervention has been high, but conflict levels low. US intervention is imperfectly correlated with stability, however. Indeed, it is conceivable that the relatively high level of US interest and activity has made the security situation in the Persian Gulf and broader Middle East worse. In recent years, substantial hard power investments (Somalia, Afghanistan, Iraq), moderate intervention (Libya), and reliance on diplomacy (Syria) have been equally ineffective in stabilizing states torn by conflict. While it is possible that the region is essentially unpacifiable and no amount of police work would bring peace to its people, it remains hard to make the case that the US presence has improved matters. In this “strong point,” at least, US hegemony has failed to bring peace.

In much of the rest of the world, the United States has not been especially eager to enforce any particular rules. Even rather incontrovertible evidence of genocide has not been enough to inspire action. Washington's intervention choices have at best been erratic; Libya and Kosovo brought about action, but much more blood flowed uninterrupted in Rwanda, Darfur, Congo, Sri Lanka, and Syria. The US record of peacemaking is not exactly a long uninterrupted string of successes. During the turn-of-the-century conventional war between Ethiopia and Eritrea, a high-level US delegation containing former and future National Security Advisors (Anthony Lake and Susan Rice) made a half-dozen trips to the region, but was unable to prevent either the outbreak or recurrence of the conflict. Lake and his team shuttled back and forth between the capitals with some frequency, and President Clinton made repeated phone calls to the leaders of the respective countries, offering to hold peace talks in the United States, all to no avail.67 The war ended in late 2000 when Ethiopia essentially won, and it controls the disputed territory to this day.

The Horn of Africa is hardly the only region where states are free to fight one another today without fear of serious US involvement. Since they are choosing not to do so with increasing frequency, something else is probably affecting their calculations. Stability exists even in those places where the potential for intervention by the sheriff is minimal. Hegemonic stability can only take credit for influencing those decisions that would have ended in war without the presence, whether physical or psychological, of the United States. It seems hard to make the case that the relative peace that has descended on so many regions is primarily due to the kind of heavy hand of the neoconservative leviathan, or its lighter, more liberal cousin. Something else appears to be at work.

Conflict and US Military Spending

How does one measure polarity? Power is traditionally considered to be some combination of military and economic strength, but despite scores of efforts, no widely accepted formula exists. Perhaps overall military spending might be thought of as a proxy for hard power capabilities; perhaps too the amount of money the United States devotes to hard power is a reflection of the strength of the unipole. When compared to conflict levels, however, there is no obvious correlation, and certainly not the kind of negative relationship between US spending and conflict that many hegemonic stability theorists would expect to see.

During the 1990s, the United States cut back on defense by about 25 percent, spending $100 billion less in real terms in 1998 that it did in 1990.68 To those believers in the neoconservative version of hegemonic stability, this irresponsible “peace dividend” endangered both national and global security. “No serious analyst of American military capabilities doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet America's responsibilities to itself and to world peace,” argued Kristol and Kagan at the time.69 The world grew dramatically more peaceful while the United States cut its forces, however, and stayed just as peaceful while spending rebounded after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the military budget was cut under President Clinton, in other words, and kept declining (though more slowly, since levels were already low) as the Bush administration ramped it back up. Overall US military spending has varied during the period of the New Peace from a low in constant dollars of less than $400 billion to a high of more than $700 billion, but war does not seem to have noticed. The same nonrelationship exists between other potential proxy measurements for hegemony and conflict: there does not seem to be much connection between warfare and fluctuations in US GDP, alliance commitments, and forward military presence. There was very little fighting in Europe when there were 300,000 US troops stationed there, for example, and that has not changed as the number of Americans dwindled by 90 percent. Overall, there does not seem to be much correlation between US actions and systemic stability. Nothing the United States actually does seems to matter to the New Peace.

### 1AR---AT: Prolif

#### Assurances are collapsing

Kulikov 20 - political analyst at New Age (Valery, <https://www.newagebd.net/article/117263/nato-in-danger-of-falling-apart>, EM)

AFTER the collapse of the Soviet Union, the objective need for NATO to exist vanished. However, instead of dissolving itself, the alliance is strenuously turning Europe into a target for a nuclear strike, wrote Contra Magazin. Already very tired of Anglo-Saxon hegemony, Italy, Germany and France are talking more and more about a potential threat from the United States, while at the same time considering creation of a European army free of NATO control. After the 1990s, NATO began to unify Eastern European countries under the auspices of Washington, becoming an instrument for conducting military actions outside the territories of its members in the interests of the United States. However, not everyone unquestioningly agrees with the alliance’s strategy, which hurts the unity of this military alliance and deepens contradictions between its members. Also, political elites of the leading member countries have become increasingly aware that their interests often not only fail to coincide with the interests of their partners in the military bloc, but sometimes go directly against them, which results in yesterday’s allies increasingly interfering with each other. And this is confirmed not only by the situation off the coast of Libya and the support of the opposing participants in the Libyan conflict by individual NATO members, but also by the Syrian conflict, where Washington and Ankara often come into confrontation with each other, and in some cases behave like outright enemies. Experts and politicians have been talking about the crisis of the North Atlantic Alliance for several dozen years by now. The first surge of such assessments is associated with the decision of Charles de Gaulle to withdraw France from the military integrated structures of the Alliance in 1966 and to transfer NATO headquarters from Paris to Brussels. During the global financial and economic crisis of 2008, against the background of cuts in government spending, NATO countries had to tackle a very difficult task of maintaining adequate military forces and means. In this light, most Alliance member states were forced to cut defense spending, an excessive disproportion arose between the military spending of the United States and European allies (in 2012 – 72 per cent to 28 per cent), the gap between the military capabilities of European NATO members increased (Great Britain – 6.9 per cent of total expenses, Germany – 4.6 per cent, Italy – 2 per cent). Over time, these problems have only intensified, in particular by the addition of new ones. For example, in late June this year, at a press conference at the White House with Polish president Andrzej Duda, US president Donald Trump called the level of military spending at 2 per cent of the GDP of NATO member countries ‘insufficient’, urging all countries that are part the alliance to ‘pay a fair share.’ On August 27, at the Assembly of the US Republican Party, president Trump once again declared himself the main advocate for increasing defence spending by NATO member states. However, a significant number of European politicians today are more inclined to reduce the military budget of their countries, especially given the current financial and economic problems. In addition, an increasing number of politicians (especially in the Baltics) who recently started to actively offer their countries for the deployment of American troops, naturally at the expense of ‘American security guarantees’, see in this an opportunity to reduce their national military spending and to transfer budget funds to other domestic expenses instead. Thus, according to err.ee., an Estonian information resource, the Minister of Finance of the country Martin Helme (Conservative People’s Party, EKRE) recently proposed to cut the state’s military spending by € 50 million. Alliances and security guarantees were once viewed as the most serious obligations a state can undertake. Today, however, Washington is handing out security guarantees like a hotel administrator — candy to its guests: everybody gets one, plus an extra piece to anyone who asks for it. However, it is believed that such obligations are worthless, notes The National Interest. And this circumstance was confirmed in light of recent events in the Eastern Mediterranean and the attitude of the alliance countries to the policies and actions of Turkey. As a result of Ankara’s recent actions, Turkey has made its presence felt from the Middle East to the Eastern Mediterranean and North Africa, which has increased the risk of confrontation and friction within NATO. Since early summer, after the contradictions arose in relation to the conflict in Libya, which reached the level of aggressive actions undertaken by the crews of the warships of the Turkish and French navies, mutual claims of the two countries intensified. They then escalated further over the manoeuvres that the French undertook jointly with the Greeks and Cypriots in the Eastern Mediterranean. As a result, Ankara accused Paris of violating the agreements on military presence in Cyprus, stepping up its manoeuvres in the Eastern Mediterranean region in response. After that, the French president, commenting on the situation, said that the actions of Turkey ‘are not like the actions of a NATO ally’, and added that Turkey has been acting this way for several years, ignoring allied relations within the framework of the North Atlantic Alliance. Recently, a sharp deterioration in relations between Turkey and another NATO member, Greece, due to gas deposits in the disputed Mediterranean region, has been added to the contradictions between Turkey and France. The conflict continues to escalate, dividing Europe into two camps. But it turned out to be difficult for the alliance to resolve the internal crisis, as it always withdrew from solving Turkish problems. Against the backdrop of the risk of a military escalation between NATO members, its Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg has so far limited himself to calls for ‘dialogue’ and ‘de-escalation.’ And the members of the alliance do not show unity in assessing Ankara’s actions, which, in particular, is evidenced by the refusal of 22 out of 30 NATO members to support France’s demand to take a more firm position on Ankara. A potential conflict, the likelihood of which at the moment is high enough, indicates that NATO is going through far from the best times. One can get the impression that the NATO leadership is either openly disregarding the interests of the European allies, who are already ready to take up arms, or Brussels is following the secret instructions of Washington, which intends to benefit from Europe weakened by a potential war. Vice-dean of the Turkish Kadir Has University, lecturer in international pelations, Professor Mitat Çelikpala believes that the alliance’s relations do not work in the Eastern Mediterranean. The conflict between the three NATO countries (France, Turkey, Greece) can only be controlled by a very large player, i.e. the United States, especially since it is currently exercising control on behalf of NATO in the Mediterranean basin. The very fact that such frictions are generally possible between allies in the alliance, threatening to escalate into armed clashes, nullifies the morale-boosting rhetoric of Brussels about some ephemeral “unity and solidarity” of the bloc members. After all, union or not, the national interests take the cake.

#### No spread AND no impact

Schneider, Senior Researcher, 19 (Jonas, at the Center for Security Studies, 9-7-19 “Chapter 26: Nuclear Proliferation and International Security.” Understanding Global Politics: Actors and Themes in International Affairs, edited by Klaus Larres and Ruth Wittlinger, Routledge, pp. 409–425.

Other analysts have sounded a much less alarmist tone, however. Some scholars even suggested that an Iranian bomb held great potential for stabilising an unbalanced and volatile Middle East (Waltz, 2012). Closer to the mainstream of Western strategic discourse, various experts have argued that despite the risks of proliferation, nuclear weapons, and the deterrent they provide should get (more) credit for contributing, in combination with other factors, to what has been labelled ‘the Long Peace’ among the great powers since 1945 (Gaddis, 1999, p. 268–271; Gavin, 2012a, p. 164; Acton 2010, pp. 16–17). Still others have contended that because nuclear proliferation is such a rare phenomenon, and since robust nonproliferation measures tend to be disruptive, the net destabilising effect of new nuclear countries is quite small and, therefore, manageable (Mueller 2010, pp. 95–99; Hymans 2013, pp. 293–296). The question of whether nuclear proliferation has stabilising or destabilising effects is not just fascinating for scholars of the nuclear age, but also highly consequential for practical policy issues. For in order to debate the merits of particular policy choices – such as preventive military strikes against nuclear facilities, grand bargains with potential proliferators or complete nuclear disarmament – we need to understand first how the spread of nuclear weapons impacts regional and global security. The chapter proceeds in three steps. The first section provides the foundation for the other parts by summarising what we know about empirical patterns of proliferation and the utility of nuclear weapons for statecraft. The second section then engages the literature on the consequences of proliferation, focusing in particular on how proliferation has influenced international stability. The final section explores whether some states have been more affected than others, and what measures these states have taken to prevent proliferation, or at least mitigate its negative consequences. Patterns of nuclear proliferation and the utility of nuclear weapons Nuclear proliferation is commonly defined as the spread of nuclear weapons to states that did not previously have them. Within a broader conceptual framework that is rarely used by scholars, yet popular in the arms control community, this diffusion of nuclear weapons to additional states is labelled horizontal proliferation. It is conceptually accompanied by the notion of vertical proliferation, which refers to qualitative improvements and increases in the number of nuclear weapons in the stockpiles of existing nuclear weapon states. In accordance with the typical usage of the term in the scholarly debate, this chapter focuses only on how the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons affects international stability. One important empirical pattern that has shaped how nuclear proliferation is understood concerns the way in which nuclear weapons have spread. The word ‘spread’ appears to suggest that the established nuclear powers have provided other interested nations with (at least a few) operational nuclear warheads. Yet such transfers have never been undertaken. Certainly, states that sought nuclear weapons have often received significant assistance from other nations (Schofield, 2014; Fuhrmann, 2012), sometimes in the form of highly sensitive technologies (Kroenig, 2010). Nonetheless, since all these transfers remained well below the weapons threshold, nations seeking nuclear weapons always had to build them indigenously. Hence, in reality, the spread of nuclear weapons has meant that merely the ambition to possess a nuclear arsenal has spread to additional states, each of which then had to pursue that goal primarily through indigenous efforts. Importantly, since a state’s national efforts to turn its desire for nuclear weapons into reality naturally span several (and sometimes many) years, nuclear proliferation must be conceived of as a process, as opposed to just a single step (Meyer, 1986). This point is reinforced by the fact that 29 out of 39 states that have embarked upon that path (Müller and Schmidt, 2010, p. 157; Mikoyan, 2012; Santoro, 2017) have not acquired a nuclear arsenal. Hence, a lot of nuclear proliferation activity has been undertaken by nations that did not ultimately become nuclear weapon states. Three patterns explain this situation. First, owing not just to the technological, but also the institutional and managerial challenges of the task, some nations simply failed in their efforts to build the bomb (Hymans, 2012; Braut-Hegghammer, 2016). Second, a few countries have chosen a nuclear ‘hedging’ strategy, intentionally confining their efforts to developing the technological capability to build an arsenal quickly while refraining from exercising that option (Narang, 2016–17, p. 134). Third, several states have undertaken a ‘nuclear reversal’, abandoning their nuclear weapons activities before developing nuclear explosive devices (Müller and Schmidt, 2010).